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ABSTRACT 
Government’s equity role in the minerals sector is one of the nationalist measures to have a 
greater control and management of mineral resources in a country. This study looks into 
evaluation of government equity participation in the minerals sector in which Tanzania is a 
case study from 1996 to 2015. Amongst the objectives of the study was the determination of 
the number of mineral rights, minimum allowable exploration expenditures in Prospecting 
Licences (PLs) and forms of equity role of Tanzanian government in the minerals sector with 
their projects. Methodology of research included going through the background of the study, 
literature review, collection of data and analysis of PLs, Mining Licences (MLs) and Special 
Mining Licences (SMLs) to mention a few.  
Some of results of the research have indicated that, there were106 mineral rights (97 PLs, 3 
MLs and 6 SMLs). State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) and National Development 
Corporation (NDC) as parastatals and Treasury Registrar (TR), a government agent owned 
these mineral rights on the behalf of the Tanzanian government (TZGT). It was also found 
that there are three forms of equity role namely: carried equity, paid equity and free carry 
equity that were applicable in prospecting, medium and large scale mining in the country. 
Carried equity role was applied in 56 PLs, 3 medium scale mines and 4 large scale mines. 
The three medium scale mines in which carried equity role was applied were Merelani 
TanzaniteOne Mining Ltd (MTM), Kigosi Gold Mine (KGM) and Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM). On 
the other hand, carried equity role was also exercised in the four large scale mines namely:  
Buckreef Gold Mine (BKGM), Liganga Iron ore Mine (LIOM), Mchuchuma Coal Mine (MCM) 
and Williamson Diamonds Mine (WDM).  
Paid equity role was applied in 41 PLs and 2 large scale mines namely: Kiwira Coal Mine 
(KCM and Stamigold Biharamulo Mine (SBM). Although the Mining Act, 2010 defines the free 
carry equity in terms of the free carried interest (FCI), this equity role approach is not yet in 
practice in Tanzania. In 2014, TZGT planned to execute free carry equity in Nachu Graphite 
Project (NGRP) and Mkuju River Uranium Project (MRUP).  Negotiations for having free 
carried interest (FCI) for each project were conducted between the TZGT and project’s 
owners from 2014 to 2015. In 2015, negotiations between parties were concluded 
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unsuccessful, as parties could not reach consensus on FCIs. This consequently impeded 
signing of minerals development agreements (MDAs), which also limited execution of the free 
carry equity role by the government.   
Research revealed also that there were a number of challenges or shortfalls faced by the 
TZGT equity role strategy in the mineral sector. One of the major challenge was the secrecy 
in agreements and contracts entered between the TZGT and the private sector investors 
through various business ownerships and mineral developments pertaining the minerals 
sector. This in turn resulted to non-transparency and unaccountability in the prospecting and 
mining, which risked TZGT entering unfair and/or objectionable agreements or contracts.  
Some of the conclusions were counter productivity of TZGT equity role and inadequacy of 
financial benefits realised from the strategy. These conclusions demonstrated ineffective 
performance of equity role of the Tanzanian government in prospecting, medium and large 
scale mining. Recommendations given in this research study report, is that, the government 
should review the Mining Act and Regulations of 2010. This is to allow the government 
incorporation of Parliament in the handling of agreements or contracts in the minerals sector. 
Moreover, proposition of fixed rates of FCI is among areas of future research work. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
Unlike other natural resources, mineral resources (e.g., gold, coal, iron, gypsum, diamond, 
stones, tanzanite, gas, oil, etc.) cannot be renewed once depleted (Barma et al, 2012). These 
resources are regarded as opportunities by the host countries. Government can grant private 
companies mining rights to extract these mineral resources, or have a stake in the companies 
or establish state companies to oversee its interests in the minerals sector. The establishment 
of a state company to oversee government interests in the minerals sector implies a direct 
participation of government in the sector, through equity participation. Equity participation 
/role is defined as the action of individual(s) or body corporate to hold shares in an enterprise, 
company or asset (Otto, nd.; Brown, 2013; Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015b).  
However, it is important to note that economic viability of the mineral resources determines 
establishment of mines to exploit minerals other than oil and/or gas (e.g., gold, coal, iron, 
etc.) and wells for oil and/or gas. In these mines and wells, local citizens secure variety of 
employments and local content opportunities, which raise their incomes. Mineral resource 
exploitation is also the source of government revenues through tax paid by operating mining 
companies. 
Production and selling of mineral products enable government to collect revenues through 
royalties, corporate income taxes and other legal means. In addition to revenues, they 
contribute mineral products whose sales are useful in determining minerals sector’s 
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (Otto et al, 2006; Wise and Shtylla, 2007). Where 
there are good government policies, the minerals sector can integrate with other sectors of 
the economy to establish downstream industries, etc. (Highley et al, 2004; Ministry of Energy 
and Minerals, 2009).  
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In this research study, good government policies are the implementable and result-oriented 
plans or courses of action of the government that influence and determine decisions, actions 
and other matters in the interest of national community (Businessdictionary, 2017a; 
Freedictionary, 2017; Bendiola, 2013). 
The sectors of the economy which can be integrated with the minerals sector or industry 
include agriculture, energy, manufacturing, construction, transportation, etc. (Highley et al, 
2004; Wise and Shtylla, 2007; Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2009). Through the 
integration of different sectors of the economy, various business industries emerge.  These 
businesses are important for both government revenue earnings and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) contribution through their products and services produced and sold, 
respectively. The government earned revenues have to be kept in the treasury to be reserved 
as coffers useful for government budgeting and spending. It is worth underlining here that a 
government is obliged to incorporate and/or integrate well its mineral resources benefits into 
the country’s national development plan. This is to enable them to contribute to the country’s 
and local citizens’ economic prosperities (National Planning Commission, 2011). Some of the 
common economic prosperities that can be attained or achieved in most countries are 
mentioned as follows (Palagashvili, nd.):   
 Increased GDP and GDP per capita; 
 Increased accumulated country’s foreign reserves in the central banks and/or 
international banks; 
 Increased human development index (HDI); 
 Increased government provision of social services, social protection and infrastructure 
(e.g., water, roads, power, logistics; communications, water, etc.); 
 Increased income-generating employments; 
 Adequate and increased entrepreneurships and livelihood activities; and 
 Increased government and /or local citizens’ equity roles in enterprises. 
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However, in order for the minerals sector to contribute more to the nation’s and local citizens’ 
economic prosperities, the following are amongst the necessities: 
 Government establishment or improvement of fiscal policy for taxation in the minerals 
sector and government spending of collected taxes from the sector (Pfister, 2009: 
Sunley and Baunsgaard, 2001); 
 Strong government administration and management of the minerals sector with 
respect to established or improved mineral sector’s policy and legal and regulatory 
frameworks (Barma et al, 2012; Bryan and Hofmann, 2007); 
 Government execution of implementable and result-oriented actions in attaining of 
nation’s and local citizens’ economic prosperities proportionate to its earnings received 
from the minerals sector (Greener et al, 2015; United Nations, 2013 and nd.; Hadi, 
2016); and 
 Government political will for enabling the achievement of the above three requirements 
(Bryan and Hofmann, 2007; Man-wai, nd.). 
Table 1.1 depicts activities and/or actions pertaining to government establishment or 
improvement of fiscal policy, strong government administration and management of the 
minerals sector, government execution of implementable and result-oriented actions and 
political will. 
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Table 1.1 Some activities for achieving economic prosperities via minerals sectors 
Requirement/Issue Activity and /or action 
Government establishment of new or improvement 
of existing fiscal policy for taxation in the minerals 
sector and government spending of such collected 
taxes or revenues. 
Establishment of new or strengthening of existing legal and regulatory frameworks in introducing 
taxes in minerals sector, collection of such taxes or revenues and government spending of the 
same (Pfister, 2009: Sunley and Baunsgaard, 2001). 
Strong government administration and management 
of the minerals sector with respect to established or 
improved minerals sector’s policy and legal and 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
 
Establishment of new or strengthening of existing legal and regulatory frameworks (Barma et al, 
2012; Bryan and Hofmann, 2007; African Union, 2009). 
Establishment of new or strengthening of existing institutional frameworks (African National 
Congress, 2012; Lopes, 2013). 
Establishment of new or strengthening of existing institutional assessment frameworks for 
assessing institutions overseeing the whole minerals sector in the country (Barma et al, 2012; 
African National Congress, 2012). 
Control of value chains (from exploration to selling points) of mineral products including adequate 
and timely revenue collection and control of misinvoicing (transfer pricing) and/or financial 
manipulation to deter tax evasion (African National Congress, 2012; Marah, 2014). 
Control of safety, occupational health and environmental protection (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 1997 and 2000; Smith, 2016). 
Government improvement of public accountability and transparency and avoidance or prevention 
of corruption, mineral rent seeking and conflicts or civil wars in the management of the minerals 
sector (Marah, 2014; Gilman, 2005; Barma et al, 2012). 
Government execution of implementable and result-
oriented actions in attaining nation’s and local 
citizens’ economic prosperities proportionate to its 
earnings received from the minerals sector 
Government provision of social services (e.g., education, food subsidies, etc.), social protection 
(e.g., pensions, medical insurance, etc.) and infrastructure (e.g., water, roads, power, logistics, 
communications, water, etc.) to the local people through spending of revenues collected from 
sectors of economy including minerals sector boosted by mineral booms (Greener et al, 2015; 
United Nations, 2013 and nd.; Hadi, 2016). 
Government accumulation of international reserves in central and abroad banks and avoidance 
or prevention of overspending during minerals boom periods (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). 
Government payment of external debts to stabilize growth on one hand and enabling of the 
minerals sector to integrate other sectors of economy on the other, during minerals boom periods 
(Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). 
Public accountability and transparency in actions taken by government in improving country’s and 
local citizens’ economic prosperities (Marah, 2014; Lopes, 2013). 
Government political will for enabling the 
achievement of the above three requirements 
respectively. 
Full government support of financial and human resources as well as taking legal actions against 
corrupt personnel and other defaulters (Bryan and Hofmann, 2007; Man-wai, nd.).  
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It is important to note here that, not every country endowed with mineral resources is with 
high economic growth and developments. There are many reasons that trigger this shortfall. 
Table 1.2 depicts some factors that attributed to less economic growth and developments to 
both Equatorial Guinea (EQG) and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 1965 to 
2015 despite their mineral booms in that period respectively. 
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Table 1.2 Factors that attributed to less economic growth and developments in EQG and DRC  
Some factors that attributed to less economic 
growth and developments 
Some government actions/activities in translating 
mineral booms into economic prosperities 
Consequences of government not utilizing mineral 
booms properly 
A: Equatorial Guinea with oil boom 
 Higher rates of authoritarianism, kleptocracy, 
corruption, as well as non-transparency and 
unaccountability in oil production contracts, oil 
revenues and expenditures to the public from 1968 
to 2015 (Nunez, 2013; McSherry, 2006; Solomon, 
2012; Equatorial Guinea Justice, 2010). 
 
 None or poor government enabling of the mineral 
sector to integrate other sectors of the economy, 
and promotion of entrepreneurships and livelihood 
activities to its local people (African Economic 
Outlook, 2012a; International Finance Corporation, 
nd.).  
 
 In 2013, Equatorial Guinea scored Human 
Development Index (HDI) of   0.554, having a 
136th position in the world (out 186 countries) 
despite its GDP per capita being US$32,026 
higher than US$27,541 of Republic of Korea (not 
endowed with mineral resources). ROK yet 
scored HDI of 0.909 in the same year. (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2013). 
 
 In 2013, more than 60% of the population lived in 
extreme poverty (less than US$700 per year) 
despite average per capital income of US$32,026 
highest in the continent (Forgét, 2013). 
B: Democratic Republic of the Congo with mineral (copper, coltan, diamond, tin, zinc, oil) booms 
 Higher rates of authoritarianism, kleptocracy, 
corruption, civil wars, as well as non-transparency 
and unaccountability in mining contracts, mineral 
resource revenues and expenditures to the public 
from 1965 to 2015 (Bwana, nd.; Solomon, 2012; 
Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015a). 
 
 None or poor government enabling of the mineral 
sector to integrate other sectors of the economy, 
and promotion of entrepreneurships and livelihood 
activities to its local people (African Economic 
Outlook, 2012b; Lyenda, 2005). 
 
 
 In 2013, the DRC scored HDI of 0.304, the last 
position in the world (out of 186 countries). It also 
scored GDP per capita of US$329 making it the 
poorest country in the world (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2013). 
 
 In 2013, 71% of the population lived below the 
poverty level (African Development Bank, 2013). 
 
 Institutional incapacity and weak legal and 
regulatory frameworks, e.g., 9 of at least 45 ‘shell’ 
companies incorporated in the British Virgin 
Islands as ‘speculators’ acquired Congolese 
mining assets at lower market values and sold 
them to multinational firms to obtain huge profits 
(Marah, 2014). 
 Misinvoicing practices of under-invoicing of mining 
assets between 2010 and 2012 that caused a loss 
of US$1.4 billion to the DRC government 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2010; Marah, 
2014). 
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From Table 1.2, factors that hindered economic growth for EQG and DRC maybe classified 
in three major groups namely:  
 Fiscal policy factors which include the followings; 
 Non-transparency and unaccountability in oil revenues and expenditures to the 
public from 1965 to 2015 for both EQG and DRC; 
 Institutional incapacity and weak legal and regulatory frameworks, e.g., nine of 
at least 45 ‘shell’ companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands as 
‘speculators’ acquired Congolese mining assets at lower market values and 
sold them to multi-national firms to obtain huge profits (Marah, 2014); and 
 Misinvoicing practices of under-invoicing of mining assets between 2010 and 
2012 that caused a loss of US$1.4 billion to the DRC government (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2010; Marah, 2014). 
 Political factors which include authoritarianism, kleptocracy for both of these countries 
with inclusion of civil wars for DRC; 
 Ethical factors which include corruption, non-transparency and unaccountability in oil 
production contracts to the public from 1965 to 2015 to both EQG and DRC; and 
 
Poor fiscal policy environment led to failure for EQG and DRC governments to collect optimal 
revenues, which attributed to the aforementioned losses presumably leading to countries’ 
less economic prosperities. There was also a problem of non-transparency and 
unaccountability in oil revenues and expenditures to the public from 1965 to 2015 to both 
EQG and DRC. This was a repugnant to the principles of fiscal policies, which require 
transparency and accountability in taxation and expenditures. If political factors are undealt 
with, they undermine the governments’ political will to the mineral law enforcers and/or 
regulators in dealing with factors negatively affecting the economic achievements. On the 
other hand, resolving of ethical factors would improve ethical conducts of law enforcers and/or 
regulators on the enforcement of the countries’ fiscal and mineral policies together with their 
legal and regulatory frameworks.   
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From Table 1.2, EQG and DRC governments failed to translate mineral booms they were 
fortuned into economic prosperities making their local citizens impoverished to abject levels. 
As seen further in Table 1.2 there were none or poor governments enabling of the mineral 
sectors to integrate other sectors of countries’ economies. In addition, both EQG and DRC 
governments meagerly promoted entrepreneurships and livelihood activities to its local 
citizens (African Economic Outlook, 2012b; Lyenda, 2005). The sampled countries’ lower 
scores in human development indices notably: 0.554 for EQG in 2013 and 0.304 for DRC in 
the same year evidenced these facts (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). 
Given the definition of the resource curse from Natural Resource Governance Institute 
(2015a) and Solomon (2012), it is evident that EQG and DRC underwent resource curse 
phenomenon for having less developments despite being rich in mineral resource endowment 
in the period 1965-2015. Major causes of resource curse include ‘Dutch disease’, lack of 
democracy, conflicts, corruption, rent seeking, inefficient spending and borrowing (Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, 2015a; Brinčíková, 2016; Solomon, 2012). 
Dutch disease’ is defined as the bad effect of increased exchange rate of local currency in 
undermining prosperity of certain industries of economy in a country (Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 2015a; Brinčíková, 2016; Solomon, 2012). In ‘Dutch disease’, imports 
at local market tend to become cheaper than products produced from agriculture and 
manufacturing industries within the country. This is due to high production costs attributed to 
high labour costs, which cause exports from the same sectors to become more expensive. 
This consequently make the local sectors less competitive, thus, their prosperities 
undermined (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015a; Brinčíková, 2016). However, it 
is important to note that skilled labour scarcity causes high labour costs in the aforementioned 
industries. High skilled labour scarcity is a result of high migration of labour from agriculture 
and manufacturing sectors to the minerals sector for it having greener pastures, which might 
be alluded to mineral booms (Brinčíková, 2016). 
Mineral resource wealth especially oil wealth has been the causative of some governments 
to become or remain authoritarian for over years undermining democracy (Natural Resource 
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Governance Institute (2015a). In authoritarian governments where lack of democracy exists, 
personal freedoms are subject to the orders and controls of the governments. In situation like 
this, governments take advantage of the calmness of the citizens to deprive their welfare 
needs and other rights despite financial benefits realisation from their minerals sectors 
(Nunez, 2013; Greener et al, 2015; Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015a; Bwana, 
nd; Equatorial Guinea Justice, 2010). 
On conflicts, natural resources including mineral resources have been causing provocations, 
and sustaining of internal conflicts as different groups fight for control of the resources or use 
natural resources to finance their fighting (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015a).  
For instance during the civil war in DRC between November 1998 and April 1999, a total of 
1,000 to 1,500 tonnage of coltan stockpiles belonging to the Belgian-Zairian company Société 
Minière et Industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI), the principal producer of the commodity were 
looted (Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2013). The rebel group Rassamblement 
Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) operating in DRC was involved in the looting of the 
coltan (Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2013).  
Economic Development Department (2017) defines corruption as “the misuse of entrusted 
power for private gain”. Corruption acts may include bribery, conflict of interest, 
embezzlement, influence, favouritism and nepotism, etc. (Economic Development 
Department, 2017). Some of the areas mostly affected by corruption in the minerals industry 
include:  
 Licencing of the mineral rights useful for commodity value chain from exploration to 
the selling points (Wolfe and Williams, 2015); 
 Auditing of desirable projects’ net profits before and after taxes for companies’ 
payments of the corporate income taxes and dividends to the shareholders (Thuronyi, 
1996; Guj et al, 2013); and 
 Valuation of minerals’ values where undervaluation can take place for royalties and 
other taxes’ evasions (Oomes and Vocke, 2003; Guj et al, 2013).  
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Therefore, when corruption practices become extreme in the mineral-rich countries chances 
are high for such countries to lose substantial revenues. This would undermine the economic 
prosperities of the countries and their local citizens. 
Fischer (2004) describes rent seeking as an ability to capture incomes without producing 
output or making a productive contribution. Cases of rent seeking have also appeared in the 
mineral-rich countries. For instance, in 2003, the Equatorial Guinea's ruler, Teodoro Obiang 
Nguema Mbasogo, deposited US$500 million in his private bank account in the United States 
of America alleged to be sourced through rent seeking in oil deals in his country (Lashmar, 
2003). Had the benefits of this money been reciprocated to the of EQG’s community through 
wealth creation they would have significantly added an impact on country’s and local citizen’s 
economic prosperities. 
Some mineral-rich countries have also experienced less economic growth and developments 
aggravated by inefficient spending and borrowing (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 
2015a). This normally happens when mineral-rich countries tend to spend and borrow hugely 
when experiencing rapid economic expansion period (boom) because of revenues realised 
from commodities of high or stable likely prices (Haslam and Heidrich, 2016; Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, 2015a; Amadeo, 2017). In this period countries endowed 
with minerals tend to invest hugely in lavish and legacy projects such as monuments, airports, 
etc., whilst undermining spending on education, health and other social services. However, 
when commodities’ prices fall, a period of economic contraction (burst) emanates. In the burst 
situation countries enter into serious debt crises, people lose their jobs and a wide spread 
bankruptcy to private sector occurs like a case in Nigeria, Mexico and Venezuela in 1980 
(Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015a; Haslam and Heidrich, 2016).  
In order to tackle resource curse, measurements’ activities or actions expressed in Table 1.1 
are useful as the government can apply them. In addition, government is responsible for direct 
solving of lack of democracy, conflicts, corruption, etc., as sources of resource curse once 
they happen in the country. Solution for such problems would mostly be government being 
accommodative to democratic society, resolving of conflicts as well as prevention and 
combating of corruption. Nevertheless, some governments apart from applying 
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aforementioned approaches in tackling resource curse may also incorporate resource 
nationalism actions (Leon, 2015). 
Resource nationalism is defined is a strategy where governments use economic nationalist 
policies to improve local returns or domestic benefits from resource industries (Wilson, 2015; 
Leon, 2015). According to Wilson (2015) and Leon (2015), a government can employ different 
measures in improving local returns from country’s natural resources. This is in line with 
deriving a significant share of economic benefits that accrue from exploitation of resources. 
Measures or actions applicable in expressing resource nationalism can vary from country to 
country, however the common ones include: 
 Government  imposition or increase of royalties or mining taxes; 
 Mandatory local contents including mandated beneficiation, locally procurement of 
goods and services as well as employment of locals; 
 Government equity role or participation; 
 Government fiscal measures for stabilisation and functioning of the country’s 
economy;  
 Preview of mining contracts with a view of possible renegotiation or cancellation; and 
 Equity role of local citizens through government empowerment initiatives. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned forms of resource nationalism have been variably applied 
in a number of mineral-rich countries of different economic systems. To mention a few, 
countries include Germany, Botswana, Chile, DRC, Angola, Norway, etc. (Sturesson et al, 
2015; Solomon, 2012; Debswana Diamond Company (Pty) Ltd, 2014; Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 2015b). 
In addition, some of these methods, especially government equity role in mineral extractive 
projects, have been useful in some countries’ minerals sectors. Four forms in which 
government equity role in minerals sector can take place include paid (full equity), carried 
equity, free equity and free carry equity (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015b, 
McPherson, 2008; Cottarelli, 2012). Minerals sectors in such countries have positively 
contributed to the countries and local citizens’ economic prosperities. For instance, in 1994, 
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the Botswana government equity role through Debswana Diamond Company (Pty) influenced 
the industry’s contribution of 42.2% to the GDP. This consequently resulted into GDP per 
capita of approximately US$5,239 and HDI of 0.670, which were among the highest in Africa 
at that time (African Development Bank, 2016). 
Looking into Tanzania, since 1884 to date, the country has been having equity role in the 
minerals sector as one way of expressing resource nationalism (Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals, 2015a). Historically, Tanzania is the country that emanated from the union of the 
two republics namely, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. In regulating the minerals sector in 
Tanzania, the government enforced five (5) mining laws from 1920 to date and these are: 
 Mining Ordinance of 1920, active from 1920 to 1928; 
 Mining Ordinance of 1929, active from 1929 to 1978; 
 Tanzania Mining Act of 1979, active from1979 to 1997; 
 Tanzania Mining Act of 1998, active from 1998 to 2009; and 
 Tanzania Mining Act of 2010, active from 2010 to date. 
 
According to BusinessDictionary (2017b), Ordinance is defined as the decree or law 
promulgated by a state or national government without the consent of the legislature. On the 
other hand, Act is the law emanating from a passed bill by legislature (Duhaime’s Law 
Dictionary, 2017). Mineral Policies and Mining Regulations endorsed in Tanzania from 1920 
to date were Mineral Policies of 1983, 1997 and 2009 and Mining Regulations of 1999 and 
2010. More importantly to note, the economic transformation envisaged by the government 
was a major factor for the formulation of such policies, laws and regulations. For instance, 
inception of the Mineral Policy of 1997 aimed at promoting private investment in the minerals 
sector. The aim was to increase minerals sector’s contribution to the GDP. It meant to raise 
GDP from below two percent to ten percent by 2025 (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2009). 
 
In addition, the Mineral Policy of 2009 is aimed at increasing the integration of minerals sector 
with other industries of economy. These industries include among others, agriculture, energy, 
manufacturing, construction and transportation, which would be possible through 
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beneficiation, local contents (Highley et al, 2004; Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2009). The 
reason for integrating minerals sector with other industries of economy was to maximise its 
contribution to the GDP and poverty alleviation in the country (Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals, 2009). 
Tanzanian government (TZGT) introduced Mineral Policy of 2009 for equity role in the 
minerals sector that led to the enactment of Mining Act of 2010 and Mining Regulations of 
2010. The objectives of this policy were to: 
 Strengthen the legal and regulatory framework through strengthening of the 
institutional capacity for effective administration and monitoring of the minerals sector; 
 Promote small scale mining and facilitate value addition to minerals; 
 Strengthen environmental management; and  
 Promote and facilitate value addition activities to increase income and employment 
opportunities. 
Following the inception of Mining Act of 2010 and Mining Regulations of 2010 in 2010, the 
TZGT assigned State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) to oversee government interests in 
prospecting, medium and large scale mining projects among other roles (Ngonyani, 2014; 
State Mining Corporation, 2015a). STAMICO is a parastatal, which was established in 1972.  
According to State Mining Corporation (2015a and 2016a), other roles of STAMICO are: 
 To invest in the minerals sector through mineral exploration and prospecting, 
development and operation of mines and mineral trading; 
 To carry out commercial services such as drilling, exploration and consultancy 
services; and 
 To coordinate the transformation of artisanal and small scale mining into regulated, 
environmentally friendly, safe, productive and sustainable operations. 
Government interests in which STAMICO was tasked by the Tanzanian government to 
oversee included free carried interests (FCIs), paid interests, and carried interests (Ministry 
of Energy and Minerals, 2009 and 2010a; Ngonyani, 2014; State Mining Corporation, 2015a). 
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It is important to highlight these interests here, though discussion covering the equities they 
emanate from as forms of government equity role is in Section 2.5.  
Free carried interest (FCI) is the percentage of total profits of the mine paid to the state owned 
corporation or parastatal as dividends by the holder of mining licence or mine. In this form of 
equity interest, the TZGT is not entitled for any contribution of the capital share in the mining 
project. The onus of meeting capital investment of the mining project remains to the investor 
who foots both his/her and TZGT equity capital shares respectively (Duane, 2012; Kaba, 
2017). Thus, in the FCI strategy the dividends earned by the TZGT during the life of the mine 
are not charged or deducted by the investor to recoup his/her money spent in contributing 
TZGT equity capital share in the project (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2010a). 
Paid interests are profits generated from prospecting projects, medium and large scale mines 
that are cash-financed by the parastatal as the sole commercial entity representing the 
government. In this type of government interest, TZGT through STAMICO would enjoy 
returns as profits for having ownership shares in such projects. In addition, when STAMICO 
enters joint venture agreements with other private sector investor in a company, it is set to 
enjoy dividends (McPherson, 2008). These dividends are the percentages of total profits 
generated from such business ownerships in prospecting, medium and large scale mining. 
Carried interest paid to the parastatal would mean dividends paid to the government through 
its carried equity role in the project. TZGT becomes an investor with a private sector investor 
in a project without contributing any equity capital share. The private sector investor carries 
the supposed equity capital share for TZGT and recovers it through TZGT foregone-dividends 
with interests (Heller, 2011). 
Nevertheless, apart from STAMICO there is also National Development Corporation (NDC), 
a parastatal and Treasury Registrar (TR), a government agent. These two oversee 
responsibilities of TZGT carried interests in prospecting, medium and large scale mining. 
NDC as a parastatal and established in 1959 is responsible for the stimulation of 
industrialisation in country’s sectors of economy including minerals sector collaborating with 
the private sector (National Development Corporation, 2012a). On the other hand, TR 
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monitors and evaluates day-to-day performances of parastatals inclusive of STAMICO and 
NDC in overseeing government interests (TanzaniaInvest, 2016). 
1.2 Problem statement and research question 
Since the inception of the Mining Act of 2010 and the government’s mandate to STAMICO to 
oversee government interests in prospecting, medium and large scale mining there has been, 
no evaluation research study conducted on equity role of the TZGT in minerals sector. This 
poses a question “How effectively has the equity role performance of the TZGT in 
prospecting, medium and large scale mining been since the enactment of Mining Act of 
2010?” In order for this research study to have a meaningful contribution, a period of 20 years 
was investigated, that is from 1996 to 2015. 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of the study were to: 
 Determine the number of mineral rights, minimum allowable exploration expenditures 
in PLs and receivable annual levies for all mineral rights under Tanzanian government 
equity role; 
 Determine forms of Tanzanian government equity role in prospecting, medium and 
large scale mining as well as projects practicing such equity role forms;  
 Determine financial and non-financial benefits of Tanzanian government equity role in 
prospecting, medium and large scale mining; and 
 Determine the challenges faced by equity role of Tanzanian government in 
prospecting, medium and large scale mining. 
1.4 Significance of the research 
Prospecting, medium and large scale mining are important in the Tanzanian minerals sector, 
since they can enable the minerals sector to positively contribute to the economic prosperities 
of the TZGT and local citizens. However, in order for this to happen, their operations would 
 16 
 
need to be optimal, well financed, administered and managed. From 1996 to 2008, Tanzanian 
minerals sector experienced financial and non-financial benefits and challenges (Tanzania 
Minerals Audit Agency, 2012; Msabaha, 2006). Some of the financial and non-financial 
benefits include: 
 An increased sector contribution to GDP from 1.4% in 1998 to 3.0% in 2008; 
 From 2007 to 2008, a total of 2.1 Mtoz of gold were exported from Tanzania making 
Tanzania the largest gold contributor in Africa, behind South Africa, Ghana and Mali;   
 Mining royalty valued at US$199.40 million was paid to TZGT by major gold mines 
from 2001 to 2008; and 
 Large scale mines employed 23,474 locals and 1,579 expatriates from 2005 to 2008. 
However, there were various challenges experienced by the minerals sector. Some 
challenges in the minerals sector in the period of 1996 to 2008 were: 
 Low integration of the minerals sector with other sectors of the economy; 
 Inadequate capacity to administer the sector; and  
 Growing negative public perception of the minerals sector. This was in respect to its 
low contribution in both social and economic aspects. 
To address aforementioned challenges, Tanzanian government took steps through the 
enactment of the Mineral Policy of 2009. The policy was intended to enable the government 
to have equity role in the prospecting, medium and large scale mining. This then enabled the 
government to: 
 Have greater control and management of minerals resources in the country; 
 Derive more economic benefits that ensue from minerals resources exploitation; 
 Facilitate integration of minerals sector with other sectors of economy; and 
 Enable national capacity building. 
The purpose of this research study is to evaluate the equity role of the Tanzanian government 
in the minerals industry in order to ascertain the value realised from the industry after the 
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enactment of the Mineral Policy of 2009. However, this evaluation includes analysis of 
benefits realised prior to enactment of this Policy in order to gauge if any value was generated 
through introduction of this Policy.  
1.5 Limitations of the research 
The research study limitation was that some mining companies could not avail their annual 
sustainability, financial and accounts reports to public domains. 
1.6 Outline of chapters 
Chapter 1 (Introduction) described background of the study, problem statement and research 
question. Other things discussed in this chapter include, objectives of the study, significance 
of the research and limitations of the research. 
Chapter 2 (Literature review) expounds on the government equity role in the minerals sector 
and forms of equity role. It also outlines Tanzanian minerals endowment, mines and mining 
methods as well as contribution of Tanzanian minerals sector to GDP.  
Chapter 3 (Research Methodology) describes methodology used in performing research 
study on the guidance of research objectives derived from research question. This chapter 
covers background of the study, literature review, collection of data, areas of analysis and 
frameworks for computation of minimum exploration expenditures and payable annual levies 
for mineral rights. 
Chapter 4 (Tanzanian government equity role in the minerals sector) demonstrates the 
Tanzanian government equity role in prospecting, medium and large scale mining. It also 
highlights information on the status of each medium and large scale mine in Tanzania under 
TZGT equity role. 
Chapter 5 (Results and Discussion) illustrates results and analysis conducted in the research. 
It covers also discussion of challenges faced by the TZGT equity role strategy and their 
causes.  
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Chapter 6 (Conclusions and recommendations) comprises of findings, implications of 
challenges and recommendations to Tanzanian government.  It further proposes areas for 
future work.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the work that has been conducted with regard to equity participation or 
role of government in the minerals industry. There are various forms of equity role of the 
governments that have been adopted by various countries in order to benefit from their 
mineral endowments. These forms are presented in this chapter. 
2.2 Equity 
According to InvestorWords (2016), there are four definitions of the word “equity” based on 
the context of its applicability and these are: 
 In the context of ownership interest in a corporation, consideration of equity is in a form 
of common stock or preferred stock; 
 In the context of a balance sheet, shareholder’s equity is a function of total assets minus 
total liabilities; 
 In the context of real assets, expression of equity is as a house value minus mortgage or 
loan payments on a house; and 
 In the context of futures trading account, regarded as the value of securities in the 
account. 
Equity is a fairness or justice in the way people are treated (Merriam-Webster, 2016). Van 
Zyl et al (2006) defined equity as a financial instrument representing part ownership of a 
corporate entity. In this study however, there has been an adoption of equity definitions by 
InvestorWords (2016) in the context of ownership of interest in a corporation and of Van Zyl 
et al (2006) respectively. 
2.3 Equity participation or role 
Equity participation/role is defined as the action of individual(s) or body corporate to hold 
shares in an enterprise, company or asset (Otto, nd.; Brown, 2013; Natural Resource 
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Governance Institute, 2015b). The purpose is to have a degree of ownership of such 
enterprise, company or asset in exchange for purchasing shares. In addition, equity financing 
is another way of obtaining ownership of a business. In as far as, minerals sector is 
concerned, individual(s) or body corporate(s) can hold shares in enterprises related to the 
minerals sector. Minerals related enterprises involve all enterprises connected to prospecting, 
mining, processing, smelting and/or refining and trading of minerals useful in the minerals 
industry. 
2.4 Government equity role in the in the minerals sector 
Equity role of the government in the minerals sector is an action of the government to own 
shares in mineral rights and/or minerals-related enterprises (Heller, 2011; Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 2015b; McPherson, 2008). A Mineral right is a right that enables 
individual(s) or body corporate to extract minerals from an area and to be paid based on 
extraction of such minerals. There are various mineral rights in different countries depending 
on existing mining value chains in those countries. For instance, they can either be 
Prospecting Licences (PLs), Mining Licences (MLs) and/or Processing Licences (PLs). 
A government can directly take ownership shares in mineral rights and/or ventures as sole 
commercial entity or in partnership with public or private companies (Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 2015b). However, not all governments apply this approach for taking 
ownership shares. Some governments assign State-owned corporations (parastatals) to take 
this responsibility on their behalf. The reason for this is to infiltrate parastatals directly in 
minerals related enterprises to oversee government interests (Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, 2014). According to Leon (2015), equity role of government in 
minerals seeks to enable the government to have greater control and management of mineral 
resources in the country. Government anticipates deriving more economic benefits that 
accrue from exploitation of minerals resources (Leon, 2015; Mills 2011).  
Greater control and management of mineral resources in the country is the initial, non-
financial benefit that the government can attain through its equity role in the minerals sector. 
Herein either governments pursue sole proprietorship (to become a sole commercial entity) 
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or joint ventures with private sector investors in partnership or companies in having 
substantial ownership of minerals related enterprises. For instance, in case where the 
government is owning shares in a mine, whether fully or partially, it will similarly own its 
mineral resources in same proportionality. The higher the government ownership of shares 
in medium and large scale mining projects, the greater the control and management of 
mineral resources. However, for a government to fully control and manage mineral resources, 
it will have to also strongly administer and manage its minerals sector as indicated in Section 
1.1, Table 1.1. When parastatals oversee, government’s interests in minerals-related 
enterprises, they must build national capacity as another non-financial benefit. This is useful 
for government’s control and management of the minerals sector in the country as institutions 
would have capacities for establishment of new or strengthening existing institutional 
frameworks (Table 1.1).  
Building of national capacity is through parastatals’ investment, management, supervision 
and monitoring of operations in the minerals related enterprises. Parastatals’ investment, 
management, supervision and operations monitoring in the minerals related enterprises is 
through two ways. Firstly, through sole proprietorship where they become sole commercial 
entities as they gain skills, experiences and competences for national capacity building. 
Lastly, it is through parastatals being in partnership with private sector investors in minerals 
projects. This would be possible through the participation of both parastatals and private 
sector investors in investment, management, supervision and operations monitoring in 
business ventures. More importantly to note is that as parastatals acquire capacities, they 
become capable of working independently without dependences on private sector investors 
(Heller, 2011; Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015b; McPherson, 2008). Table 2.1 
indicates parastatals, which had contributed to building their countries’ national capacities in 
controlling and managing mineral resources successfully. 
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Table 2.1 National capacity building attributing state-owned enterprises (parastatals) 
Name of Parastatal Country 
Petrobras Brazil 
Petronas Malaysia 
Petroleum company of Trinidad and 
Tobago Limited 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Debswana Diamond company (Pty) Ltd Botswana 
Statoil  Norway 
Codelco Chile 
Source: Natural Resource Governance Institute (2015b); Heller (2011); McPherson 
(2008) 
The other non-financial benefits attained by government through its equity role in prospecting, 
medium and large scale mining is local content promotion (Heller, 2011; Amoako-Tuffour et 
al, 2015). This is achieved through mining projects employing local citizens and project 
operators procure locally produced or supplied goods and services (Heller, 2011; Amoako-
Tuffour et al, 2015; McPherson, 2008). This in turn promotes local content. Finally, the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) where companies with mining projects near 
communities provide social and infrastructure services. 
According to McPherson (2008), Ogunlade (2010), Heller (2011) and Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals (2010a), financial benefits mostly derived from the minerals sector include: 
 Receivable corporate income tax; 
 Receivable mining royalty; 
 Receivable annual levies; 
 Receivable other taxes including PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, Stamp Duty, Import Duty; 
Excise Duty and Service Levy; 
 Receivable profits through paid equity role as sole commercial entity; 
 Receivable paid interests (dividends) through paid equity role in a partnership as 
majority or minority shareholder; 
 Receivable carried interests (dividends) through carried equity role in a partnership or  
company as minority shareholder; and 
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 Receivable free carried interests as dividends from large scale mines with SMLs 
having minerals development agreements (MDAs). 
However, it is important to underscore that governments should ensure that they have solid 
and measurable mechanisms for collection of taxes. The reason being that this area can 
contribute significantly to government revenues. As such, government authorities, 
departments and their officials mandated to collect such taxes would need to be ethical and 
knowledgeable enough (Australian Government, 2010). This is apart from clear policies, main 
laws, by-laws, regulations, operation manuals, etc., expounding on mechanisms for collecting 
such taxes to be used by them. For example, looking into service levy in Tanzania as a 
component of other taxes, most of the local government authorities are unaware of their legal 
obligation to collect it (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2015a). They are unaware in the 
sense that they only collect service levy from mine owners instead of collecting it also from 
mine contractors and sub-contractors. 
2.5 Forms of government equity role 
There are four main types of government equity role namely: paid or full equity, carried equity, 
free equity and free carry equity. These forms of government equity are discussed further in 
this section. 
2.5.1 Paid or full equity 
Paid equity is the equity capital financing or buying of shares in enterprises undertaken by 
government, as a private investor would do (Heller, 2011; Natural Resource Governance 
Institute, 2015b; Cottarelli, 2012). In addition, the interest of the paid equity is termed as paid 
equity interest or sometimes paid interest. However, according to McPherson (2008), paid 
equity exist in two categories. These categories include either investing on its own via 
parastatal or investing with an involvement of the private sector from the start of operations 
whereas it acquires majority or minority interest in a private or public joint venture company 
(McPherson, 2008).  
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In any case in which a parastatal is involved it has to meet its proportionate investment cash 
calls. This is possible only through government funding of the parastatal and self-funding 
through its well-established financial capacity. However, in all cases, government has to 
become cautious in avoiding public funds from being abused by the parastatal. This happens 
mostly when a parastatal foots itself in investment as a sole commercial entity or a 
shareholder in a private joint venture (JV) company together with a private sector investor 
(Heller, 2011; Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015b). According to Ogunlade 
(2010), paid or full equity is termed also as a working interest (WI) participation. Table 2.2 
indicates some countries whose governments employ WI participation in the minerals sector. 
Table 2.2 indicates that it is most likely that countries endowed with minerals would opt for 
WI of at least 15%, if they chose to undergo paid equity role in mining. Paid equity as a form 
of government equity role has pros and cons and they are tabulated in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.2 Countries employing working interest (WI) participation 
Country Description (% of WI) 
Ghana 20 
Kyrgyz Republic 15 - 66 
Papua New Guinea 30 
Sierra Leone 30 
Source: McPherson (2008) 
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Table 2.3 Pros and cons of paid or full equity 
Pros of paid or full equity 
 Gives higher transparency and accountability to the government especially when the parastatal is a sole commercial entity for being administered and 
managed by the government itself.  
 Sense of government ownership of minerals related projects is high for being administered, managed and financed by the government itself. 
 Higher contribution to the national capacity building especially when government is in joint venture with the private sector as the parastatal will gain skills, 
experiences and competences (Section 2.4). 
 Higher contribution to the local content promotion as compared to other forms of government equity role given that government is the owner of the parastatal 
and does its role of promoting the private sector.  
 Higher contribution to parastatals profits maximisation and bolstering of parastatals growth as government will forge its own business strategic plan to follow, 
execute, audit, review and improve. 
 Higher contribution to parastatals competitiveness due to availability of finance, investment and operating cash flows. 
 Higher realisation of total profits by government when it serves as a sole commercial entity. 
 Yields on time government profits realisation and dividends earnings than in other forms of government equity role. This is due to absence of carried equity 
capital share of the government that necessitates investor’s recovery of initial investment through government-foregone dividends with interests.  
Cons of paid full equity 
 Risks government coffers on expense of its spending on social services, social protection and infrastructure development. 
 Can be prone to price volatility of commodities hence affecting government paid equity interest. 
 Can be prone to misinvoicing (transfer pricing) and/or financial manipulation if not well administered and managed. This can consequently lead to 
unsatisfactory or non-existent dividends for the government. 
 Understaffing and ineffective supervision by parastatal can undermine development of minerals related projects, lessening revenues accruing to the 
government and aggravate corruption. 
Source: Economic Commission for Africa (2010); Marah (2014); Heller (2011) 
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2.5.2 Carried equity 
In this form of government equity role, the private sector investor meets all capital costs and 
expenses in an investment without any government financial contribution (Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 2015b; Cottarelli, 2012; McPherson, 2008). However, according to 
Heller (2011) and McPherson (2008), the recovery of investor’s money spent as government 
contribution in an investment would be through government-foregone dividends with 
interests. 
The interest that is exerted by the government carried equity transaction is termed as carried 
equity interest or carried interest. Government should device solid mechanisms for managing 
its stake in carried equity mining projects. By doing so, it will prevent itself from a trap of 
earning unsatisfactory or nil dividends (Heller, 2011).This as indicated by Van Zyl et al (2006), 
Korchaki (2014), and Heller (2011) happens especially when: 
 Projects undergo reinvestments. 
 Government’s shares in a company are common shares (not preferred shares). 
 Government is mostly with a minority representation in a board of directors of the company 
responsible for: 
- Authorization of advance payments of preferred dividends to preferred 
shareholders before other actions of company’s realised profits are undertaken 
which maybe keeping of total profits as retained earnings, reinvestment on 
projects or payments of common dividends to common shareholders; and 
- Making decision on whether to keep profits as retained earnings to reinvest in 
projects or distribute dividends for common shareholders including government, 
or not. 
 There is misinvoicing (transfer pricing) and/or financial manipulation if not well 
administered and managed. 
Mali is an example of mineral-rich countries that enforces carried equity role by imposing 15% 
carried interest in mining companies (Otto, nd.; Kaba, 2017). In addition, McPherson (2008) 
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indicated that petroleum rich countries notably: Algeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon are pursuing carried equity role (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 Some petroleum rich countries employing carried interest (CI) 
Country Description (% of CI) 
Algeria 51 
Cameroon 50 
Equatorial Guinea 15 
Gabon 15 
Libya 50 
Sudan 5 - 10 
Vietnam 20 
Source: McPherson (2008) 
It is important to define private joint venture company, partnership and public joint venture 
company for this research study. Private JV company is defined as a non-listed company 
(company that is not listed in the stock exchange) incorporated by two or more companies 
that contribute capital and other resources for a common project or projects (Macdonald, 
2009). Partnership is an unincorporated joint venture of two or more individuals or companies 
that agree to pool capital and other resources for undertaking a specific task. Furthermore, 
according to BusinessDictionary (2017c), a partnership is governed by a partnership 
agreement. Public JV company is a company listed in stock exchange and incorporated by 
two or more companies that contribute capital and other resources for a common project or 
projects. The advantages and disadvantages of carried equity are tabulated in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 Pros and cons of carried equity 
Pros of carried equity 
 Gives fairly higher transparency and accountability to the government especially when the parastatal is in public JV with private sector investor 
than in partnership. This is due public single or JV companies for having higher transparent operating nature than in in partnership.  
 Prevents government coffers from being spent in mining investments like in paid equity form of equity role (for as it is being contributed by the 
private sector investor) and instead be spent into social services, protection and infrastructure. Prevention of  
 Sense of government ownership of minerals related projects is high for playing part together with the private sector in administration and 
management responsibilities. 
 Contributes fairly to the national capacity building especially when government is in private or public JV with the private sector investor than 
in partnership as the parastatal will gain skills, experiences and competences (Section 2.4). 
 Contributes fairly to the local content promotion given that the government is the partial owner of the business and plays its role of promoting 
the private sector. 
Cons of carried equity 
 Delays government earnings of dividends due to private sector investor’s recovery of incurred government contribution through government-
foregone-dividends with interest. 
 Can be prone to price volatility of commodities hence affecting government paid equity interest. 
 Can be prone to misinvoicing (transfer pricing) and/or financial manipulation if not well administered and managed. This can consequently 
lead to unsatisfactory or non-existent dividends for the government. 
 Understaffing and ineffective supervision of carried equity by parastatal can undermine minerals related projects development, lessening 
revenues accruing to the government and aggravate corruption. 
Source: Correia et al (1993): Marx et al (1999); Economic Commission for Africa (2010); Marah (2014); Heller (2011); 
Cottarelli (2012) 
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2.5.3 Free equity 
This is a form of equity role in which the company holding shares, freely grants a portion of 
its shares to the government at no cost (Heller, 2011; Cottarelli, 2012). However, it is not 
exactly true that such shares offered to the government by the company are strictly free. This 
is because tax concessions, contribution of rights or infrastructure from the government tends 
to accompany them (Heller, 2011; Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015b; Cottarelli, 
2012). According to McPherson (2008), some countries that employ free equity role are 
notably: Liberia and Sierra Leone with 15% and 10% free equity role, respectively. However, 
Heller (2011) and Natural Resource Governance Institute (2015b) singled out this kind of 
equity as being deterrent to investment. McPherson (2008) and Kaba (2017) on the other 
hand disagree with this view. Governments need to take precautions when entering 
agreements with mining companies to avoid worse trade-off traps, which can have negative 
impacts on their prosperities. Table 2.6 presents pros and cons of free equity role. 
Table 2.6 Pros and cons of free and free carry equities 
Pros of free and free carry equities 
 Prevent government coffers from being spent in mining investments like in paid or 
carried equity forms of equity role and instead be spent into social services, 
protection and infrastructure. 
Cons of free and free carry equities 
 Give less transparency and accountability to the government as compared to carried 
equity. 
 Sense of government ownership of minerals related projects is low for non-direct 
government participation in the management and operation affairs of the mining 
company granting free interest (FCI). 
 Less contribution to the national capacity, building for non-direct government 
participation in the management and operations affairs of the mining company 
granting free interest (FCI). 
 Fairly less contribution to the local content promotion if there is no solid local content 
legislation. 
Source: Heller (2011); Cottarelli (2012); McPherson (2008): Kaba (2017)
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2.5.4 Free carry equity 
This is a form of equity having both features of free and carried equities (Kaba, 2017). It is a 
percentage of mining company’s shares offered to the government by the company, which 
carries also its costs and expenses for the government. In this type of equity, the company’s 
contributing shareholders carry all costs and expenses for the government, which does not 
incur any of them. In addition, unlike in carried equity, when profits are made, the company 
does not recoup any of its costs and expenses incurred from the government portion. More 
importantly to note is that in free carry equity, company grants shares to the government in 
consideration for its contribution in kind to the mining company (Kaba, 2017; The 
Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa, 1997 and 2016). According to 
Kaba (2017), government contribution in kind may be granting of the mining licence and/or 
mining rights.  
It should be noted that the interest due to the government on the free carry equity transaction 
is called the free carried interest (FCI) (Bourassa and Turner, 2013). In this context then, 
mining company pays FCI as dividends to the government during profits making periods. In 
addition, the nature of payment of dividends on FCI may be ordinary or preferred. However, 
this depends on the terms of agreement on the nature of dividend payments. Normally, two 
parties namely: government and mining company clearly, expound all rights bestowed upon 
shareholders in the free carry equity role.  
More importantly to note is that FCI is non-dilutable and the government through options in 
the minerals development agreement (MDA) is mandated to acquire more shares in a mining 
company (Kaba, 2017). Acquisition of more company shares by the government is through 
paid equity. 
Furthermore, solid frameworks or mechanisms on how the two parties would enjoy their 
shareholding rights is crucial. The countries that adopt this type of equity role are, inter alia, 
DRC, Guinea and Ghana with agreed free carried interests of 5%, 15% and 10%, respectively 
(Kaba, 2017; Ralbovsky, 2012). Table 2.6 shows pros and cons of free carry equity role. 
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2.6 Tanzanian minerals endowment, mines and mining methods 
This section discusses the nature, quality and quantity of mineral resources and quantity of 
known Tanzanian mineral reserves. In addition, it covers scale of mines and mining methods 
adopted in medium and large scale mines in Tanzania.  
2.6.1 Nature and quality of mineral resources 
Tanzania has an endowment of minerals amongst others, gold, tanzanite, diamond, coal, 
uranium, iron, gemstones and copper hoisted in mineral deposits. These mineral deposits 
exist in stratigraphic formations such as Cenozoic volcanics, Ubendian belt, Greenstone belts 
and Archean Craton to mention a few (Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1 Stratigraphic formations of mineral deposits in Tanzania 
Source: Msabaha (2006) 
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According to Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2010a), there are five groups of minerals 
existent in Tanzania. These include: 
 Metallic minerals such as gold, nickel, tin, rare earth element, iron ore, copper, lead and 
PGMs; 
 Gemstones such as diamonds, tanzanite, ruby, emerald and sapphire;  
 Industrial minerals such as phosphate, gypsum, limestone, kaolin, graphite and bauxite;  
 Building materials such as stones, sand, aggregates, gravel and fire clay; and 
 Energy minerals including uranium and coal. 
 
2.6.2 Quantity of known Tanzanian mineral reserves 
In Tanzania, information pertinent to geology and geophysics useful for assisting investors in 
selecting areas for prospecting is available. This information is available at the Geological 
Survey of Tanzania (GST) located in Dodoma. It is vital to note that 90 percent of the country 
has been geologically surveyed (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2015b). Therefore, the 
mineral prospecting operations carried out from 1990s to 2015 have revealed quantities of 
proved reserves of various minerals as indicated in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 Proven quantities of mineral reserves in Tanzania  
Mineral  Proved reserves (‘000) 
Gold 2.2 t 
Iron ore 126 kt 
Graphite 158.2 kt 
Uranium 160 kt 
Rare earth elements 101 kt 
Coal 5000 kt 
Copper 13.7 kt 
Nickel 209 kt 
Tanzanite 12.6 kt 
Diamond 51 kcar 
Sources: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2015b); Mwihava and Masanja (2015) 
 33 
 
In addition, Tanzania is important in the global mining industry as it supplies the world with 
various minerals such as: 
 1.6% of world’s gold, making it to the 15th position in the world (Yager, 2013; Mine 
Web, 2015); 
 Producing 166,500 carats of diamond in year 2013/2014, making it 13th in the globe 
(Jewell and Kimball, 2015). This production was 0.23% of the annual total average 
production of 72.35 million carats; and 
 It is the only supplier of tanzanite in the world (Ihucha, 2014; Yager, 2013).  
 
The tanzanite industry in Tanzania has not greatly flourished despite its long history of its 
existence. This is due to undermentioned reasons (Ihucha, 2014; Rimoch and Cherng, 2013; 
Dodgson, 2016): 
 Continuous practice in the country of exporting rough tanzanite; 
 Inadequate  and inefficient jewellery cutting centres; 
 High rate of tanzanite smuggling; 
 Tax evasion; and 
 Lack of government political will in the control of tanzanite sector. 
2.6.3 Scale of mines 
In Tanzania, from 1996 to 2015, there had been nine active mines (Mwihava and Masanja, 
2015; Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, 2016a). These included six large scale mines and 
three medium scale mines (Table 2.8). 
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Table 2.8 Large and medium- scale mines in Tanzania by December 2015 
Company/Project Scale of 
the mine 
Mineral 
sought 
District Commissioning 
Year 
Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM) also known as 
TanzaniteOne Tanzanite mine (TTM) 
Medium Tanzanite Simanjiro 2001 
Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM) Medium Coal Mbinga 2012 
New Luka Gold Mine (NLGM) Medium Gold Chunya 2012 
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine (BGM) Large Gold Kahama 2001 
Buzwagi Gold Mine (BZGM) Large Gold Kahama  2009 
Geita Gold Mine (GGM) Large Gold Geita 2000 
North Mara Gold Mine (NMGM) Large Gold Tarime 2002 
Stamigold Biharamulo Mine (SBM) formerly known 
as Tulawaka Gold Mine (TGM) 
Large Gold Biharamulo 2005 
Williamson Diamonds Mine (WDM) Large Diamond Kishapu 1940 
Source: Mwihava and Masanja (2015); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2016a) 
2.6.4 Mining methods employed in mines in Tanzania 
There are two major mining methods employed in these mines, namely: open pit and 
underground mining methods. Table 2.9 indicates mining method employed in each mine. 
Table 2.9 Mining methods employed in large and medium scale mines 
Company/Project Mining method 
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine (BGM) Underground mining method 
Buzwagi Gold Mine (BZGM) Open pit mining method 
Geita Gold Mine (GGM) Open pit & underground mining methods 
North Mara Gold Mine (NMGM) Open pit & underground mining methods 
Stamigold Biharamulo Mine (SBM) formerly 
known as Tulawaka Gold Mine (TGM) Open pit mining method 
Williamson Diamonds Mine (WDM) Open pit mining method 
Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM) also known as 
TanzaniteOne Tanzanite mine (TTM) Underground mining method 
Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM) Underground mining method 
New Luka Gold Mine (NLGM) Open pit & underground mining methods 
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Figure 2.2 shows the location of large and medium scale mines in Tanzania and major 
minerals sought. Most of the gold mines, that is, North Mara, Bulyanhulu, Geita, Biharamulo, 
Buzwagi and Golden Pride are located in the east and south of Lake Victoria. It is important 
to note that the gold deposits where most of the gold mining occurs are in the Greenstone 
belts formations as indicated in Figure 2.1. According to Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency 
(2016a), the total value of minerals exported by the nine active mines in 2015 was 
approximately US$1.7 billion as indicated in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.2 Location of medium and large scale mines in Tanzania  
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2015b) 
 36 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Mineral sales/exports by major mines in 2015 
Source: Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2016a) 
2.7 Contribution of Tanzanian minerals sector in the GDP 
The minerals sector in Tanzania is important in the country’s economy as it contributes to the 
nation’s GDP. Figure 2.4 shows historical contribution of the Tanzanian minerals sector to 
the GDP from 1998 to 2010. 
From Figure 2.4, the Tanzanian minerals sector’s contribution to the nation’s GDP was 1.4% 
in 1998, which raised to 3% maximum in 2006. However, in three years notably: 2006, 2007 
and 2008 the percentage of contribution of the mineral sector at the country steadily remained 
at 3%. Due to the world’s economic crises as indicated by Muganyizi (2012) the sector’s 
contribution to the nation’s GDP dropped from 3% in 2008 to 2.5% in 2009 all the way to 2.4% 
in 2010. Apart from the performance of the Tanzanian minerals sector’s contribution to the 
nation’s GDP, the country aims at raising the GDP growth contribution to 10% in 2025 
(Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2015a).  
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Figure 2.4 Historical contribution of Tanzanian minerals sector to the GDP 
Source: Muganyizi (2012) 
2.8 Historical equity role of TZGT in minerals sector before 1996 
Germans and British ruled Tanganyika from 1884 to 1915 and from 1916 to 1960, 
respectively. Tanganyika got her independence from British on 9 December 1961. Zanzibar, 
a neighbouring country to Tanganyika, also got hers from British Empire on 12 January 1964. 
These countries merged on 26 April 1964 to form one country called Tanzania. Records 
indicate that in 1950, the British administration formulated Colonial Development Corporation 
(CDC) to be responsible for holding and financing government projects (National 
Development Corporation, 2012a). During this period, the government established five (5) 
mining-related companies held by CDC as indicated in Figure 2.5. These companies were: 
Williamson Diamonds Ltd, Diamond Cutting Co. Ltd, Nyanza Salt Mines Ltd, Tanganyika 
Meerschaum Corporation and Tanzania Gemstone Industries Ltd. There is no company in 
which CDC had ownership share of less than 50%. 
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Figure 2.5 Percentage of ownership in mining related companies 
Source: Ngonyani (2014); Jourdan (1990) 
As Tanganyika became independent in 1961, it formed the Tanganyika Development 
Corporation (TDC) in order to replace CDC in 1962. Then TDC undertook the same roles and 
functions of CDC-holding and financing the government projects including five mining 
companies (National Development Corporation, 2012a). However, in 1965, TDC changed its 
name to become National Development Corporation (NDC) in order to catalyse economic 
development in all sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, in 1967, TZGT changed its economic system through “the Arusha declaration” 
(Muganda, 2004: Solomon, 2012; Ngowi, 2009). In “the Arusha declaration”, the new policy 
for Tanzania became socialism and self-reliance in which command economic system was 
adopted (Muganda, 2004; Ngowi, 2009; Weir, nd.). The aim was to enable the government 
to control all means of production in the country through parastatals. These means of 
production included plantations, industries, mines, commerce and banks (Muganda, 2004, 
Ngowi, 2009; Weir, nd.). 
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Ngonyani (2014) highlighted that in 1972, Tanzania government through Public Corporations 
Act of 1969 established State Mining Corporation (STAMICO), which started operations in 
1973. With the introduction of STAMICO, NDC transferred to STAMICO all the five mining 
companies it used to hold. Thereafter, STAMICO took over holding and started financing 
these companies and others that had emerged while at the same time, overseeing of 
government interests as was done by CDC and NDC. 
In 1992, TZGT endorsed Public Corporations Act of 1992 to replace the Public Corporations 
Act of 1969 (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1992). This action of TZGT was due to 
underperformance experienced by parastatals during socialism and self-reliance policy 
between 1967 and late1980s. Underperformance of parastatals was attributed to lack of local 
expertise, lack of managerial skills, embezzlement, bureaucracy, capacity underutilisation; 
loss making, reliance on government subsidies, non-payment of taxes, overemployment and 
monopolistic behaviour of operation and huge debts (Muganda, 2004; Ngowi, 2009). 
In 1993, TZGT established the Presidential Parastatal Sectoral Reform Commission (PSRC) 
to be in charge of privatisation of state-owned organisations (Twaakyondo et al, 2002; 
Muganda, 2004). Under Public Corporations Act of 1992, transferring of all companies under 
government holding corporations to the Treasury Registrar (TR) for privatisation through 
PSRC took place. This action affected all companies under STAMICO, which were 
transferred to the TR and were kept under receivership or liquidated (Muganda, 2004; 
Ngonyani, 2014). Consequently, STAMICO was closed in April 1996. 
2.9 Specification and de-specification of STAMICO 
After the companies were placed in receivership or liquidated, STAMICO was listed in August 
1997 as a specified public corporation under PSRC. This was after its closure in April 1996 
(Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1992; Ngonyani 2014).  As STAMICO became a specified 
public corporation, all its rights, privileges, powers, duties or functions were vested in the 
board of directors. The board of directors then waited for STAMICO’s shares allotting or 
selling by government (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1992). However, decision by the 
government to allot or sell STAMICO delayed and therefore made it survive from 1996 to 
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2008. During this period, it concentrated on provision of contract drilling services, consultancy 
work, property rental income, acquisition of mineral rights and joint venturing (Ngonyani, 
2014). Furthermore, during the same time, there were recommendations in 2008 from the 
Justice Mark Bomani Commission’s Report favouring restoration of STAMICO than its 
closure. Government then decided to restore STAMICO (Bomani, 2008). Effecting of actual 
de-specification of the corporation was in April 2009 when publishing of a de-specification 
order in the government gazette took place (State Mining Corporation, nd.). 
2.10 Other participations of Tanzanian government from 1884 to 2015 in the mining 
industry 
2.10.1 Demarcation and allocation of mining plots to small scale miners 
The German and British administrations partially demarcated and allocated mining plots to 
small scale miners (SSMs) between 1884 and 1960. However, in between 1961 and 2015, 
TZGT demarcated and allocated more mining plots to SSMs as compared to the period 1884-
1960 (The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, 2001; Mwihava and Masanja, 2015; United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2012). The benefits realised from demarcation and 
allocation of plots were job creation, means for economic livelihood as well as government 
revenues realisation. However, a key lesson was that most of demarcations and allocation 
lacked predetermined detailed geological surveys. This was a major drawback to the effective 
implementation of mining activities. 
2.10.2 Extension services to small scale miners 
The government between 1961 and 2015 offered training to SSMs, which encompassed 
mining laws, explosives handling, mining and mineral processing methods, safety, 
occupational health and environmental management. Both the Minerals Department and 
STAMICO had been cooperating in training of SSMs (Mwihava and Masanja, 2015; United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2012). The realised benefits included improved safety in 
mineral production and increase in income for miners. The shortfalls were lack of adequate 
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on-job training and inadequate follow-ups by government to SSMs to assess implementation 
of what they had been trained. 
2.10.3 Grants giving to small scale miners 
Government had provided grants of worth US$3.77 million to 121 SSMs from 2013 to 2015 
(Mtweve, 2013; Kisima, 2016; Mwihava and Masanja, 2015; Corporate Digest, 2016). The 
SSMs used the grants for capital expenditures in mining operations, which lead to increased 
mineral production and government revenues. However, there was no accountability in 
expenditures and there was ineffective mechanism by which government made follow-ups to 
SSMs sites to prove value for money against expenditures. 
2.10.4 Regulating minerals sector 
Between 1884 and 2015, TZGT regulated minerals sector through Mining Ordinances of 1920 
and 1929; Mineral Policies of 1983, 1997 and 2009; Mining Acts of 1979, 1998 and 2010 and 
Mining Regulations of 1999 and 2010. In regulating the minerals sector, various issues were 
addressed: 
 Government revenues collection; 
 Safety, occupational health and environmental inspections; 
 Mining disputes resolution; 
 Explosives management; and 
 Incidents and accidents inquiries. 
Benefits were compliance of SSMs, medium and large scale miners and other stakeholders 
to the country’s mineral industry legislations. The high level of compliance led to increased 
mineral production and consequently, high government revenues. The challenges included:  
 Lack of research and development (R&D) by government on the applicability of the 
Mineral Policies, Mining Legislations and Regulations;  
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 A delay by government to pass the proposed Minerals Value Addition Act of 2015 for 
regulation of mineral value addition activities and minerals beneficiation in the country; 
and 
 A delay by government in enactment of a new Explosives Act and Regulations to cope 
with advancement in explosives and blasting industries. 
2.10.5 Provision of services 
During the period between1884 to 2015, the government provided minerals related services 
through its agencies. The first agency was the Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST). The 
establishment of GST was formerly as Department of Geological Survey in 1923, before its 
reestablishment as GST in 1997. In addition, GST had provided various geological data of 
different categories and purposes to minerals sector stakeholders (Geological Survey of 
Tanzania, 2016; The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, 2001). GST had further provided 
mineral sample test services to minerals sector stakeholders. The second agency was 
STAMICO, which provided services to SSMs as well as undertaking drilling and exploration 
consultancy services (State Mining Corporation, 2016b). The benefits through GST services 
were: 
 User-friendliness of geological data to stakeholders and an increase in discovery of 
minerals; 
 An increase of revenues; 
 Government institutional capacity development; and 
 Enhancement of public and private sectors development to do with minerals sector.  
Further benefits through STAMICO services were: 
 Usefulness of drilling and exploration consultancy services to mineral stakeholders on 
compilations of pre-feasibility and feasibility studies of their mining projects;  
 Government institutional capacity development;  
 Compliance of SSMs with safety, occupational health and environmental protection 
requirements; and 
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 Increase of revenues.  
GST and STAMICO with their services encountered the following challenges: 
 Inadequate research & development (R&D); and 
 Absence of annual reports in public domain and reporting without the use of Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines. 
2.11 Changes in Tanzanian minerals sector from 1996 to 2008 
In 1996, government realised that the Mining Act of 1979 had failed to attract local and foreign 
mining investment. This failure of the Mining Act of 1979 coupled with economic reforms 
undertaken by the TZGT between late 1980s and early 1990s made the government change 
the legislation (Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, 2016b; Muganda, 2004; Ngowi, 2009; Weir, 
nd.). The aim was to attract investors to bring into the country capital, technology and 
expertise (Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, 2016b). The aim made the TZGT endorse the 
Mineral Policy of 1997 and Tanzania Mining Act of 1998 (State Mining Corporation, 2016b; 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2009). Other notable changes were the formulation of fiscal 
incentives aimed at attracting both local and foreign investors, and the opening of six (6) large 
scale mines as indicated in Table 2.10.  
Table 2.10 Mines established in Tanzania between 1998 and 2003 
Mine/Project Year commissioned Year closed 
Golden Pride Project 1998 2012 after reaching its 
end life. 
Geita Gold Mine (GGM) 2000 Still in operations 
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine (BGM) 2001 Still in operations 
North Mara Gold Mine (NMGM) 2002 Still in operations 
Tulawaka Gold Mine (TGM) currently known 
as Stamigold Biharamuro Mine (SBM) 
2005 Still in operations 
Buhemba Gold Mine 2003 2007 due to 
undertaking of 
uneconomical large 
scale mining 
Source: Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2016b); State Mining Corporation (2015b) 
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With this development, gold production increased from less than one tonne per annum in 
1998 to over 45 tonnes per annum in 2010. Consequently, the minerals sector became the 
second largest in terms of foreign currency of earning (East African Community, 2011). Other 
outstanding developments in the course of Minerals Policy of 1997 and Mining Act of 1998 
from 1997 to 2008 were: 
 Increased sector contribution to GDP from 1.4% in 1998 to 3.0% in 2008 (Muganyizi, 
2012); 
 Direct foreign investment (FDI) to the excess of US$2.5 billion from US$1.3 billion 
(Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2009);  
 Increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the mineral sector from US$1.3 billion in 
1997 to US$2.5 billion in 2007 through exploration and mining projects (Ministry of 
Energy and Minerals, 2009); and 
 Increased mineral exports from US$26 million in 1997 to US$420 million in 2002 as 
indicated in Figure 2.7 (Msabaha, 2006). 
 
Figure 2.6 Tanzania mineral exports from 1990 to 2005.  
Source: Msabaha (2006) 
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Despite these achievements, Msabaha (2006) and Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2009) 
highlighted the following as major challenges:  
 Low integration of the minerals sector and other sectors of the economy; 
 Inadequate capacity to administer the sector; 
 Inadequate infrastructure such as roads, reliable power supply and communications 
to support the sector; 
 Low level of minerals value addition; and 
 Growing negative public perception on minerals sector. This is in respect to low 
contribution in both social and economic aspects. 
Some of the impacts of these shortcomings included: 
 Less contribution to GDP of other sectors of economy e.g., agriculture and 
manufacturing for their low integration by the minerals; 
 Undermining of the local content on the procurement of locally produced supplied 
goods and services; and 
 Increased transport costs from mines to the selling points and from suppliers of goods 
and consumables to the mines. 
2.12 Changes in Tanzanian minerals sector from 2009 to 2015 
In order to address challenges that ensued during Mineral Policy of 1997 regime, changes in 
the minerals sector had to occur (Msabaha, 2006). Accordingly, the TZGT decided to review 
the minerals sector through formulation of several committees in 2004. These committees 
included the Presidential Committee to advice the government on administering the minerals 
sector (Bomani, 2008; East African Community, 2011). As such, this initiative resulted in the 
formulation of the Tanzania Mineral Policy of 2009 and Mining Act of 2010. 
 46 
 
2.13 Chapter summary 
This chapter has expounded on equity, equity role, government equity role in the minerals 
sector and financial and non-financial benefits of equity role. Other things covered included 
studying forms of government equity role namely: paid, carried, free, and free carry. Forms 
of equity role were then analysed in terms of pros and cons to fully understand them during 
their application in the research. Other issues of Tanzanian minerals endowment, mines, 
mining methods as well as contribution of minerals sector to the GDP were analysed. The 
minerals sector contribution is set to reach 10% by 2025 on the projection that the country 
shall turn into middle economy. 
Covering of historical equity role before 1996 and participation of TZGT in other areas of the 
minerals sector from 1884 to 2015 was done. Other areas of minerals sector that TZGT 
participated in aforementioned period included demarcation and allocation of mining plots, 
extension services to SSMs. Lastly, outlining of specification and de-specification of 
STAMICO and changes in Tanzanian minerals sector from 1996 to 2008 and 2009 to 2015 
took place. The next chapter discusses the research methodology used to undertake the 
research study.
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodology used in performing research on the guidance of 
research objectives derived from research question. Methodology of the study included the 
following: 
 Going through the background of the study and literature review; 
 To understand how resource nationalism leads to government equity role and 
its root causes; 
 To enhance and build knowledge on the subject of the government equity role; 
and 
 To understand how the Tanzanian government has been participating in the 
minerals sector from 1996 to 2015. 
 Collection of data relative to the area of study through desktop study means. For 
instance, collection of primary data of PLs partially owned by STAMICO from 1996 to 
2015 indicated in Appendix 8.1.1 was through desktop study; 
 Analysis of all PLs, MLs and SMLs partially and wholly owned by STAMICO, NDC and 
TR, (Appendices 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3), together with minimum exploration expenditures in 
PLs and payable annual levies for all mineral rights to; 
 Determine all mineral rights, minimum allowable exploration expenditures in 
PLs and receivable annual levies for all mineral rights under Tanzanian 
government equity role from 1996 to 2015; 
 Analysis of all forms of equity role of Tanzanian government in prospecting, medium 
and large scale mining and identification of prospecting projects and mines exercising 
such forms; 
 Analysis of financial and non-financial benefits of Tanzanian government equity role in 
prospecting, medium and large scale mining; and 
 Analysis of shortfalls as challenges faced by equity role of Tanzanian government in 
prospecting, medium and large scale mining. 
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More importantly to note, is that the analysis of minimum allowable exploration expenditures 
in PLs necessitated computations of the same indicators. This involved the setting out of a 
four years period from 2011 to 2015 (i.e., 2011/2012-2014/2015) as the major rationale. The 
set conditionality was applied in the calculations of minimum allowable exploration 
expenditures in PLs and government receivable annual levies for mineral rights. The main 
reason was to have a uniform approach of using exploration expenditure and payable annual 
levy rates stipulated in the Mining Act of 2010 and Mining Regulations of 2010 (Appendix 
8.5). These legislations came in force on 1 November 2010 through 2015. In Tanzania, 
Prospecting Licences (PLs) have three phases namely: Initial Prospecting Period (IPP), First 
Renewal Period (FRP) and Second Renewal Period (SRP) (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 
1998, 1999, 2010a and 2010b). It is worth noting that the duration of PLs life phases during 
the Mining Act of 1998 and Mining Regulations of 1999 were 3:2:2. This ratio of 3:2:2 
represents initial prospecting period of three years, first renewal period of two years, second 
renewal period of two years, respectively. 
In order to ensure valid comparisons of PLs issued under the regulations before 2010 and 
those after, it was vital to synchronise the life phases. The synchronisation of PLs life phases 
of the scenario 3:2:2 for IPP: FRP: SRP of during the Mining Act of 1998  and Mining 
Regulations 1999 to match with the ones of 4:3:2 manner applicable in the Mining Act of 2010 
and Mining Regulations of 2010 (Table 3.1 and Appendix 8.7) was done.  
As depicted in Table 3.1 and Appendix 8.7, all PLs under STAMICO and NDC issued from 
2007 to 2014 qualified for the determination of their exact valid life phases. This was to the 
reflection of the aforementioned 2011-2015 rationale. In summary, Table 3.1 and Appendix 
8.7 entailed the following: 
 With exception of PLs issued in 2010 whose IPPs of 3 years in 3:2:2 scenario were 
presumed to be equal to IPPs of 4 years in 4:3:2; and 
 The rest of PLs issued in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 followed the 4:3:2 scenario.
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Table 3.1 Life phases reflection of PLs under STAMICO from 2011 to 2015 
PLs of the same group A demo PL in the group 
being reflected from 
3:2:2 to 4:3:2 scenario   
Conformity to Mining Regulations of 1999 Conformity to Mining Regulations of 
2010 
From To Years Life phase under Mining 
Regulations of  1999 (3:2:2) 
Life phase reflection in Mining 
Regulation of 2010 (4:3:2) 
PL 6427/2010, PL 6428/2010,  
PL 6429/2010, PL 6430/2010,  
 PL 6431/2010, PL 6432/2010, 
 PL6544/2010, PL 6545/2010, 
 PL 6546/2010, PL 6547/2010,  
PL 6548/2010, PL 6549/2010,  
PL9968/2010, PL 6477/2010, 
PL 6537/2010 and PL 
6755/2010  
PL 6545/2010 12.07.2010 11.07.2011 1 An IPP  of 3 years was valid 
and crossed over a year 2011 
The IPP of 3 years under Mining 
Regulations of 1999 was assumed to be 
equal to the IPP of 4 years under Mining 
Regulations of 2010 
12.07.2011 11.07.2012 2 
12.07.2012 11.07.2013 3 
12.07.2013 11.07.2014 4 Mining Regulations of 1999 
are inapplicable 
A FRP of 3 years is valid under Mining 
Regulations of 2010 
12.07.2014 11.07.2015 5 
12.07.2015 11.07.2016 6 
12.07.2016 11.07.2017 7 Mining Regulations of 1999 are 
inapplicable 
A SRP of 2 years is valid under Mining 
Regulations of 2010 
12.07.2017 11.07.2018 8 
PL 7132/2011  
 
PL 7132/2011 04.07.2011 03.07.2012 1 Mining Regulations of  1999 
were inapplicable 
An IPP of 4 years was valid under Mining 
Regulations of 2010 04.07.2012 03.07.2013 2 
04.07.2013 03.07.2014 3 
04.07.2014 03.07.2015 4 
04.07.2015 03.07.2016 5 Mining Regulations of 1999 
were inapplicable 
A FRP of 3 years is valid under Mining 
Regulations of 2010 
 
04.07.2016 03.07.2017 6 
04.07.2017 03.07.2018 7 
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PL 8356/2012 PL 8356/2012 25.10.2012 24.10.2013 1 Mining Regulations of 1999 are 
inapplicable 
An IPP of 4 years is valid under 
Regulations of 2010 
25.10.2013 24.10.2014 2 
25.10.2014 24.10.2015 3 
25.10.2015 24.10.2016 4 
PL 8794/2013 and PL 
9243/2013 
PL 8794/2013 28.06.2013 27.01.2014 1 Mining Regulations of 1999 
were inapplicable 
An IPP of 4 years is valid under 
Regulations of 2010 
28.01.2014 27.01.2015 2 
28.01.2015 27.01.2016 3 
28.01.2016 27.01.2017 4 
PL 9548/2014, PL 9549/2014, 
PL 9550/2014, PL 9578/2014, 
PL 9594/2014, PL 9595/2014, 
PL 9856/2014, PL 9857/2014,  
PL 9858/2014, PL 9859/2014,  
PL 9860/2014 and  PL 
9963/2014 
PL 9548/2014 15.01.2014 114.01.2015 1 Mining Regulations of 1999 are 
inapplicable 
An IPP of 4 years is valid under 
Regulations of 2010 
15.01.2015 114.01.2016 2 
15.01.2016 114.01.2017 3 
15.01.2017 114.01.2018 4 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (nd., 1998, 1999, 2010a and 2010b) 
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Parameters used in computation of minimum exploration expenditures in each PL’s life phase 
included: 
 Size area of the PL in terms of km2 covered in Appendices 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.1.3 and 8.1.4; 
 Minimum allowable exploration expenditure rates of US$500.00 for IPP, US$2,000.00 
for FRP and US$6,000.00 for SRP (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2010b);  and 
 Number of PL’s years relevant to IPP, FRP and SRP. 
The exact amount of minimum exploration expenditures deemed committed in a PL was 
calculated using Equation 3.1 as the last step: 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥 = (𝑆)(𝐾)(𝑅)   (3.1) 
Where: 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥 is the minimum allowable exploration expenditure of an organization in PL’s life phase 
(US$), 
𝑆        is the PL’s area size (km2); 
𝐾       is the Number of years; and  
𝑅       is the minimum allowable exploration expenditures in PL’s life phase (US$/km2/year). 
In this study, receivable annual levies by the Tanzanian government for mineral rights were 
the payable annual levies made by the mineral right holders on the mineral rights they own. 
Payable annual levies for mineral rights were calculated using Equation 3.2. 
𝑃𝐴𝐿𝑀𝑅 = (𝑆)(𝑁)(𝐾)                  (3.2) 
Where: 
𝑃𝐴𝐿𝑀𝑅       is payable annual levies for mineral right (US$); 
𝑆                  is mineral right’s area size (km2); 
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𝑁              is number of years; and  
𝐾              is annual levy rate of the mineral right (US$/km2/year). 
Annual levy rates in the computation of payable annual levies are indicated in Appendix 8.5. 
These rates were in two mechanisms:  
 Rates with validity from 1 November 2010 to 15 July 2012; and 
 Rates with validity from 16 July 2012 to 31 December 2015.  
Other considerations were applicable in the computation of the annual levies for the mineral 
rights. These included: 
 Unlike MLs and SMLs whose annual levy rates are flat, in PLs annual levy rates are 
dependent on the PLs’ life phases notably: IPP, FRP and SRP (Appendix 8.5). In 
these PLs’ life phases, their periods and rates which differ were used in the 
computation of PLs annual levies; and 
 Unlike MLs and SMLs whose area sizes remain fixed when determining their annual 
levies, in PLs their area sizes reduced half way when they were in the first renewal 
period (FRP) and second renewal period (SRP) (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 
2010). 
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4 TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT EQUITY ROLE IN THE MINERALS 
SECTOR 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the equity role of Tanzanian government in prospecting, medium and 
large scale mining in relation to objectives of the study. Tanzanian government undertook 
equity role in some prospecting, medium and large scale projects in the country through 
STAMICO, NDC and TR. This led STAMICO, NDC and TR to adopt three forms of business 
ownerships in order to implement the government’s strategy. These included sole commercial 
entities, partnerships and private JV companies respectively. 
4.2 Tanzanian government’s equity role in prospecting 
In here, carried and paid equity roles of TZGT through STAMICO and NDC in prospecting 
were analysed. The analysis focused on the prospecting licences partially and wholly owned 
by STAMICO and NDC from 1996 to 2015 (Appendices 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.1.3 and 8.1.4). 
4.2.1 Carried equity role of STAMICO in prospecting 
STAMICO’s carried equity role in 13 gold Prospecting Licences (Appendix 8.1.1) was through 
the private joint venture company namely Buckreef Gold Company Limited (BKCGL) with 
TANZAM 2000. STAMICO and TANZAM 2000 are main shareholders of BKGCL with 
ownership shares of 45% and 55%, respectively (State Mining Corporation, 2017). In 
addition, TANZAM 2000 was the main operator in all 13 PLs, thereby meeting all cash calls 
including exploration expenditures and payable annual levies for the 13 PLs. This section 
outlines the computation of minimum allowable exploration expenditures and payable annual 
levies for 13 PLs deemed to have been incurred by TANZAM 2000.  
Table 4.1 presents the computation of minimum allowable exploration expenditures in each 
of 13 PLs from 2011 to 2015 using Equation 3.1. From Table 4.1, at least US$222,038 
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minimum allowable exploration expenditures was deemed to have been spent in 13 PLs by 
BKGCL from 2011 to 2015. 
Table 4.1 Exploration expenditures in 13 PLs partially owned by STAMICO 
Initial Prospecting Period (IPP) in which minimum 
allowable exploration expenditure rate per km2 per 
year is US$500 
First Renewal Period (FRP) in which 
minimum allowable exploration 
expenditure rate per km2 per year is 
US$2000 
 
Total 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures 
in IPP and 
FRP (US$) 
Licence No., Initial size 
(km2) of PL and mineral 
sought 
Period Expenditures 
in IPP (US$) 
Reduced 
size (km2) 
of PL 
Period Expenditures 
in FRP (US$) 
 
PL 6427/2010 & size 2.1 km2 2 2100 1.050 2 4200 6300 
PL 6428/2010 & size 2.99 
km2  
2 2990 1.495 2 5980 8970 
PL 6429/2010 & size 19.99 
km2 
2 19990 9.995 2 39980 59970 
PL 6430/2010 & size 8.9 km2 2 8900 4.450 2 17800 26700 
PL 6431/2010 & size 2.67 
km2 
2 2670 1.335 2 5340 8010 
PL 6432/2010 & size 1.97 
km2 
2 1970 0.985 2 3940 5910 
PL 6544/2010 & size 2.58 
km2 
2 2580 1.290 2 5160 7740 
PL 6545/2010 & size 5.28 
km2 
2 528 2.640 2 10560 11088 
PL 6546/2010 & size 17.41 
km2 
2 17410 8.705 2 34820 52230 
PL 6547/2010 & size 5.29 
km2 
2 5290 2.645 2 10580 15870 
PL 6548/2010 & size 1.89 
km2 
2 1890 0.945 2 3780 5670 
PL 6549/2010 & size 2.66 
km2 
2 2660 1.33 2 5320 7980 
PL 9968/2014 & size 5.6 km2 1 5600 - - - 5600 
Total (US$) 74578   147460 222038 
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The payable annual levy for each of the 13 PLs from 2011 to 2015 was computed using 
Equation 3.2 and presented in Appendix 8.8. From Appendix 8.8, BKGCL made payable 
annual levies of approximately US$21,941.  
4.2.2 Paid equity role of STAMICO in prospecting 
This section outlines computation of minimum allowable exploration expenditures and 
payable annual levies for 19 PLs deemed to have been incurred by STAMICO in line with 
paid equity role. 
4.2.2.1 Minimum allowable exploration expenditures by STAMICO  
Appendix 8.9 depicts computation of minimum allowable exploration expenditures in each of 
19 PLs from 2011 to 2015 using Equation 3.1. From Appendix 8.9, STAMICO needed a 
budget of at least US$231,880 for exploration activities from 2011 to 2015.  
4.2.2.2 Payable annual levies by STAMICO  
Appendix 8.10 depicts computation of payable annual levy for each of 19 PLs from 2011 to 
2015 using Equation 3.2. STAMICO was expected to pay levies to the government that were 
estimated to a value of US$33,504 for holding 19 PLs. 
4.2.3 Carried equity role of NDC in prospecting 
NDC’s carried equity role in 43 PLs as indicated in Appendix 8.1.3 was through two private 
JV companies namely: Tancoal Energy Limited (TEL) and Tanzania China International 
Mineral Resources Limited (TCIMRL). NDC is a shareholder with Intra Energy (Tanzania) 
Limited (IETL) and a shareholder with Sichuan Hongda Group of China (SHG) in TCIMRL. 
Percentages of ownership of NDC and IET in TEL are 30/70 and of NDC and SHG in TCIMRL 
are 20/80, respectively. TEL owns 10 coal PLs whereas TCIMRL owns 10 coal PLs, 16 iron 
coal PLs and seven dolomite PLs. However, this section used 37 PLs in both computations 
of minimum allowable exploration expenditures and payable annual levies. The reason being 
that the 37 PLs selected fall within the confines of the 2011-2015 rationale underscored in 
Chapter 3. 
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4.2.3.1 Minimum allowable exploration expenditures by TEL and TCIMRL 
Appendix 8.12 presents computation of minimum allowable exploration expenditures in each 
of 37 PLs from 2011 to 2015 using Equation 3.1. From Appendix 8.12, at least US$764,330 
had to be set aside as the minimum allowable exploration expenditures to be on 37 PLs by 
both TEL and TCIMRL. 
4.2.3.2 Payable annual levies for 37 PLs by TEL and TCIMRL  
Appendix 8.13 presents the results of payable annual levy for each of 37 PLs held by TEL 
and TCIMRL from 2011 to 2015 using Equation 3.2. From Appendix 8.13, TEL and TCIMRL 
had to pay approximately US$89,365 to the government.  
4.2.4 Paid equity role of NDC in prospecting 
NDC as a sole commercial entity wholly owned 22 PLs from 1996 to 2015 to develop their 
licences’ prospecting areas through paid equity role (Appendix 8.1.4). However, based on 
the set rationale of a four years period (2011-2015) underscored in Chapter 3 for 
computations of both minimum allowable exploration expenditures and receivable annual 
levies for mineral rights in this research study, NDC exercised paid equity role on 20 PLs out 
of 22 it wholly owned from 1996 to 2015. 
Figure 4.1 presents a summary of computations from information presented in Appendix 8.14 
of minimum allowable exploration expenditures in 20 PLs wholly owned by NDC. From Figure 
4.1, subtotals of exploration expenditures of 20 PLs in terms of IPP, FRP and SRP were 
US$434,950, US$386,500 and US$28,410 respectively. The total amount is US$849,860. 
This means that NDC had to budget to spend at least US$849,860 on 20 PLs for exploration 
activities. 
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Figure 4.1 Minimum allowable exploration expenditures in 20 PLs wholly owned by 
NDC 
 
On the other hand, Figure 4.2 depicts the summation of subtotals of payable annual levies in 
IPP, FRP and SRP resulting in the total value for levies. Equation 3.2 was used for 
computation of results presented in Appendix 8.15. From Figure 4.2, NDC was in the 
commitment of payable annual levies of approximately US$107,028 from 2011 to 2015. 
 
Figure 4.2 Payable annual levies by NDC to TZGT for 20 PLs 
 58 
 
4.3 Tanzanian government’s equity role in medium scale mining 
There is only one type of equity role by the Tanzanian government in medium scale mining 
namely, carried equity role discussed in this section. Tanzanian government through 
STAMICO and NDC conducted carried equity role in three medium scale mines namely 
Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM), Kigosi Gold Mine (KGM) and Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM), 
respectively. This section discusses the three mines. 
4.3.1 Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM) 
Table 4.2 outlines the general information analysed and/or evaluated in relation to TZGT’s 
carried equity role in Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM). Ownership of the mine is by the 
partnership between STAMICO and TOML. Value of the 50% shares bought by STAMICO 
was US$4 million carried by TOML. TOML’s recovery of US$4 million is through 40% of 
STAMICO's foregone dividends with interests. STAMICO is obliged to receive 60% of its 50% 
shareholding interests for being a shareholder. However, declaration of dividends will be done 
only when the partnership holding MTM realises profitable returns. The partnership between 
STAMICO and TOML owning Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM) shares profits at the mine as 
illustrated in Figure 4.3.  
Urafiki Gemstones EPZ Company, which is the wholly subsidiary of TOML, performs value 
addition of tanzanite. It is worth noting that Urafiki Gemstones EPZ is a fully owned subsidiary 
of TanzaniteOne Mining Limited. In 2015, MTM employed 592 locals on economies of scale 
grounds to leverage mining expansion activities set by the management in that year. The 
mine has contributed to the development of the communities where is located such as 
developing roads and construction of health care centres. There was a decline on the amount 
spent on CSR activities from US$427,967 in 2010 to zero in 2014. 
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Figure 4.3 Share of profits at Merelani Tanzanite Mine between STAMICO and TOML 
Source: Controller and Auditor General (2015); State Mining Corporation (2017); 
TanzaniaInvest (2014)
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Table 4.2 General information on the status of the Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM) 
Carried Equity Role in Medium Scale Mining 
Merelani Tanzanite Mine: STAMICO and TanzaniteOne Mining Limited (TOML) 
Location and background 
Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM) is located in Merelani area in Simanjiro District in Manyara region. This is the 
only area in the world known to have tanzanite deposits. The deposits have about 109 million carats of 
tanzanite The mine is under the licence ML 490/2013.  
Ownership STAMICO: 50% and TanzaniteOne Mining Limited: 50%. 
Licence validity 
Approval date 20 June 2013. 
Expiry date 19 June 2023. 
Mining operations 
During the mining operations, TOML will receive 1%, 2.5% and 2% of the market value of the sold minerals for 
operating costs, management fees and a special share profit for value added tanzanite. 
Mineral production Total of 52.85 million carats of tanzanite (all exported) from 2011-2015 at a value of US$58.16 million.  
Mining royalty Total of US$1.38 million from 2011 to 2015. 
Payable annual levy Total of US$45,600.00 from 2013 to 2015. 
Corporate income tax Total of US$2.6 million from 2006 to 2014. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, stamp duty, Import duty, Excise duty and service levy) Total of US$8.64 million from 2006 to 2014. 
Employment equity MTM cumulatively employed 1,166 locals and 23 expatriates from 2009 to 2015.  
Human resource development Fairly achieved despite lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
Procurement and enterprise development A 91.63% total procurement from 2012 to 2014 was local at the cost of US$11.6 million. 
Mine community development (MCD) From 2010 to 2014, the mine supplied communities with water, primary school, roads and health care centres.  
Sources: Controller Auditor General (2015); State Mining Corporation (2017); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency 
(2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016a) 
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From Figure 4.4, whilst tanzanite export sales increased from 2465162 carats in 2012 to 
15628191 carats in 2013, royalty paid by the mine to the TZGT declined from US$371,296.19 
in 2012 to US$229,545 in 2013. However, the results indicate that there is a query on whether 
a fair mining royalty was paid to the government by MTM in year 2013 following data anomaly. 
This was due to a mismatch of tanzanite production from 2012 to 2013 vis-a-vis royalty 
payments in the same period. 
 
Figure 4.4 Tanzanite production and exports by MTM from 2011 to 2015 
Source: Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016a) 
From Figure 4.5, MTM paid US$8.64 million and US$2.58 million to TZGT for other taxes and 
corporate income taxes covering a period from 2006 to 2014 respectively. The main reason 
for corporate income taxes to be lower than other taxes is that from 2009 to 2014 MTM did 
not pay any corporate income taxes due to non-profit working operations. 
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Figure 4.5 Corporate income tax and other taxes paid by MTM from 2006 to 2014 
Source: Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2015) 
4.3.2 Kigosi Gold Mine (KGM) 
Table 4.3 depicts general information and data retrieved from various sources, analysed 
and/or evaluated in relation to TZGT’s carried equity role in Kigosi Gold Mine (KGM). The 
required payable levy to the government was approximately US$59,460 from 2013 to 2015. 
There was no corporate income tax paid to the government because there were no mining 
activities carried out at the mine. This is due to non-provision of written consent of the lawful 
occupier of the surface right to the miner (KTM). 
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Table 4.3 General information on the status of the Kigosi gold Mine (KGM) 
Carried Equity Role in Medium Scale Mining 
Kigosi Gold Mine: STAMICO and Tanzania American International Development 
Corporation 2000 Limited (TANZAM 2000) 
Location and background 
Kigosi Gold Mine (KGM) is located in Kigosi game 
reserve in Bukombe District in Geita region. The 
Wildlife Conservation Act of 2013 regulates the 
game reserve area. KGM is under the licence ML 
496/2013. The mine orebody is of inferred mineral 
resources of 6.30 million tons at an average grade 
of 0.3g/t of gold. At first ownership of KGM was by 
TANZAM 2000 at 100%. Then later STAMICO and 
TANZAM 2000 formed a partnership to hold the 
mine at 15/85 percent of ownership shares. It is 
worth noting that TANZAM 2000 is a fully owned 
subsidiary of Intra Energy Corporation (IEC) of 
Australia. 
Ownership 
STAMICO: 15%. 
TANZAM 2000: 85%. 
Licence validity 
Approval date 11 October 2013. 
Expiry date 10 October 2023. 
Mining operations 
No carrying out of mining operations had taken place 
at the mine. This is due to non-provision of written 
consent of the lawful occupier of the surface right 
(Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism) to 
permit mining operations at the mine for the Mining 
Licence being issued on the Minister’s surface right. 
Mineral production 
There were no mineral production at the mine as the 
mine had been awaiting the written consent from the 
Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism.  
Mining royalty None. 
Payable annual levy Total of US$59,460.00 from 2013 to 2015. 
Corporate income tax None. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, 
stamp duty, Import duty, Excise duty and 
service levy) 
None. 
Employment equity No data displayed in public domains. 
Human resource development No data displayed in public domains. 
Procurement and enterprise 
development 
No data displayed in public domains. 
Mine community development (MCD) None. 
Source: Eastern Standard Time (2011); Tanzanian Royalty Exploration Corporation 
(2016) 
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4.3.3 Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM) 
Ngaka Coal Mine is owned by NDC and IETL having 30% and 70% shareholding, 
respectively. Table 4.4 outlines general data analysed and/or evaluated in relation to TZGT 
carried equity role in Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM). There was no corporate income tax collected 
during the period under study, this may be due to the mine not being profitable. Figure 4.6 
depicts that from 2011 to 2015, NCM paid a total of US$1.11 million mining royalty to the 
TZGT. However, there was a sharp increase in mining royalty paid to the TZGT by NCM from 
2011 to 2015. This increment in mining royalty was due to both increase in coal production 
and price. On the contrary, there was a slight fall in mining royalty by US$3,602 from 2014 to 
2015. This was due to fewer coal exports, lower coal price and lesser coal consumption by 
some of local cement manufacturers. Some of local cement manufactures chose to import 
foreign coal at the expense of local coal, thereby, affecting NCM negatively. 
 
Figure 4.6 Trends in NCM coal production and royalty payment by NCM 
Source: Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 and 2016a) 
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Table 4.4 General information of the status of the Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM) 
Carried Equity Role in Medium Scale Mining 
Ngaka Coal Mine: NDC and Intra Energy (Tanzania) Limited (IETL) 
Location and background Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM) is located in Ngaka area in Mbinga District 
in Ruvuma region. The mine is under the licence ML 439/2011. 
Tancoal Energy Limited (TEL) made up of two shareholders namely 
NDC and IETL owns the mine. The proven coal reserves at the 
NCM stands at 412 million tons It is worth noting that IETL is a fully 
owned subsidiary of Intra Energy Corporation (IEC) of Australia. 
Ownership  
NDC: 30%. 
IETL: 70%. 
Licence validity 
Approval 
date 
18 August 2011. 
Expiry 
date 
17 August 2021. 
Mining operations 
IETL is the main operator of the NCM carrying out mining 
operations. 
Mineral production A total of 790,761 tons of coal was produced, 690,494 tons sold 
locally and 49,225 tons exported from 2011 to 2015. Dividends had 
not been declared due to non-realisation of profitable returns by 
TEL. 
Mining royalty US$1.11 million from 2011 to 2015. 
Payable annual levy Total of US$119,760.00 from 2011 to 2015. 
Corporate income tax None. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, stamp 
duty, Import duty, Excise duty and service 
levy) 
None. 
Employment equity No data displayed in public domains. 
Human resource development Fairly achieved despite lack of monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms put in place by the government to ensure skills and 
knowledge transfer. 
Procurement and enterprise development No data displayed in public domains. 
Mine community development (MCD) No data displayed in public domains. 
Source: TanzaniaInvest (2017a); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015 and 2016a) 
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4.4 Tanzanian government equity role in large scale mining 
There are three types of equity roles that the Tanzanian government is engaged in for large 
scale mining participation namely: carried equity, paid equity and free carry equity. The 
government participation is through the roles played by STAMICO, NDC and TR.  
4.4.1 Carried equity role of STAMICO, NDC and TR in large scale mining 
Tanzanian government through STAMICO, NDC and TR conducted carried equity role in four 
large scale mines namely Buckreef Gold Mine, Liganga Iron ore Mine, Mchuchuma Coal Mine 
and Williamson Diamonds Mine respectively. This section discusses the benefits and 
challenges realised/experienced by the government through its proxies in these mines. 
4.4.1.1 Buckreef Gold Mine (BKGM) 
Table 4.5 summaries general information analysed and/or evaluated in relation to TZGT’s 
carried equity role in Buckreef Gold Mine (BKGM). The mine is owned by STAMICO and 
TANZAM 2000 with a 45% and 55% shareholding values, respectively. There are no taxes 
paid to the government because the mine has not commenced producing gold.
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Table 4.5 General information of the status of the Buckreef Gold Mine (BKGM) 
Carried Equity Role in Large Scale Mining 
Buckreef Gold Mine: STAMICO and Tanzania American International Development Corporation 2000 Limited (TANZAM 2000) 
Location and background 
Buckreef Gold Mine (BKGM) is located in Rwamgasa area in Geita District in Geita region. The mine is 
under the licence SML 04/92. Buckreef Gold company Limited (BKGCL) made up of two shareholders 
namely STAMICO and TANZAM 2000 owns the mine. The mine orebody is of measured and indicated 
gold ore reserves of 60 million tonnes with average grade of 1,26g/t of Au. It is worth noting that TANZAM 
2000 is a fully owned subsidiary of Tanzanian Royalty Corporation (TRX). 
Ownership STAMICO: 45% and TANZAM 2000: 55%. 
Licence validity 
Approval date 12 June 2000. 
Expiry date 11 June 2027. 
Mining operations TANZAM 2000 carried out mining operations for BKGCL since 2000 despite none of profitable returns.   
Mineral production There had been no gold production since 2000. 
Mining royalty None. 
Payable annual levy Total of US$0.16 million from 2011 to 2015. 
Corporate income tax None. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, stamp duty, Import duty, Excise duty and service levy) None. 
Employment equity No data displayed in public domains. 
Human resource development 
Fairly achieved despite lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms put in place by the government 
to ensure skills and knowledge transfer. 
Procurement and enterprise development No data displayed in public domains. 
Mine community development (MCD) No data displayed in public domains. 
Sources: State Mining Corporation (2017); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2016a) 
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4.4.1.2 Liganga Iron ore Mine (LIOM) 
Table 4.6 outlines general information analysed and/or evaluated in relation to TZGT carried 
equity role in Liganga Iron ore Mine (LIOM). The mine is owned by NDC and SHG with 20% 
and 80% shareholding, respectively. Mine is under development and its operations 
commencement is dependent on the completion of ongoing on constructions of: (i) 
Mchuchuma Coal Mine, (ii) 600MW Mchuchuma Thermal Power Station, (iii) 220kV 
transmission line from Mchuchuma to Liganga and (iv) Liganga Iron Ore Mine. There has 
been no royalty and taxes paid but only levies of US$0.15 million has been paid to the 
government. 
4.4.1.3 Mchuchuma Coal Mine (MCM) 
Table 4.7 summaries information in relation to TZGT carried equity role in Mchuchuma Coal 
Mine (MCM). The mine is owned by NDC and SHG with 20% and 80% shareholding, 
respectively. There had been no coal production since 2014, thus, the government could only 
receive a levy of approximately US$0.13 million. 
4.4.1.4 Williamson Diamonds Mine (WDM) 
Table 4.8 summaries information in relation to government carried equity role in Williamson 
Diamonds Mine (WDM). TR and Petra Diamonds Limited own the mine with 25% and 75% 
shareholding, respectively. The government was able to collect taxes and levies totalling to 
approximately US$36 million from 2006 and 2014. From 2010 to 2014, the mine spent 
US$1.16 million in CSR activities on communities around the mine. CSR activities performed 
by the mine included supplying the communities with water, upgrading roads and numerous 
classrooms provision of infrastructures well as agriculture improvements. However, there was 
a decline on the amount spent on CSR activities (i.e., from US$381, 813 in 2010 to 125,323 
in 2014 respectively). 
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Table 4.6 General information of the status of the Liganga Iron ore Mine (LIOM) 
Carried Equity Role in Large Scale Mining 
Liganga Iron ore Mine: NDC and Sichuan Hongda Group of China (SHG) 
Location and background 
Liganga Iron ore Mine (LIOM) is located in Liganga area in Ludewa District in Njombe region. The mine is under the licence is SML 533/2014. 
Tanzania China International Mineral Resources Limited (TCIMRL) made up of two shareholders NDC and SHG owns the mine. The mine 
orebody is with 126 million tons mineable iron ore reserves. SHG is a fully owned subsidiary of Hongda Group of China. LIOM is one of the 
two subprojects under the large Liganga Iron Coal Project (LIOP). The other is Liganga Iron and Steel Metallurgical Complex specifically for 
the production of iron and steel products namely vanadium pentoxide and titanium dioxide. The two subprojects under LIOP will depend entirely 
on power and coal supplies from Mchuchuma Coal Project (MCP). This means that MCP has to start operations in advance of LIOP. LIOP 
and SHG will invest US$1.8 billion in the two aforementioned subprojects.  
Ownership  NDC: 20% and SHG: 80% 
Licence 
validity 
Approval date  09 October 2014. 
Expiry date  08 October 2039. 
Mining operations 
Mine is under development and its operations commencement is dependent on the completion of ongoing on constructions of: (i) Mchuchuma 
Coal Mine, (ii) 600MW Mchuchuma Thermal Power Station, (iii) 220kV transmission line from Mchuchuma to Liganga and (iv) Liganga Iron 
Ore Mine. 
Mineral production There had been no iron ore production since 2014. 
Mining royalty None. 
Payable annual levy US$0.15 million from 2014 to 2015. 
Corporate income tax None. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, stamp duty, Import duty, Excise duty and service levy) None. 
Employment equity LIOM together with MCM will employ 32,000 locals.  
Human resource development Fairly achieved despite lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms  
Procurement and enterprise development No data displayed in public domains. 
Mine community development (MCD) No data displayed in public domains. 
Source: TanzaniaInvest (2017b); National Development Corporation (2012b) 
 70 
 
Table 4.7 General information of the status of the Mchuchuma Coal Mine (MCM) 
Carried Equity Role in Large Scale Mining 
Mchuchuma Coal Mine: NDC and Sichuan Hongda Group of China (SHG) 
Location and background 
Mchuchuma Coal Mine (MCM) is located in Mchuchuma area in Ludewa District in Njombe region. The mine is under the licence 
is SML 534/2014. Tanzania China International Mineral Resources Limited (TCIMRL) made up of two shareholders namely NDC 
and SHG owns the mine. Mine deposits are with 428 million tons proven coal reserves. MCM is among three subprojects under 
the large Mchuchuma Coal Project (MCP). The other two include: (i) 600MW Mchuchuma Thermal Power Station and (ii) 220kV 
transmission line from Mchuchuma to Liganga. MCM and SHG will invest US$1.2 billion in the three aforementioned subprojects.  
Ownership NDC: 20% and SHG:80% 
Licence 
validity 
Approval date 09 October 2014. 
Expiry date 08 October 2039. 
Mining operations Mine is under development in conjunction with the other two subprojects under MCP. 
Mineral production There had been no coal production since 2014. 
Mining royalty None. 
Payable annual levy US$0.13 million from 2014 to 2015. 
Corporate income tax None. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, stamp duty, Import duty, Excise duty and service levy) None. 
Employment equity 
MCM together with LIOM will employ 32,000 locals. However, there had been no data in public domains outlining the number of 
expatriates employed at the MCM. 
Human resource development 
Fairly achieved despite lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms put in place by the government to ensure skills and 
knowledge transfer. 
Procurement and enterprise development No data displayed in public domains. 
Mine community development (MCD) No data displayed in public domains. 
Source: TanzaniaInvest (2017b); National Development Corporation (2012c) 
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Table 4.8 General information of the status of the Williamson Diamonds Mine (WDM) 
Carried Equity Role in Large Scale Mining 
Williamson Diamonds Mine: TR and Petra Diamonds Limited 
Location and background 
Williamson Diamonds Mine (WDM) is located in Mwadui area in Kishapu District in Shinyanga region. The mine is under the licence SML 
216/2005. Ownership of the mine is by the partnership between TR and Petra Diamonds Limited of South Africa. The deposits have about 
40.39 million carats of diamond. 
Ownership TR: 25% and Petra Diamonds Limited: 75%. 
Licence validity 
Approval date 25 May 2005. 
Expiry date 24 May 2030. 
Mining operations Petra Diamonds Ltd had carried out mining operations for the partnerships holding. 
Mineral production 
Total of 702,692 carats of tanzanite (all exported) from 2011-2015 at a value of US$202.92 million. In 2013, the mine paid to TZGT, corporate 
income tax of worth US$0.75 million an indication of profitable returns realisation at the mine. However, there were no data in public 
substantiating resulted dividends for TZGT via TR due to that payment. 
Mining royalty Total of US$9.44 million from 2011 to 2015. 
Payable annual levy US$0.31 million from 2011 to 2015. 
Corporate income tax Total of US$0.11million from 2006 to 2014. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, stamp duty, Import duty, Excise duty and service levy) Total of US$25.92 million from 2006 to 2014.  
Employment equity 
Mine cumulatively employed 558 locals and 11 expatriates from 2009 to 2015. However, from 2010 to 2012 about 76 locals left. 24 new 
employees (locals) were employed in 2013 and 2014. 
Human resource development Fairly achieved despite lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms  
Procurement and enterprise development Local procurement of goods was at 80.5% from 2012 to 2014 at a value of US$98.91 million. 
Mine community development (MCD) 
The mine spent US$1.16 million in CSR activities on communities around the mine. CSR activities such as supplying the communities with 
water, roads and schools. 
Source: Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016a) 
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Figure 4.7 shows that WDM paid to the TZGT corporate income tax of US$0.11 million for 
the year 2013 after having realised profit returns. The mine operated under losses in the 
remaining years from 2006 to 2012 and 2014 respectively. These impeded payments of 
corporate income taxes and government dividends. However, it is not clear whether WDM 
paid government dividends during the time of paying the aforementioned corporate income 
tax. This is due to lack of information or data in public domains by Petra Diamonds Ltd, TR, 
MEM and TEITI. Other notable payments by WDM to the TZGT in the 2006-2014 period were 
of the other taxes totalling to approximately US$26 million. 
 
Figure 4.7 Corporate income tax and other taxes paid by WDM from 2006 to 2014 
Source: Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2015) 
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4.4.2 Paid equity role of STAMICO in large scale mining 
Tanzania through STAMICO conducted paid equity role in two large scale mines namely: 
Kiwira Coal Mine (KCM) and Stamigold Biharamulo Mine (SBM). These mines are discussed 
in this section. 
4.4.2.1 Kiwira Coal Mine (KCM) 
Table 4.9 outlines general information and data retrieved from various sources, analysed 
and/or evaluated in relation to TZGT paid equity role in Kiwira Coal Mine (KCM).  Kiwira Coal 
and Power Ltd (KCPL) owns KCM and the 6MW Power Station within the SML area. The 
plant is set to power the mine and generate revenues for KCPL through electricity selling to 
TANESCO. KCPL is a sole commercial entity and a wholly owned subsidiary of STAMICO. 
The proved coal reserves at the NCM stands at 35.4 million tonnes. 
4.4.2.2 Stamigold Biharamulo Mine (SBM) 
Table 4.10 outlines general information in relation to TZGT paid equity role in Stamigold 
Biharamulo Mine (SBM), which is owned by Stamigold Company Limited. Stamigold 
Company Limited is a subsidiary of STAMICO. Before 2013, Pangea Minerals Ltd and MDN 
Inc. owned SBM formerly known as known Tulawaka Gold Mine. As Tulawaka gold Mine was 
approaching its end of life, its owners settled with the TZGT for the government to acquire 
the mine in order to mine the remnant gold bearing areas of 200,000 troy ounces. In this deal, 
Pangea Minerals Ltd and MDN Inc. had to give TZGT US$11.6 million out of US$16.1 million 
of mine rehabilitation fund. The remaining US$4.5 million acted as a compensation for giving 
government the mine. TZGT tasked STAMICO to operate the mine and be responsible for 
the mine rehabilitation. In order to address these, it formulated Stamigold Company Ltd, its 
fully owned subsidiary in October 2013. TR and STAMICO are shareholders in this mine as 
per government with 1% and 99% shareholding, respectively. The mine has paid a total of 
approximately US$2.7 million of taxes and levy to the government; however, these taxes do 
not include corporate income tax.  
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Table 4.9 General information of the status of the Kiwira Coal Mine (KCM) 
Paid Equity Role in Large Scale Mining 
Kiwira Coal Mine: NDC Kiwira Coal and Power Limited (KCPL) 
Location and background 
Kiwira Coal Mine (KCM) is located in Kiwira area crossing two Districts of Ileje and Rungwe 
both in Mbeya region. The mine is under the licence SML 233/2005. Kiwira Coal and Power 
Ltd (KCPL) owns KCM and the 6MW Power Station within the SML area. The plant is set to 
power the mine and generate revenues for KCPL through electricity selling to TANESCO. 
Ownership KCPL: 100%. 
Licence validity 
Approval date 17 November 2005. 
Expiry date 16 November 2030. 
Mining operations 
Operations not yet started awaiting tendering for re-development of the mine and 6MW Power 
Station. 
Mineral production None. 
Mining royalty None. 
Payable annual levy US$0.23 million from 2011 to 2015 
Corporate income tax None. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, stamp duty, Import duty, Excise duty and service levy) None. 
Employment equity No data displayed in public domains. 
Human resource development No data displayed in public domains. 
Procurement and enterprise development No data displayed in public domains. 
Mine community development (MCD) No data displayed in public domains. 
Sources: State Mining Corporation (2017); TanzaniaInvest (2017c); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2016a) 
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Table 4.10 General information of the status of the Stamigold Biharamulo Mine (SBM) 
Paid Equity Role in Large Scale Mining 
Stamigold Biharamulo Mine: Stamigold Company Limited and Treasury Registrar (TR) 
Location and background 
Stamigold Biharamulo Mine (SBM) is located in Tulawaka area crossing four Districts in two regions. These 
are Geita, Bukombe and Chato Districts in Geita region and Biharamulo District in Kagera region. The mine 
is under the licence SML 157/2003. 
Ownership STAMICO: 99% and Treasury Registrar (TR): 1%. 
Licence validity 
Approval date 03 November 2003. 
Expiry date 02 November 2028. 
Mining operations Stamigold company Ltd had carried out mining operations at the mine since July 2014.  
Mineral production 
Exportation of gold and silver was 21,236 and 2,240 troy ounces of value US$24.67 million from 2014 to 
2015. 
Mining royalty US$0.82 million from 2014 to 2015. 
Payable annual levy Total of US$0.30 million from 2011 to 2015. 
Corporate income tax None. 
Other taxes (PAYE, SDL, WHT, VAT, stamp duty, Import duty, Excise duty and service levy) Total of US$1.61million 2011 to 2015. 
Employment equity Only locals employed at the mine, 340 skilled and 43 non-skilled employed at the mine. 
Human resource development Fairly achieved despite lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms  
Procurement and enterprise development Mine spent US$63,076.92 in purchasing locally produced and supplied food stuffs from 2011 to 2015. 
Mine community development (MCD) 
From 2011 to 2015, the mine spent a total of US$101,238.47 on CSR activities for community around the 
mine. CSR activities performed included facilitation of desks to pupils and renovations of water storage 
facilities, feeder roads as well as classrooms. 
Sources: State Mining Corporation (2017); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2014, 2016a) 
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4.4.3 Free carry equity role of TZGT in large scale mining 
Following the inception of Mineral Policy of 2009 in Tanzania, TZGT introduced free carry 
equity role in large scale mining. This is another form of government equity role in large scale 
mining apart from carried and paid forms (Section 4.4).  
Mining companies under free carry equity pay free carried interest (FCI) in terms of dividends 
to the government during profits-making periods (Section 2.5.4). However, according to 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2010a), minerals development agreement (MDA) deems to 
incorporate mechanism for mining companies to grant FCI to the government. In addition, 
other crucial things relative to FCI, MDA incorporates include: 
 The grant of SMLs; 
 The conduct of mining operations under a SML; 
 The grant of the TZGT free carried interest by the mining company under the carry 
equity role; 
 State participation in mining; and 
 Financing of any mining operations under a special mining licence. 
The Minister for Energy and Minerals is empowered to enter into MDA with holders of or 
applicants for SMLs. However, in order for MDA to be endorsed, prior negotiations between 
government and mining company take place. In the negotiations of the MDA on the project 
under free equity carry, there are also discussions about the value of the FCI. The aim is to 
obtain agreeable FCI to be applied in the project. However, types of minerals and level of 
investment determine FCI as rationales (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2010a). It is worth 
highlighting here that, in 2014 TZGT had decided to acquire free carried interest from two 
large scale mining projects for its carry equity role. The two projects pertaining to this 
government strategy are Nachu Graphite Project (NGRP) and Mkuju River Uranium Project 
(MRUP) owned by Uranex (Tanzania) Limited and Mantra Tanzania Limited, respectively.  
Reserves of graphite in NGRP stand at about 174 million tonnes with an average grade of 
5.4% graphitic carbon (Cg). This project applied a cut-off grade of 3%. The uranium deposit 
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at MRUP contains approximately 56,517 tonnes measured and indicated (Mining 
Technology, 2017; Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, 2016a). In addition, Uranex (Tanzania) 
Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Magnis Resources Limited whilst Mantra Tanzania 
Limited is a subsidiary of Mantra Resources Pty Ltd.  
The negotiations for having FCI for each project between the TZGT and the projects owners 
took place from 2014 to 2015. However, these negotiations could not lead to agreeable FCIs 
for signing of minerals development agreements (MDAs) as they ended up fruitless in 2015. 
This therefore made the Tanzanian government not to practice free carry equity role in NGRP 
and MRUP. 
4.5 Chapter summary 
In the period from 1996 to 2015, the equity role of the Tanzanian government focused on 
prospecting, medium and large scale mining. In prospecting, execution of carried form of 
TZGT equity role took place in 13 and 43 PLs partially owned by STAMICO and NDC 
respectively. At the same time, the paid equity was applied in 41 PLs of the same parastatals. 
Carried and paid forms of TZGT equity role were also applied in medium and large scale 
mines as follows:  
 Three medium scale mines, i.e. MTM, KGM and NCM, applied carried equity role;  
 Four large scale mines, i.e. BKGM, LIOM, MCM and WDM, practiced  the same carried 
equity role: and 
 Two large scale mines notably: KCM and SBM conducted paid equity role.  
In addition, TZGT introduced free carry equity, which obliges mining companies under this 
form of equity role to grant free carried interests (FCIs) to the TZGT (Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals (2010a). In 2014, two large scale mining projects namely Nachu Graphite Project 
(NGRP) and Mkuju River Uranium Project (MRUP) were in the process of adopting the free 
carry role. Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2010a) requires that FCIs be determined through 
negotiations between TZGT and mining companies set to pursue the strategy. In addition, 
negotiations for having FCI for NGRP and MRUP took place from 2014 to 2015. Despite 
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parties carrying out the negotiations, they did not arrive at agreeable FCIs for signing of 
minerals development agreements (MDAs) which could not take place.
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses results of analyses pertinent to objectives of the research study 
including challenges (shortfalls or shortcomings) faced by Tanzanian government’s 
equity role strategy from 1996 to 2015. In addition, this chapter discusses also causes 
of such shortfalls or challenges faced by the strategy. 
5.2 Results of all mineral rights owned by Tanzanian government 
The analysis of all mineral rights owned by the TZGT focused on PLs, MLs and SMLs 
partially and wholly owned by STAMICO and NDC and TR. In this study, Appendices 
8.11, 8.16 and 8.3.1 were used to determine a number of mineral rights owned by the 
TZGT from 1996 to 2015.  More importantly to note, is that Appendix 8.11 generated 
from information presented in Appendices 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.2.1, 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 while 
Appendix 8.16 emanated from Appendices 8.1.3, 8.1.4 and 8.3.1. 
Data in Appendix 8.11 was used to produce Figure 5.1, which indicates that STAMICO 
partially and wholly owned 17 and 20 mineral rights from 1996 to 2015, respectively. 
Partially owned mineral rights by STAMICO were 13 PLs, 2 MLs and 2 SMLs whilst 
wholly owned ones included 19 PLs and 1 SML. Minerals sought in the mineral rights 
were gold, tanzanite, phosphate, REE, gypsum, kaolin, feldspar and coal.  
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Figure 5.1 Mineral rights partially and wholly owned by STAMICO 
Data in Appendix 8.16 was used to produce Figure 5.2, which depicts that NDC 
partially and wholly owned 46 and 22 mineral rights, respectively from 1996 to 2015.  
As shown in Figure 5.2 partially owned mineral rights by NDC were 43 PLs, 1 ML and 
2 SMLs while wholly owned ones were 22 PLs. Minerals sought in mineral rights 
included coal, iron, dolomite, soda ash, AOBG and gold. 
 
Figure 5.2 Mineral rights partially and wholly owned by NDC 
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NDC played its role in the minerals industry by going into joint venture with IETL and 
SHG through TEL and TCIMRL companies, respectively. According to Figure 5.3, TEL 
was awarded 10 coal Prospecting Licences and 1 coal Mining Licence. In addition, 
TCIMRL acquired 10 coal, 17 iron, 7 dolomite Prospecting Licences and 1 coal Special 
Mining Licences. 
 
Figure 5.3 Shareholders of TEL and TCIMRL private JV companies and mineral 
rights  
Looking into the equity role of TR in mineral rights, Appendix 8.3.1 indicates that TR 
partially owned one diamond SML namely SML 216/2005. The TR’s percentage of 
ownership of a mineral right vis-a-vis private investor was 25%. The private investor 
that owns the diamond SML with TR is Petra Diamonds Ltd, owning 75% shares in the 
Licence.  
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In this research study, it was also important to analyse the number of mineral rights 
issued per mineral type (Figure 5.4). This together with the analysis of business 
structures (business ownerships) holding mineral rights as indicated in Figure 5.5 was 
useful in the understanding of: 
 The mineral seeking intensity in Tanzania under government equity role in the 
mining industry; and 
 Entities holding mineral rights, their nature of business ownerships and types 
of mineral rights held under TZGT equity role in the mining industry. 
On the mineral seeking intensity under TZGT equity role from 1996 to 2015, seeking 
of coal was at higher rate as compared to other minerals followed by gold and iron 
(Figures 5.4 and 5.5). This was presumably due to high granting of coal mineral rights 
by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM). For instance, from 1996 to 2015, MEM 
granted 36 coal, 28 gold and 19 iron mineral rights in line with TGZGT equity role in 
the minerals industry. 
 
Figure 5.4 Mineral rights sought under equity role from 1996 to 2015 
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Figure 5.5 presents entities, which owned mineral rights from 1996 in relation to TZG 
equity role in the mining industry. Each indicator in the presentation in Figure 5.5 
comprised of the mineral type, type of mineral right and percentage of ownership by 
the shareholder(s). Deducing from Figure 5.5: 
 60 mineral rights out of 106 were owned through private JV companies; 
 42 mineral rights out of 106 were fully owned by STAMICO and NDC as sole 
commercial entities, thus making a 39.6% ownership; and 
 Four mineral rights out of 106 were owned through partnerships, thus making 
a 3.8% of ownership. 
 
Figure 5.5 Mineral types, mineral rights and business ownerships by TZGT  
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5.3 Results of minimum allowable exploration expenditures in PLs 
This section presents the analysis of minimum allowable exploration expenditures in 
PLs under STAMICO and NDC. Table 5.1 was generated from information presented 
in Table 4.1 and Appendix 8.9, whilst Table 5.2 was from information shown in 
Appendices 8.12 and 8.14. 
Table 5.1 presents minimum allowable exploration expenditures in 32 PLs under 
STAMICO from 2011 to 2015. TANZAM 2000 contributed its capital share and the 
required share of STAMICO for the 13 PLs. The minimum required expenditure for 
these 13 PLs was estimated to be at least US$222,038 for exploration activities from 
2011 to 2015 (Table 5.1). In addition, STAMICO was required to spend at least 
US$231,880 on its 19 wholly owned PLs for exploration activities. Thus, the total 
minimum allowable exploration expenditures on 32 PLs was approximately US$0.45 
million. 
Table 5.1 Minimum allowable exploration expenditures in PLs under STAMICO 
Nature of 
PLs 
ownership 
from 2011 
to 2015 
 
Mineral rights 
description 
No. of 
mineral 
rights 
Percentag
e of 
ownership 
of 
STAMICO 
in mineral 
rights (%) 
Exploration 
expenditure
s share of 
STAMICO 
(US$) 
Exploration 
expenditures 
share of private 
investor 
Minimum 
allowable 
exploration 
expenditure
s in PLs 
(US$) 
%  Amount 
(US$) 
Partial 
ownership 
Gold PLs wholly owned 
by STAMICO and 
TANZAM 2000 
13 45 99,917.10 55 122,120.90 222,038.00 
 
Subtotal  
13  99,917.10  122,120.90 222,038.00 
Wholly 
ownership 
Gold PLs wholly owned 
by STAMICO 
11 100 185,685.00 
- - 
185,685.00 
Phosphate PLs wholly 
owned by STAMICO 
2 100 3,875.00 
- - 
3,875.00 
REE PLs wholly owned 
by STAMICO 
2 100 13,275.00 
- - 
13,275.00 
Gypsum PL wholly 
owned by STAMICO 
1 100 1,980.00 
- - 
1,980.00 
Kaolin PLs wholly 
owned by STAMICO 
1 100 1,350.00 
 
- - 
1,350.00 
 
Feldspar PL wholly  
owned by STAMICO 
1 100 9,025.00 
- - 
9,025.00 
Coal PLs wholly owned 
by STAMICO 
1 100 16,690.00 
- - 
16,690.00 
 
Subtotal  
19 - 231,880.00 - 
- 
231,880.00 
 
Total 
32 - 331,797.10 - 122,120.90 453,918.00 
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Table 5.2 depicts minimum allowable exploration expenditures on 57 PLs under NDC 
from 2011 to 2015. IETL and SHG were deemed to have spent at least US$764,330 
for exploration activities on 37 PLs from 2011 to 2015. However, due to the carried 
equity role of the TZGT on 37 PLs, IETL and SHG had to contribute both 
US$189,880.50 (TZGT’s equity capital share supposed to be contributed by NDC on 
behalf TZGT) and US$574,449.50 (Private sector investor’s equity capital share 
specifically sourced from IETL and SHG themselves). As NDC was also deemed to 
have spent US$849,860 for exploration activities on its 20 wholly owned PLs, the total 
minimum allowable exploration expenditures in the 57 PLs was about US$1.61 million. 
The totals in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 add up to US$2.06 million as the total minimum 
allowable exploration expenditures from 2011 to 2015. 
Table 5.2 Minimum allowable exploration expenditures in PLs under NDC 
Nature of PLs 
ownership 
from 2011 to 
2015 
 
Mineral rights 
description 
No. of 
mineral 
rights 
Percentage 
of 
ownership 
of NDC in 
mineral 
rights (%) 
Exploration 
expenditures 
share of 
NDC(US$) 
Exploration 
expenditures share 
of private investor 
Minimum 
allowable 
exploration 
expenditures 
in PLs (US$) 
%  Amount 
 (US$) 
Partial 
ownership 
Coal PLs partially 
owned by NDC and 
IETL 
10 30 111,043.50 70 370,145.00 370,145.00 
Coal PLs partially 
owned by NDC and 
SHG 
8 20 30,907.00 80 123,628.00 154,535.00 
Iron PLs partially 
owned by NDC and 
SHG 
12 20 44,462.00 80 177,848.00 222,310.00 
Dolomite PLs partially 
owned by NDC and 
SHG 
7 20 3,468.00 80 13,872.00 17,340.00 
 
Subtotal  
37 - 189,880.50 - 574,449.50 764,330.00 
Wholly 
ownership Coal PLs wholly owned 
by NDC 
11 100 298,820.00 
- - 
298,820.00 
Soda Ash PLs wholly 
owned by NDC 
5 100 455,700.00 
- - 
455,700.00 
AOBG PLs wholly 
owned by NDC 
1 100 74,580.00 
- - 
74,580.00 
Gold PLs wholly owned 
by NDC 
1 100 16,365.00 
- - 
16,365.00 
Iron PLs wholly owned 
by NDC 
2 100 4,395.00 
- - 
4,395.00 
Subtotal  
20 - 849,860.00 - 
- 
849,860.00 
Total 
57 - 1,039,740.50 - 574,449.50 1,614,190.00 
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Figure 5.6 illustrates minimum exploration expenditures for held PLs from 2011 to 
2015. The nature of contribution of minimum exploration expenditures included 
contributions from private sector companies and parastatals. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 were 
used to produce Figure 5.6.  
 
Figure 5.6 Minimum allowable exploration expenditures for held PLs  
 
From Figure 5.6 it can be deduced that:  
 From 2011 to 2015, the parastatals’ contribution in the total minimum allowable 
exploration expenditures for held PLs was deemed to be US$1.37 million 
(66.5%) whilst the contribution from the private companies was US$0.69 million 
(33.5%); and 
 Parastatals’ contribution was higher than private companies’ contribution by 
US$0.68 million (33%) which implied a need for government to assess the value 
for money on its coffers deemed to have been spent in exploration activities in 
the held PLs. 
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5.4 Analysis of receivable annual levies for licences 
This section analyses the levies the Tanzanian government received for the period 
under study. The government received levies for licences issued under prospecting, 
mining and special licence categories. 
5.4.1 Payable annual levies under STAMICO 
Table 5.3 depicts payable annual levies from licences partially or wholly owned by 
NDC for the period 2011 to 2015. The total levies paid to government were 
approximately US$855,866. The contribution from wholly owned licences by 
STAMICO was about US$679,191 given the fact that majority of licences issued to 
STAMICO are wholly owned. 
5.4.2 Payable annual levies under NDC 
Table 5.4 displays payable annual levies from licences partially or wholly owned by 
NDC for the period 2011 to 2015. The total levies paid to government were 
approximately US$595,503. The contribution from private sector investors namely 
IETL and SHGL was about US$374,254. This was attributed to many partially owned 
mineral rights issued to NDC having higher shareholding ownerships than private 
sector investors. 
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Table 5.3 Payable annual levies from licences under STAMICO 
Mineral rights description 
No. of 
mineral 
rights 
Percentage of 
ownership of 
STAMICO in 
mineral rights 
(%) 
Payable annual 
levies share of 
STAMICO 
(US$) 
Payable annual levies share of 
private or other TZGT partner  
Payable 
annual levies 
(US$) 
%  Amount (US$) 
Partially owned licences  
 Gold PLs partially owned by STAMICO and TANZAM 2000 
13 45 9,873.765 55 12,067.935 21,941.70 
Tanzanite ML (ML 490/2013) partially owned by STAMICO and TOML 1 50 22,880.00 50 22,880.00 45,600.00 
Gold ML (ML 496/2013) partially owned by STAMICO and TANZAM 2000 1 15 8,919.00 85 50,541.00 
59,460.00 
 
Gold SML (SML 157/2003) partially owned by STAMICO and TR  1 99 301,514.40 1 3,045.60 
304,560.00 
 
Gold SML (SML 04/92) partially owned by STAMICO and TANZAM 2000 1 45 72,180.00 55 88,220.00 
160,400.00 
 
Wholly owned licences 
Gold PL wholly owned by STAMICO 11 100 24,265.30 N/A 0.00 24,265.30 
Phosphates PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 2 100 775.00 N/A 0.00 775.00 
REE PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 2 100 2,655.00 N/A 0.00 2,655.00 
Gypsum PL wholly owned by STAMICO 1 100 396.00 N/A 0.00 396.00 
Kaolin PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 1 100 270.00 N/A 0.00 270.00 
Feldspar PL wholly owned by STAMICO 1 100 1,805.00 N/A 0.00 1,805.00 
Coal PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 1 100 3,338.00 N/A 0.00 3,338.00 
Coal SML (SML 233/2005) wholly owned by STAMICO 1 100 
230,400.00 
 N/A 0.00 
230,400.00 
 
Grand total 37 N/A 679,191.465 N/A 176,674.535 855,866.00 
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Table 5.4 Payable annual levies from licences under NDC 
Mineral rights description 
No. of mineral 
rights 
Percentage of ownership of NDC 
in mineral rights (%) 
Payable annual levies 
share of NDC (US$) 
Payable annual levies share of 
private investor 
Payable annual 
levies (US$) 
%  Amount (US$) 
Partially owned licences 
10 Coal PLs partially owned by NDC 
and IETL 10 30 13,649.475 70 45,498.25 45,498.25 
8 Coal PLs partially owned by NDC and 
SHG 8 20 3,928.42 80 15,713.68 19,642.10 
12 Iron PLs partially owned by NDC and 
SHG 12 20 4,151.35 80 16,605.40 20,756.75 
7 Dolomite PLs partially owned by NDC 
and SHG 7 20 693.60 80 2,774.40 3,468.00 
1 Coal ML (ML 439/2011) partially 
owned by NDC and IETL 1 30 35,928.00 70 83,832.00 
119,760.00 
 
1 Iron ore SML (SML 533/2014) partially 
owned by NDC and SHG 1 20 30,410.00 80 121,640.00 
152,050.00 
 
1 Coal SML (SML 534/2014) partially 
owned by NDC and SHG 1 20 25,460.00 80 101,840.00 
127,300.00 
 
Wholly owned licences 
11 Coal PLs wholly owned by NDC 11 100 31,777.10 - - 31,777.10 
5 Soda Ash PLs wholly owned by NDC 5 100 56,183.40 - - 56,183.40 
1 AOBG PLs wholly owned by NDC 1 100 14,916.00 - - 14,916.00 
1 Gold PLs wholly owned by NDC 1 100 3,273.00 - - 3,273.00 
2 Iron PLs wholly owned by NDC 2 100 879.00 - - 879.00 
Grand total 60 - 221,249.345 - 374,254.255 595,503.60 
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5.4.3 Payable annual levies under TR 
The total receivable annual levies by the government for mineral rights partially owned 
by TR from 2011 to 2015 were US$306,000 (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Payable annual levies from licences under TR 
 
Adding together grand total values of payable annual levies from Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 
5.5, the total annual levies that were payable to the government from 2011 to 2015 
was approximately US$1.76 million. Figure 5.7 presents payable annual levies for held 
licences by STAMICO, NDC and TR to the TZGT from 2011 to 2015. 
 
Figure 5.7 Payable annual levies for held licences 
Mineral rights description 
No. of 
mineral 
rights 
Percentage of 
ownership of 
TR in the 
mineral right 
(%) 
Annual 
levies share 
of TR 
(US$) 
Annual levies 
share of private 
partner  
Payable 
annual levies 
(US$) 
%  Amount 
(US$) 
1 Diamond SML (SML 
216/2005) partially owned 
by TR and Petra Diamonds 
Limited 
1 25 76,500.00 75 229,500.00 306,000.00 
Grand Total 
1 25 76,500.00 75 229,500.00 306,000.00 
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From Figure 5.7, the annual payable levies share of STAMICO from 2011 to 2015 on 
its wholly and partially owned mineral rights exceeded the ones of NDC’s and TR’S 
mineral rights. This was because STAMICO owned more MLs and SMLs than NDC 
and TR with greater ownership shares (Table 5.3, Table 5.4 and Table 5.5). It should 
be underscored here that the annual levy rates of MLs and SMLs expressed in 
US$/km2/year (Appendix 8.5) are far much higher than in PLs which caused higher 
payable annual levies on mineral rights under STAMICO at the tune of approximately 
US$0.9 million (Figure 5.7).  
Figure 5.7 further demonstrates that unlike STAMICO, which had more shares of 
ownership in mineral rights than NDC and TR, a rationale that mostly necessitated its 
self-commitment in settling of payable annual levies, NDC relied on the private sector 
investors in settling of the payable annual levies. However, on the further analysis of 
the Figure 5.7, the deemed expected parastatals’ contribution of payable annual levies 
on TZGT partially and wholly owned PLs outdid the private sector investors’ 
contribution. 
5.5 Analysis of forms of the Tanzanian government equity role 
5.5.1 Role of government in prospecting licences 
The government plays a role in the prospecting licences through partial or wholly 
ownership through parastatals such as STAMICO and NDC. There are two forms of 
ownership exercised by the government, that is, carried and paid equity participation. 
The parastatals held 56 and 41 licences under paid equity and carried equity 
participation roles, respectively. Table 5.6 shows that STAMICO had 19 PLs and 13 
PLs under paid equity and carried equity, respectively. Whereas NDC exercised more 
carried equity participation than paid equity at 43 PLs and 22 PLs, respectively. 
Therefore, the government carries more business risk in the investments under 
STAMICO compared to those under NDC. 
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Table 5.6 Forms of equity role of government in prospecting 
 
Category/Aspect 
PLs partially 
owned by 
STAMICO 
 
PLs wholly 
owned by 
STAMICO 
PLs partially owned 
by NDC 
 
PLs wholly 
owned by 
NDC 
13 PLs 
 
19 PLs 43 PLs 
 
22 PLs 
Government 
(TZGT) role 
Carried equity 
 
Paid equity Carried equity 
 
Paid equity 
Main operator TANZAM 2000 
STAMICO IETL in 10 coal PLs 
and SHG in 10 coal, 16 
iron and 7 dolomite 
PLs 
NDC 
Overseer of TZGT 
interests 
STAMICO STAMICO NDC NDC 
PLs ownership 
13 gold PLs 
owned by BGCL 
19 PLs owned 
by STAMICO 
10 coal PLs owned by 
TEL 
22 PLs 
owned by 
NDC 
10 coal PLs owned by 
TCIMRL 
16 iron PLs owned by 
TCIMRL 
10 dolomite PLs owned 
by TCIMRL 
PLs ownership 
shareholding 
TANZAM 2000 
(55%) and 
STAMICO 
(45%) in 13 goal 
PLs 
STAMICO IETL (70%) and NDC 
(30%) in 10 coal PLs 
NDC 
SHG (80%) and NDC 
(20%) in 10 coal PLs 
SHG (80%) and NDC 
(20%) in 16 iron PLs 
SHG (80%) and NDC 
(20%) in 7 dolomite 
PLs 
Receivable profits 
(dividends) for 
TZGT interests 
(inclusive of 
mineral resources) 
45% of total 
profits from 
BGCL through a 
sale of 13 gold 
PLs 
100% total 
profits by 
STAMICO 
through a sale 
of 19 PLs 
30% of total profits 
from TEL through a 
sale of 10 coal PLs 
100% total 
profits by 
NDC through 
a sale of 22 
PLs 20% of total profits 
from TCIMRL through 
a sale of 10 coal PLs 
20% of total profits 
from TCIMRL through 
a sale of 16 Iron PLs 
and 7 dolomite PLs. 
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5.5.2 Role of government in medium scale mining licences 
STAMICO and NDC are involved in carried equity in three medium scale mines as 
indicated in Table 5.7. The government did not earn any dividends from these mines 
under the period of the research study. This was may be due to a non- going concern 
situation experienced by STAMICO and at the same time, some of its mines were not 
in operation (Controller and Auditor General, 2015). STAMICO and NDC may not have 
paid any amount to the government due to type of equity engagement involved where 
NDC could only receive any payments from the mine after the foregone dividends have 
covered the amount initially invested by the private partner to cover the parastatals 
ownership costs. 
5.5.3 Role of government in large scale mining licences 
The government involved in large scale mining through exercising paid and carried 
equity roles (Tables 5.8 and 5.9). The paid equity role is through SBM and KCM while 
carried equity is through BKGM, MCM, LIOM and WDM. The parastatals tasked with 
heading and protecting the role of government are STAMICO, NDC and TR (the 
government agent). Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that the government did not receive any 
earnings from these roles. This may be alluded to the fact that some operations can 
only begin after certain activities have occurred, such as constructions of 
Mchuchuma’s coal mine, thermal power station and a transmission line from 
Mchuchuma to Liganga.
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Table 5.7 Forms of equity role of government in medium scale mining 
Category/Aspect STAMICO NDC 
Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM) Kigosi Gold Mine (KGM) Ngaka Coal Mine (NCM) 
Government (TZGT) role Carried equity Carried equity Carried equity 
Mineral reserves 100 million carets of tanzanite 6.30 million tonnes of gold at a grade  
0.3g/t  
423 million tonnes of coal 
Date licence issued 20 June 2013 11 October 2013 18 August 2011 
Expiry date 19 June 2023 10 October 2023 17 August 2021 
Mine ownership Mine owned by partnership of TOML and 
STAMICO 
Mine owned by partnership of 
TANZAM 2000 and STAMICO 
Mine owned by Tancoal 
Energy Limited (TEL), a 
private JV company 
Mine ownership shareholding TOML (50%) and STAMICO (50%) TANZAM 2000 (85%) and 
STAMICO (15%) 
IETL (70%) and NDC (30%) 
Linkages of shareholders TOML is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Sky Associates Group Limited (SAGL) 
whilst STAMICO is a parastatal in TZGT 
TANZAM 2000 is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Tanzanian Royalty 
Exploration Corporation 
IETL is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Intra Energy 
Corporation (IEC) 
Mine operator TOML TANZAM 2000 IETL 
TZGT interests 50% of total profits (dividends) payable to 
TZGT via STAMICO 
15% of total profits (dividends) 
payable to TZGT via STAMICO 
30% of total profits 
(dividends) payable to TZGT 
via NDC 
TZGT contribution to the project TZGT absolved from making contribution 
undertaken by TOML on its behalf  
TZGT absolved from making 
contribution undertaken by TANZAM 
2000 on its behalf 
TZGT absolved from making 
contribution undertaken by 
IETL on its behalf 
Level of TZGT equity participation in the 
mine 
 
At  50% carried interest by TOML 
overseen by  STAMICO 
At  15% carried interest by 
TANZAM 2000 overseen by 
STAMICO 
At  30% carried interests by 
IETL overseen by NDC 
Mode of recovery of carried government 
contribution by the contributor (a private 
sector partner with TZGT) 
Through STAMICO’s foregone dividends 
with interests during profits making times 
Through STAMICO’s foregone 
dividends with interests during 
profits making times 
Through NDC foregone 
dividends with interests 
during profits making times 
Recent earned profits or received 
dividends by TZGT  
None  None  None  
Status of mining operations Ongoing Operations not  undertaken awaiting 
written consent from Minister for 
Natural Resources and Tourism 
Ongoing 
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Table 5.8 Forms of equity role of government in large scale mining: STAMICO and TR 
Category/Aspect STAMICO 
Biharamulo Stamigold Mine (SBM) Buckreef Gold Mine (BKGM) Kiwira Coal Mine (KCM) 
Government (TZGT) role Paid equity Carried equity Paid equity 
Mineral reserves 200,000 troy ounces of gold 60 million tonnes of gold with average 1.26 g/t Au 35.4 million tonnes of coal 
Date licence issued 3 November 2003 12 June 2000 17 November 2005 
Expiry date 2 November 2028 11 June 2027 16 November 2030 
Mine ownership Mine is owned by partnership of Stamigold 
Company Ltd and Treasury Registrar 
Mine is owned by Buckreef Gold Company Ltd (BKGCL), 
a private JV company 
Mine is owned by Kiwira Coal Power 
Ltd (KCPL), a subsidiary sole 
commercial entity of STAMICO 
Mine ownership shareholding Stamigold Company Ltd (99%) and TR 
(1%) 
TANZAM 2000 (55%) and STAMICO (45%) KCPL (100%) 
Linkages of shareholders Stamigold Company Ltd is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of STAMICO 
TANZAM 2000 is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Tanzanian Royalty Exploration Corporation 
KCPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
STAMICO 
Mine operator Stamigold Company Ltd TANZAM 2000 KCPL 
TZGT interests 99% and 1% of total profits (dividends) 
payable to TZGT via STAMICO and TR 
45% of total profits (dividends) payable to TZGT via 
STAMICO 
100% total profits earned by TZGT 
through STAMICO via KCPL 
TZGT contribution to the project Is met by Stamigold  TANZAM 2000 contributed on behalf of the government. Is met by KCPL 
Level of TZGT equity role in the mine 100%  45% carried interest by TANZAM 2000 overseen by 
STAMICO 
100%  
Mode of recovery of carried government 
contribution by the contributor (a private sector 
partner with TZGT) 
Not applicable Through STAMICO’s foregone dividends with interests 
during profits making times 
Not applicable 
Recent earned profits or received dividends by 
TZGT  None  None  None  
Status of mining operations Ongoing Ongoing Operations not yet started awaiting 
tendering for re-development of the 
mine and 6MW Power Station within 
the mine 
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Table 5.9 Forms of equity role of government in large scale mining: NDC and TR 
Category/Aspect NDC TR 
Mchuchuma Coal Mine (MCM) Liganga Iron ore Mine (LIOM) Mwadui Diamond Mine (WDM) 
Government (TZGT) role Carried equity participation Carried equity participation Carried equity participation 
Mineral reserves 428 million tonnes of coal 126 million tonnes of coal 40.39 million carets of diamond 
Date licence issued 9 October 2014 9 October 2014 25 May 2005 
Expiry date 8 October 2039 8 October 2039 24 May 2030 
Mine ownership Mine is owned by Tanzania China International 
Mineral Resources Ltd (TCIMRL), a private JV 
company 
Mine is owned by Tanzania China International 
Mineral Resources Ltd (TCIMRL), a private JV 
company 
Mine is owned by a partnership of Petra 
Diamonds Ltd and Treasury Registrar 
Mine ownership shareholding SHG (80%) and NDC (20%) SHG (80%) and NDC (20%) Petra Diamonds Ltd (75%) and TR 
(25%) 
Linkages of shareholders SHG is a wholly owned subsidiary of Honda Group of China None  
Mine operator SHG SHG Petra Diamonds Ltd 
TZGT interests 20% of total profits (dividends) payable to TZGT via NDC 25% of total profits via TR 
TZGT contribution to the project TZGT absolved from making contribution 
undertaken by SHG on its behalf 
TZGT absolved from making contribution 
undertaken by SHG on its behalf 
TZGT absolved from making 
contribution undertaken by Petra 
Diamonds on its behalf 
Level of TZGT equity role in the mine 20% carried interest by SHG overseen by NDC 20% carried interest by SHG overseen by NDC 25% carried interest by Petra Diamonds 
overseen by TR 
Mode of recovery of carried government contribution 
by the contributor (a private sector partner with 
TZGT) 
Foregone dividends with interests during profits making times 
Recent earned profits or received dividends by 
TZGT  None  None  None  
Status of mining operations Operations to start after mine  construction 
going on is completed 
Operations to start after constructions  Ongoing 
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5.6 Summary of the forms of government equity role in the minerals sector 
Table 5.10 summarises results of forms of TZGT equity role in prospecting, medium and large 
scale mining. The government did not participate in mining equity role through the application 
of free carry equity principles. This was attributed by failure of parties in negotiations (TZGT 
Vs owners of each mining project) to reach consensus on FCs which also impeded signing 
of MDAs (Section 4.4.3). 
Table 5.10 Forms of TZGT equity role in use in Tanzania 
Area of 
participation  
Form of TZGT 
equity role 
Prospecting Licences (PLs) and Mining 
projects (mines) exercising respective 
forms of TZGT equity role 
Total 
STAMICO NDC TR 
Prospecting Carried 13 PLs 43 PLs None 56 PLs 
Paid 19 PLs 22 PLs None 41 PLs 
Medium scale 
mining 
Carried MTM and 
KGM 
NCM None 3 medium 
scale mines 
Large scale mining Carried BKGM, LIOM and MCM WDM 4 large scale 
mines 
Paid KCM and 
SBM 
None None 2 large scale 
mines 
Free carry In 2014, TZGT planned to apply free carry equity role in NGRP 
and MRUP pending meeting first of agreeable FCIs (through 
negotiations between TZGT and projects owners) and signing of 
MDAs. Negotiations for FCIs between parties started from 2014 
to 2015 where in 2015 they were halted for being futile.  
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5.7 Results of benefits of government equity role in prospecting  
In this research study, total payable annual levies for 89 PLs partially and wholly owned by 
STAMICO and NDC are the financial benefits of the TZGT equity role in prospecting. Table 
5.11 depicts a derivation of financial benefits of the TZGT equity role in prospecting. The total 
derived benefits amounted to approximately US$252,000. 
Table 5.11 Derivation of financial benefits of the TZGT equity role in prospecting 
Payable 
annual levies 
retrieved 
Category of financial benefit from 2011 to 2015 Amount 
(US$) 
Table 5.4 Payable annual levies from 13 PLs partially owned by STAMICO 21,941.70 
Payable annual levies from 19 PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 33,504.30 
Table 5.5 Payable annual levies from 37 PLs partially owned by NDC 89,365.10 
Payable annual levies from 20 PLs wholly owned by NDC 107, 028.50 
Total  251,839.60 
 
In this study, both TZGT carried and paid equity roles on prospecting activities through 
STAMICO and NDC were analysed to look into non-financial benefits they generate. 
Performances were analysed vis-a-vis three set of non-financial benefit indicators in 
prospecting namely geo-knowledge, government confidence in undertaking mining and 
national capacity building. It is observed from Table 5.12 that: 
 Geo-knowledge, government confidence in undertaking mining and national capacity 
building fairly improved through carried equity role of STAMICO and both carried and 
paid roles in NDC; and  
 Geo-knowledge, government confidence in undertaking mining and national capacity 
building negligibly improved through paid equity role of STAMICO. 
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Table 5.12 Non-financial benefits of TZGT equity role in prospecting 
Item STAMICO NDC 
Carried 
equity role 
Paid equity 
role 
Carried 
equity role 
Paid equity 
role 
Geo-knowledge Fairly 
improved 
Negligibly 
improved 
Fairly 
improved 
Fairly 
improved 
Government confidence 
in undertaking mining 
Fairly 
improved 
Negligibly 
improved 
Fairly 
improved 
Fairly 
improved 
National capacity 
building 
Fairly 
improved 
Negligibly 
improved 
Fairly 
improved 
Fairly 
improved 
 
Results of the non-financial benefits of the TZGT equity role in medium and large scale mining 
were compiled in Appendix 8.17 using information presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 
4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and  4.10 respectively. Appendix 8.17 presents degree of performances of each 
mine on areas of non-financial benefits. Areas of non-financial benefits include greater control 
of the minerals sector, employment equity, human resource development, procurement and 
enterprise development and community development. 
There were two major shortcomings faced by the TZGT equity role in prospecting, medium 
and large scale mining. Firstly, STAMICO had been in financial constraints since 2013 
through 2014 for it being not in a going concern situation (Table 5.13). In this case as 
highlighted by Controller and Auditor General (2015), STAMICO had been having a 
recurrence of losses, for instance losses of approximately US$450,293 and US$632,452 in 
2013 and 2014, respectively.  
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Table 5.13 Features of income statement of STAMICO for 6 months ended June 2014  
Financial year 2014 (US$) 
 
2013 (US$) 
 
Income 
Total Income 1,074,067.87 1,363,418.24 
Expenditure 
Total Expenditure 1,572,453.44 2,484,822.74 
Net (Loss)/Profit for before tax -498,385.57 -1,121,404.51 
Deferred taxation 0.00 671,110.70 
Net (Loss)/Profit after tax -498,385.57 - 450,293.81 
Total Net (Loss)/Profit after tax for 18 months -948,679.38 
Net (Loss)/Profit after tax per month -52,704.41 
Average Net (Loss)/Profit after tax per year -632,452.92 
Source: Controller and Auditor General (2015) 
Lastly, the secrecy in agreements or contracts in partnerships, private JV companies and 
mineral developments between the TZGT and the private sector investors. The secretive 
nature of business structures than in public single or JV companies is another cause of the 
shortfall. Secrecy attributed to non-transparency and unaccountability in the prospecting, 
medium and large scale mining projects under TZGT equity role. In addition, non-
transparency and unaccountability in these projects risked TZGT entering unfair and/or 
objectionable agreements or contracts.  
 
Public single or JV companies are supposed to release public certified copies of their annual 
financial statements with the Registrar of Companies (Correia et al, 1993; Marx et al, 1999). 
In addition, they are obliged to furnish their shareholders with mid-yearly interim reports and 
audited annual financial statements (Correia et al, 1993; Marx et al, 1999). All these two 
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requirements for public single and JV companies are the reflection of how transparent and 
accountable they are as compared to the aforementioned business ownerships.  
5.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the results, analysis and challenges faced by TZGT equity role 
strategy. This means the results of the mineral rights, minimum allowable expenditures, 
receivable expenditures, etc., sought in the research together with shortfalls were illustrated. 
In this chapter, a number of challenges faced by the strategy were identified and their causes 
discussed. The implications of these shortfalls and recommendations for dealing with them 
are covered in Chapter 6. 
It was important to undertake computations of minimum allowable exploration expenditures 
on PLs partially and wholly owned by STAMICO and NDC in order to understand the cost 
effectiveness of the two parastatals in meeting such costs in paid and carried equity roles on 
behalf of the TZGT. As highlighted in Appendices 8.9 and 8.12, Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, 
exploration expenditures on wholly owned PLs by STAMICO and NDC inflicted more costs 
to the TZGT than on partially owned PLs.  Non-strategic and incautious government spending 
on exploration activities of wholly owned PLs that results into non-improvement of geo-
knowledge, government confidence in undertaking mining and national capacity building 
termed as non-financial benefits should be avoided for financial benefits realisation (Table 
5.12). 
A comparison of costs (exploration expenditures and payable annual levies) against financial 
benefits generated from mineral rights from 2006 to 2015 based on collected data is shown 
in Table 5.14. It is worth noting here that, Tables 4.2-4.10, 5.1 & 5.2 and 5.11 were used to 
produce Table 5.14. Based on Table 5.14, the financial benefits to the TZGT at the period 
2006 to 2015 on mineral rights was inadequate for TZGT’s sporadic receipt of corporate 
income taxes, mining royalty and other taxes.  Furthermore, the Tanzania government could 
not receive any sort of profits or interests (dividends) from its wholly and partially owned 
mines (Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9) undermining its equity role strategy in making financial 
benefits out of the projects.  
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Table 5.14 Summary of financial benefits of the government from 2006 to 2015 
 
 
Mineral right 
Costs incurred in mineral rights   Financial benefits from mineral rights 
Minimum 
allowable 
exploration 
expenditures 
(US$ million) 
Payable 
annual 
levies 
(US$ 
million) 
Total 
costs 
(US$ 
million) 
 Receivable 
annual 
levies 
 (US$ 
million) 
Corporate 
income tax 
(US$ 
million) 
Mining 
Royalty 
(US$ 
million) 
Receivable 
profits or 
interests 
(dividends) 
through 
equity roles 
Other 
taxes  
(US$ 
million) 
Total 
financial 
benefits 
(US$ 
million) 
13 PLs partially owned by 
STAMICO 
0.22 0.02 0.24 0.02 - - - - 0.02 
19 PLs wholly owned by 
STAMICO 
0.23 0.03 0.26 0.03 - - - - 0.03 
37 PLs partially owned by 
NDC 
0.76 0.09 0.85 0.09 - - - - 0.09 
20 PLs wholly owned by 
NDC 
0.85 0.11 0.96 0.11 - - - - 0.11 
Subtotal US$) 2.06 0.25 2.31 0.25 - - - - 0.25 
ML 490/2013 of MTM - 0.05 0.05 0.05 2.60 1.38 - 8.64 12.67 
ML 496/2013 of KGM - 0.06 0.06 0.06 - - - - 0.06 
ML 439/2011 of NCM - 0.12 0.12 0.12 - 1.11 - - 1.23 
Subtotal US$) - 0.23 0.23 0.23 2.60 2.49 - 8.64 13.96 
SML 04/92 of BKGM - 0.16 0.16 0.16 - - - - 0.16 
SML 533/2014 of LIOM - 0.15 0.15 0.15 - - - - 0.15 
SML 534/2014 of MCM - 0.13 0.13 0.13 - - - - 0.13 
SML 216/2005 of WDM - 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.11 9.44 - 25.92 35.78 
SML 233/2005 of KCM - 0.23 0.23 0.23 - - - - 0.23 
SML 157/ 2003 of SBM - 0.30 0.30 0.30 - 0.82 - 1.61 2.73 
Subtotal US$) - 1.28 1.28 1.28 0.11 10.26 - 27.53 39.18 
Total (US$) 2.06 1.76 3.82 1.76 2.71 12.75 - 36.17 53.39 
 
Based on data collected and analysed in this research study, the financial benefits stood at 
US$53.39 million against exploration costs of US$2.06 million (for all PLs) and payable 
annual levies of US$1.76 million (for all mineral rights) respectively (Table 5.14). In 
economics context, minimum allowable exploration expenditures and payable annual levies 
would be termed as operating costs. These two costs may be incorporated in the income 
statements together with mineral sales revenues, cost of minerals sold, other operating 
costs/expenses, depreciation expenses, etc. Then, projects’ net profits before and after taxes 
would be determined for companies’ payments of corporate income taxes to the government 
and dividends to the shareholders respectively (Correia et al, 1993). 
In addition, as seen in Section 5.7 and Table 2.5, there are more advantages for the 
government to collaborate in business with the private sector investors through public single 
or JV companies rather than in partnerships and private JV companies. Due to the complexes 
underlying business ownerships revealed in this study, it is worth noting that government 
shareholding is just one side of a complex commercial structure in business ownerships. 
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Skills to be part of the auditing of the value chain is important to be satisfied with how the 
companies get to the profits/losses before sharing.  
On the area of transfer pricing, whilst the author accepts that transfer pricing plays a role in 
reduced financial benefits to governments as mentioned in Tables 1.1, 2.3 and Section 2.5.2, 
however, due to lack of information as highlighted in Section 1.5, was not interrogated. 
However, there is a need for future work for the TZGT as a sole commercial entity or as itself 
with private sector investors collaborating in prospecting or mining projects to undertake 
comprehensive routine projects’ financial valuations. These would help in divulging 
appropriate compensations and/or financial benefits the TZGT is supposed to enjoy during 
projects’ life spans. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDANTIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This research study entitled “Evaluation of government equity participation in the minerals 
sector: A case study of Tanzania from 1996 to 2015” was carried out. Based on the problem 
statement and research question, tackling of four research objectives took place in the line of 
answering the research question.  
6.2 Conclusions 
This section outlines conclusions on areas of equity role of Tanzanian government, financial 
benefits, non-financial benefits and challenges faced by the equity role in the minerals sector. 
These conclusions reflect objectives of the study vis-a-vis the research question. Later 
Section 6.3 provides the way forward through recommendations for addressing conclusions 
and challenges highlighted in this section.  
6.2.1 Equity role of Tanzanian government in minerals sector 
Results in this research show that the Tanzanian government’s equity role from 1996 to 2015 
in PLs, medium and large scale mines involving carried and paid forms (Table 5.10) was 
counterproductive. This was due to non-transparency and unaccountability in agreements in 
business ownerships in which government and private sector investors pursued (Section 5.7). 
Also sole commercial entities, partnerships and private JV companies business ownerships 
adopted in TZGT equity role are secretive in nature that too causes their counter productivity.  
6.2.2 Financial benefits 
Results indicate that Tanzanian government inadequately realised financial benefits through 
its equity role in the prospecting, medium and large scale mining. Inadequacy in financial 
benefits was characterised by unreliable payments of corporate income tax, mining royalty 
and other taxes by the mining companies (Table 5.14). Another reason alluding to this 
problem was the non-realisation of profits and receipt of dividends by government from mining 
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enterprises in which the government is a sole commercial entity (via parastatals) or a 
shareholder with the private sector investors (Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9).  
6.2.3 Non-financial benefits 
Results indicate that Tanzanian government fairly realised non-financial benefits through its 
equity role in the prospecting, medium and large scale mining (Table 5.12 and Appendix 
8.17). Areas of non-financial benefits were TZGT greater control of the minerals sector, 
employment equity, human resource development, procurement and enterprise development 
as well as community development. However, in Tanzania there are no solid mechanisms 
and frameworks for overseeing of non-financial benefits (Ramdoo, 2016; Columbia Center 
on Sustainable Investment, nd.). 
6.2.4 Challenges faced by Tanzanian government equity role 
More importantly to note is that TZGT equity participation in prospecting, medium and large 
scale mining from 1996 to 2015 met with a number of challenges (shortfalls and 
shortcomings). Amongst challenges, include: 
 STAMICO’s financial constraints caused by a non-going concern situation of the 
company itself (Section 5.7); 
 Secrecy in agreements or contracts in partnerships, private JV companies and mineral 
developments between the TZGT and the private sector investors. This attributed to 
non-transparency and unaccountability risking TZGT entering unfair and/or 
objectionable agreements or contracts (Section 5.7); 
 A query on lower mining royalty payments by Merelani Tanzanite Mine (MTM) in 2013 
(Figure 4.4); and 
 Lack of some mining companies to unveil their mines’ status information into public 
domains (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). 
The above findings indicate that there was ineffective equity role performance of the 
Tanzanian government in prospecting, medium and large scale mining. Section 6.3 outlines 
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recommendations as a way forward for improving the government effective performance in 
equity role.  
In this research study, the research question was “How effectively has the equity role 
performance of the TZGT in prospecting, medium and large scale mining been since the 
enactment of Mining Act of 2010?” Considering the achievement in the objectives of the 
study, it is fairly speaking that the research question was adequately answered. 
6.3 Recommendations 
It is recommended that the following issues be considered for improving the government’s 
effective performance in the equity role strategy. 
 Government to engage in public single or JV companies registered in DSE when 
executing equity role for transparency and accountability than in sole commercial 
entities, partnerships and private JV companies business ownerships; 
 Government to review Mining Act of 2010 and Regulations of 2010 to allow 
government incorporation of Parliament in the approval, monitoring, implementation 
or review of partnerships, private JV companies and minerals development 
agreements or contracts;  
 Government to review Mining Act of 2010 to include provisions of solid mechanisms 
and frameworks for all forms of government equity role, assessing, and measuring 
performance in equity role; 
 Government to review Mining Act of 2010 and Regulations of 2010 to include 
frameworks for derivation, validation and auditing of operating and capital costs used 
in mining projects; 
 Government to review Tax Act of 2008 and Companies Act of 2002 to include 
frameworks for computation of corporate income taxes in mines and distribution of 
dividends to shareholders respectively (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2008; 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2002); 
 TZGT to revisit incentives it offers to mining investors serving as tax shields to have a 
50/50 win situation (Appendix 8.6);  
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 Government to formulate legislations with solid mechanisms and frameworks to 
oversee non-financial benefits in the country; 
 Government through MEM to immediately track the aforementioned queried tanzanite 
sales in 2013. In case there was any mining royalty evasion, MD should recover it 
immediately; (Figure 4.4); 
 Government to make interventions into STAMICO’s operations with workable strategic 
solutions in rescuing the parastatal from dwindling; and (Section 5.7); 
 Government to amend Mining of 2010 and Mining Regulations of 2010 to include 
provisions tasking all mining companies having valid mineral rights to be annually 
submitting to MEM, sustainability, financial and accounts reports. It is suggested also 
that the mining companies submit the same to the Registrar of Companies and to the 
DSE for the listed ones (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2002; Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange, 2016).  
6.4 Recommendations for future work 
Carrying out of this research had raised a number of issues that would attract research 
work. In this study however, areas for future work proposed include: 
 Determining if using a fixed rate for FCIs will be beneficial; 
 Developing frameworks or guidelines for establishing private and public JV mining 
companies between government and private sector partners; 
 How to improve reporting compliance by mining parastatals and companies in 
Tanzania in relation to internationally accepted standards; and 
 Conducting financial valuations on mining projects under TZGT equity role to 
divulge appropriate compensations and/or financial benefits in which the TZGT is 
supposed to enjoy during the projects’ life spans. 
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8 APPENDICES 
8.1 PLs partially and wholly owned by STAMICO and NDC 
8.1.1 PLs partially owned by STAMICO from 1996 to 2015 
Licence 
No. 
Size 
(Km2) 
Mineral 
 
 
PL Locality Validity  
of  
licence 
% of ownership in 
the licence 
Private  
Partner’s 
name 
Private JV 
company 
holding 
licence 
(100%) 
District Region Date 
issued 
Expiry 
date 
STAMICO Private  
Partner 
PL 6427/2010 2.1 Gold Geita  Geita 21.06.2010 20.06.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6428/2010 2.99 Gold Geita  Geita 21.06.2010 20.06.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6429/2010 19.99 Gold Geita  Geita 21.06.2010 20.06.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6430/2010 8.9 Gold Geita  Geita 21.06.2010 20.06.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6431/2010 2.67 Gold Geita  Geita 21.06.2010 20.06.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6432/2010 1.97 Gold Geita  Geita 21.06.2010 20.06.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6544/2010 2.58 Gold Geita  Geita 12.07.2010 11.07.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6545/2010 5.28 Gold Geita  Geita 12.07.2010 11.07.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6546/2010 17.41 Gold Geita  Geita 12.07.2010 11.07.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6547/2010 5.29 Gold Geita  Geita 12.07.2010 11.07.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6548/2010 1.89 Gold Geita  Geita 12.07.2010 11.07.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 6549/2010 2.66 Gold Geita  Geita 12.07.2010 11.07.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
PL 9968/2014 5.6 Gold Geita  Geita 10.07.2014 09.07.2018 45 55 TANZAM 2000 BKGCL 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (nd.) 
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8.1.2 PLs wholly owned by STAMICO from 1996 to 2015 
Licence 
No. 
Size 
(Km2) 
Mineral 
 
 
PL Locality 
 
 
Validity of licence % of ownership 
in the licence by 
STAMICO 
District Region Date issued Expiry date 
PL 6477/2010 7.98 Gold Geita Geita 16.07.2010 15.07.2016 100 
PL 6537/2010 7.61 Gold Chato Geita 13.08.2010 12.08.2016 100 
PL 6755/2010 24.00 Gold Nzega Tabora 21.09.2010 20.09.2016 100 
PL 7132/2011 9.98 Gold Butiama Mara 04.07.2011 03.07.2018 100 
PL 8356/2012 8.53 Gold Nyang’wale Geita 25.10.2012 24.10.2016 100 
PL 8794/2013 8.1 Gold Biharamulo, 
Chato 
Kagera, 
Geita 
28.01.2013 27.01.2017 100 
PL 9243/2013 7.1 Gold Bukombe Geita 28.06.2013 27.06.2017 100 
PL 9548/2014 3.77 Gold Chato Geita 15.01.2014 14.01.2018 100 
PL 9549/2014 10.94 Gold Biharamulo Kagera 15.01.2014 14.01.2018 100 
PL 9550/2014 7.01 Gold Bukombe Geita 15.01.2014 14.01.2018 100 
PL 9578/2014 16.2 Gold Biharamulo, 
Bukombe 
Kagera, 
Geita 
21.02.2014 20.02.2018 100 
PL 9594/2014 1.61 Phosphate Mbozi Mbeya 12.03.2014 11.03.2018 100 
PL 9595/2014 6.14 Phosphate Bahi Dodoma 12.03.2014 11.03.2018 100 
PL 9856/2014 15.86 REE Nkasi, 
Sumbawanga 
Urban 
Rukwa 02.07.2014 01.07.2018 100 
PL 9857/2014 10.69 REE Nkasi Rukwa 02.07.2014 01.07.2018 100 
PL 9858/2014 3.96 Gypsum Chamwino Dodoma 02.07.2014 01.07.2018 100 
PL 9859/2014 2.7 Kaolin Mufindi Iringa 02.07.2014 01.07.2018 100 
PL 9860/2014 18.05 Feldspar Mvomero Morogoro 02.07.2014 01.07.2018 100 
PL 9963/2014 33.38 Coal Ileje, Kyela Mbeya 10.07.2014 09.07.2018 100 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (nd.) 
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8.1.3 PLs partially owned by NDC from 1996 to 2015 
Licence 
No. 
Size 
(Km2) 
Mineral 
 
 
PL Locality 
 
 
Validity of licence % of ownership in 
the licence 
Private 
Partner’
s name 
Private JV 
company 
holding 
licence 
(100%) 
District Region Date issued Expiry 
date 
NDC Private 
Partner 
PL 5030/2008 16.69 Coal Mbinga Ruvuma 09.05.2008 08.05.2016 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 5756/2009 14.77 Coal Songea Rural Ruvuma 12.06.2009 11.06.2017 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 5903/2009 14.72 Coal Mbinga Ruvuma 12.06.2009 11.06.2017 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 6285/2009 4.71 Coal Mbinga Ruvuma 31.12.2009 30.12.2017 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 7391/2011 19.80 Coal Mbinga Ruvuma 28.11.2011 27.11.2018 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 7392/2011 20.00 Coal Mbinga Ruvuma 28.11.2011 27.11.2018 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 7620/2012 17.39 Coal Mbinga Ruvuma 01.02.2012 31.01.2016 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 8999/2013 58.47 Coal Mbinga Ruvuma 27.03.2013 26.03.2017 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 9807/2014 6.93 Coal Nyasa  Ruvuma 13.06.2014 12.06.2018 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 10417/2014 15.44 Coal Songea Rural Ruvuma 02.12.2014 01.12.2018 30 70 IETL TEL 
PL 6005/2009 11.22 Iron Ludewa Njombe 31.12.2009 30.12.2017 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 6006/2009 15.73 Iron Ludewa Njombe 31.12.2009 30.12.2017 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 6007/2009 3.32 Iron Ludewa Njombe 31.12.2009 30.12.2017 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 6008/2009 12.28 Iron Ludewa Njombe 31.12.2009 30.12.2017 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 6009/2009 3.6 Iron Ludewa Njombe 31.12.2009 30.12.2017 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 6010/2009 12.52 Coal Ludewa Njombe 31.12.2009 30.12.2015 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 6643/2010 9.9 Iron Ludewa Njombe 13.10.2010 12.10.2016 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 6712/2010 18.77 Coal Ludewa Njombe 13.10.2010 12.10.2016 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 7413/2011 4.4 Iron Ludewa Njombe 06.12.2011 05.12.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 7461/2011 4.95 Iron Ludewa Njombe 19.12.2011 18.12.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 6986/2012 6.48 Coal Ludewa Njombe 07.08.2012 06.08.2016 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 7714/2012 1.83 Dolomite Ludewa Njombe 23.02.2012 22.02.2016 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 7716/2012 12.96 Coal Ludewa Njombe 23.02.2012 22.02.2016 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 7717/2012 1.66 Dolomite Ludewa Njombe 23.02.2012 22.02.2016 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
 125 
 
PL 7718/2012 1.8 Dolomite Ludewa Njombe 23.03.2012 22.03.2016 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 8128/2012 3.65 Dolomite Ludewa Njombe 12.07.2012 11.07.2016 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 9056/2013 2.2 Dolomite Ludewa Njombe 27.03.2013 26.03.2017 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 9533/2014 12.62 Coal Ludewa Njombe 15.01.2014 14.01.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 9766/2014 1.66 Dolomite Ludewa Njombe 02.06.2014 01.06.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 9767/2014 1.8 Dolomite Ludewa Njombe 05.06.2014 04.06.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 9881/2014 6.48 Coal Ludewa Njombe 30.06.2014 30.06.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10110/2014 18.77 Coal Ludewa Njombe 13.08.2014 12.08.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10259/2014 5.59 Iron Ludewa Njombe 25.09.2014 24.09.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10260/2014 8.09 Iron Ludewa Njombe 25.09.2014 24.09.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10261/2014 6.14 Iron Ludewa Njombe 25.09.2014 24.09.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10263/2014 12.62 Coal Ludewa Njombe 25.09.2014 24.09.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10418/2014 4.95 Iron Ludewa Njombe 02.12.2014 01.12.2018 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10680/2015 6.14 Iron Ludewa Njombe 18.09.2015 17.09.2019 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10681/2015 5.61 Iron Ludewa Njombe 18.09.2015 17.09.2019 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10682/2015 10.38 Iron Ludewa Njombe 18.09.2015 17.09.2019 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10683/2015 5.75 Coal Ludewa Njombe 18.09.2015 17.09.2019 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10684/2015 22.8 Coal Ludewa Njombe 18.09.2015 17.09.2019 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
PL 10747/2015 6.88 Iron Ludewa Njombe 27.10.2015 26.10.2019 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (nd.) 
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8.1.4 PLs wholly owned by NDC from 1996 to 2015 
Licence 
No. 
Size 
(Km2) 
Mineral 
 
 
PL Locality Validity of licence % of ownership 
of the licence by 
NDC 
District Region Date issued Expiry date  
PL 4679/2007 8.42 Coal Ludewa Njombe 18.09.2007 17.09.2017 100 
PL 5325/2008 18.94 Coal Ludewa Njombe 25.07.2008 24.07.2016 100 
PL 6245/2009 
41.03 
Soda Ash 
Longido, 
Monduli 
Arusha 31.12.2008 30.12.2017 100 
PL 6246/2009 39.33 Soda Ash Monduli Arusha 31.12.2009 30.12.2017 100 
PL 6708/2010 7.16 Coal Ludewa Njombe 13.10.2010 12.10.2016 100 
PL 6710/2010 14.73 Coal Ludewa Njombe 13.10.2010 12.10.2016 100 
PL 6711/2010 9.78 Coal Ludewa Njombe 13.10.2010 12.10.2016 100 
PL 6917/2011 9.47 Coal Ludewa Njombe 22.02.2011 21.02.2018 100 
PL 6923/2011 7.36 Coal Ludewa Njombe 22.02.2011 21.02.2018 100 
PL 6959/2011 11.87 Coal Ludewa Njombe 28.02.2011 27.02.2018 100 
PL 7713/2012 10.91 Gold Songea Rural Ruvuma 23.02.2012 22.02.2019 100 
PL 7715/2012 15.53 Coal Ludewa Njombe 23.02.2012 22.02.2019 100 
PL 8065/2012 49.72 AOBG Ngorongoro Arusha 20.06.2012 19.06.2016 100 
PL 8797/2013 99.21 Soda Ash Ngorongoro Arusha 28.01.2013 27.01.2017 100 
PL 9573/2014 
82.08 
Soda Ash 
Longido, 
Monduli 
Arusha 24.01.2014 23.01.2018 100 
PL 9575/2014 
68.38 
Soda Ash 
Longido, 
Monduli 
Arusha 24.01.2014 23.01.2018 100 
PL 9751/2014 9.47 Coal Ludewa Njombe 05.06.2014 04.06.2018 100 
PL 9577/2014 6.18 Iron Ludewa Njombe 24.01.2014 23.01.2018 100 
PL 10081/2014 7.36 Coal Ludewa Njombe 11.08.2014 10.08.2018 100 
PL 10193/2014 2.61 Iron Ludewa Njombe 29.08.2014 28.08.2018 100 
PL 10611/2015 49.71 Soda Ash Ngorongoro Arusha 08.05.2015 07.05.2019 100 
PL 10692/2015 11.87 Coal Ludewa Njombe 18.09.2015 17.09.2019 100 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (nd.) 
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8.2 MLs and medium scale mines owned by STAMICO and NDC 
8.2.1 MLs partially owned by STAMICO and NDC from 1996 to 2015 
Licence 
 No. 
Size 
(Km2) 
Mineral Licence 
Locality 
 
Validity of 
Mining 
Licence as at 
31 
December, 
2015 
Ownership of the licence  Ownership of the licence 
by private investor 
Partnership or 
company 
holding the 
licence (100%) 
STAMCO 
or NDC 
% of 
ownership 
of the 
licence 
Private 
partner’s 
name 
% of 
ownership 
of the 
licence 
 
ML 490/2013 
 
 
7.6 
Tanzanite Simanjiro 
District, 
Manyara 
region 
Valid till 
19.06.2023, 
issued on 
20.06.2013 
STAMICO 50 TOML 50 
Partnership of 
STAMICO 
(50%) and 
TOML (50%) 
ML 496/2013 9.91 Gold  Bukombe 
District, 
Geita 
region 
Valid till 
10.10.2023, 
issued on 
11.10.2013 
STAMICO 15 TANZAM 
2000 
85 
Partnership of 
STAMICO 
(15%) and 
TANZAM 2000 
(85%) 
ML  
439/2011 
9.98 Coal Mbinga 
District, 
Ruvuma 
region 
Valid till 
17/08/2021, 
issued on 
18/08/2011 
NDC 30 IETL 70 TEL (Private JV 
company) 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (nd.) 
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8.2.2 Medium scale mines partially owned by STAMICO and NDC 
Name of mine Licence 
No. 
Mineral 
 
Ownership of the mine 
by STAMICO and NDC 
from 2011 to 2015 
Ownership of the mine 
by private investor 
from 2011 to 2015 
Partnershi
p or 
company 
holding 
the mine 
(100%) 
Status of 
mining 
operations 
as at 31st 
Dec, 2015 
STAMICO 
or NDC 
% of 
ownership 
of the mine 
Private 
partner’s 
name 
% of 
ownership 
of the mine 
Merelani 
Tanzanite 
Mine 
 
ML 
490/2013 
 
Tanzanite STAMICO 50 TOML 50 
Partnership 
of 
STAMICO 
(50%) and 
TOML 
(50%) 
In operation 
since June, 
2013 
Kigosi Gold 
Mine 
ML 
496/2013 
Gold  STAMICO 15 TANZAM 
2000 
85 
Partnership 
of 
STAMICO 
(15%) and 
TANZAM 
2000 (85%)  
Operations 
not yet 
started 
         
Ngaka Coal 
 Mine 
ML 
439/2011 
 
Coal NDC 30 IETL 70 TEL 
(Private JV 
company) 
 
In operation 
since 
August, 
2011 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2015b); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2016a) 
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8.3 SMLs and large scale mines partially owned by STAMICO, NDC and TR 
8.3.1 SMLs partially owned by STAMICO, NDC and TR from 1996 to 2015 
Licence 
 No. 
Size 
(Km2) 
Mineral Licence 
locality 
 
 
Validity of 
Mining 
Licence as at 
31 December, 
2015 
Ownership of the 
licence  
Ownership of the 
licence 
by private or other 
TZGT partner 
Partnership or 
company holding 
the licence 
(100%) 
STAMICO
, NDC or 
TR 
% of 
ownership 
of the 
licence 
Private 
or other 
TZGT 
partner’
s name 
% of 
ownership 
of the 
licence 
SML 
157/2003 
25.38 Gold Biharamuro Valid till 
02.11.2028, 
issued on 
03.11.2003 
STAMICO 99 TR 
(Other 
TZGT 
partner) 
1 
Partnership of 
Stamigold (99%) 
and TR (1%) 
SML 
04/92 
16.04 Gold Geita District, 
Geita region 
Valid till 
11.06.2027, 
issued on 
12.06.2000 
STAMICO 45 TANZAM 
2000 
(Private 
investor) 
55 BKGCL (Private JV 
company) 
SML 
533/2014 
30.41 Iron Ludewa 
District, 
Njombe 
region 
Valid till 
08.10.2039, 
issued on 
09.10.2014 
NDC 20 SHG 
(Private 
investor) 
80 TCIMRL (Private 
JV company) 
SML 
534/2014 
25.46 Coal Ludewa 
District, 
Njombe 
region 
Valid till 
08.10.2039, 
issued on 
09.10.2014 
NDC 20 SHG 
(Private 
investor) 
80 TCIMRL (Private 
JV company) 
SML 
216/2005 
30.6 Diamond Kishapu 
District, 
Shinyanga 
region 
Valid till 
24.05.2030, 
issued on 
25.05.2005 
TR 25 Petra 
Diamond
s Ltd 
(Private 
investor) 
75 Partnership of TR 
(25%) and Petra 
Diamonds Ltd 
(75%) 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2015b); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2016a) 
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8.3.2 SMLs wholly owned by STAMICO from 1996 to 2015 
Licence 
 No. 
Size 
(Km2) 
Mineral Licence locality 
 
Validity of Mining Licence as at 
31 December, 2015 
% of ownership of the 
mine 
SML 233/2005 19.2 Coal 
Ileje and 
Rungwe 
Districts in 
Mbeya region 
Valid till 16.11.2030, issued on 
17.11.2005 
 
100 
 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (nd.) 
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8.3.3 Large scale mines partially owned by STAMICO, NDC and TR 
Name of mine Licence 
No. 
Mineral 
 
Ownership of the mine 
by STAMICO, NDC and 
TR 
Ownership of the mine 
by private or other 
TZGT partner 
Partnershi
p or 
company 
holding 
the mine 
(100%) 
Status of 
mining 
operations as 
at 31st Dec, 
2015 
STAMICO
, NDC or 
TR 
% of 
ownership 
of the 
mine 
Private or 
other 
TZGT 
partner’s 
name 
% of 
ownership 
of the 
mine 
Stamigold 
Biharamuro 
Mine 
 
SML 
157/2003 
Gold STAMICO 99 TR 1 
Partnership 
of 
Stamigold 
(99%) and 
TR (1%) 
In operation 
since June, 2013 
Buckreef 
Gold Mine 
 
SML 
04/92 
 
Gold STAMICO 45 TANZAM 
2000 
55 BKGCL 
(Private JV 
company) 
In operation 
since June, 2013 
Liganga Iron 
ore Mine 
SML 
533/2014 
 
Iron ore NDC 20 SHG 80 TCIMRL 
(Private JV 
company) 
Operations not 
yet started 
Mchuchuma 
Coal Mine 
SML 
534/2014 
 
Coal NDC 20 SHG 80 TCIMRL 
(Private JV 
company) 
Operations not 
yet started 
Williamson 
Diamonds 
Mine 
SML 
216/2005 
Diamond TR 25 Petra 
Diamonds 
Ltd 
75 TR (25%) 
and Petra 
Diamonds 
Ltd (75%)  
In operation 
since 1940 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2015b); Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency (2016a) 
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8.3.4 Large scale mines wholly owned by STAMICO from 1996 to 2015 
Name of 
mine 
Licence 
No. 
Mineral 
 
% of 
ownership of 
the mine 
Company 
operating 
the mine 
Status of mining operations as 
at 31st Dec, 2015 
Kiwira Coal 
Mine 
SML 233/2005 
 
Coal 100 KCPL In operation since August, 2011 
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8.4 Application, preparation and renewal fees for mineral rights in Tanzania 
A: Application, preparation,  and renewal fees for PLs, RLs, SMLs, MLs and MLs 
Type of geological fee Fees from 1st November, 
2010 to 15th July, 2012 
(US$) 
Fees from 16th July, 2012 to 31st 
December, 2015 (US$) 
Application fees for PL for metallic minerals, energy minerals and 
kimberlitic diamond 
100.00 300.00 
Application fees for PL for building materials and gemstones 
excluding kimberlitic diamond 
100.00 300.00 
Application fees for PL for industrial minerals 50.00 200.00 
Application fees for RL 500.00 4,000.00 
Application fees for SML 2,000.00 5,000.00 
Application fees for ML 1,000.00 2,000.00 
Application fees for ML for building materials 500.00 2,000.00 
Application fees fee for transfer of PML 100.00 200.00 
Application fees for transfer of shares in PML 100.00 500.00 
Application fees for renewal of PL for metallic minerals, energy 
minerals and kimberlitic diamond 
100.00 300.00 
Application fees for renewal of RL 500.00 4,000.00 
Application fees fee for renewal of SML 1,000.00 5,000.00 
Application fees for renewal of ML 500.00 2,000.00 
Application fees for renewal of ML for building materials and 
industrial minerals 
500.00 2,000.00 
Preparation fees for PL for all minerals 200.00 500.00 
Preparation fees for ML for all minerals 500.00 1,000.00 
Preparation fees for SML 1,000.00 2,000.00 
Preparation fees for RL 1,000.00 2,000.00 
Type of geological fee Fees from 1st November, 
2010 to 15th July, 2012 
(TZS/US$) 
Fees from 16th July, 2012 to 31st 
December, 2015 (US$) 
Application fees for PCL TZS100,000.00  US$200.00 
Application fees for SL TZS100,000.00  US$200.00 
Application fees for RFL TZS100,000.00  US$200.00 
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Preparation fees for PCL TZS100,000.00  US$200.00 
Preparation fees for SL US$500.00 US$200.00 
Preparation fees for RFL US$500.00 US$200.00 
Application fees for renewal of PCL TZS100,000.00  US$200.00 
Application fees for renewal of SL US$500.00 US$200.00 
Application fees for renewal of RFL US$500.00 US$200.00 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2010b and 2012) 
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8.5 Annual levies for mineral rights in Tanzania 
A: Annual levies for PLs, RLs, SMLs, MLs and PMLs  
Type of Annual levies   Annual levy rates from 1st 
November, 2010 to 15th 
July, 2012 (US$/km2/year) 
Annual levy rates from 16th 
July, 2012 to 31st December, 
2015 (US$/km2/year) 
Annual levy for IPP of PL for metallic  
minerals, energy minerals and kimberlitic 
diamonds for initial period 
 
 
40.00 
 
 
100.00 
Annual levy for IPP of PL for building 
materials 
 
40.00 
100.00 
Annual levy for IPP of PL for gemstones 
excluding kimberlitic diamonds 
 
40.00 
 
100.00 
 
Annual levy for FRP of PL 
 
50.00 
 
150.00 
 
Annual levy for SRP of a PL 
 
60.00 
 
 
200.00 
 
Annual levy for RL 
 
500.00 
 
 2,000.00 
 
Annual levy for SML 
 
2,000.00 
  
5,000.00 
Annual levy for ML for metallic  minerals, 
energy minerals, gemstones and 
kimberlitic diamonds 
 
1,000.00 
 
 3,000.00 
Annual levy for ML for building materials 
and industrial minerals 
500.00 
 
 2,000.00 
B: Annual levies for PCLs, SLs and RFLs 
Type of Annual levies   Fees from 1 November 
2010 to 15 July 2012 
(US$/year) 
Fees from 16 July 2012 to 31 
December 2015 (US$/year) 
 
Annual levy for PCL 
 
TZS1000,000/year 
 
 
US$1000/year 
Annual levy for SL US$2000/year 
 
US$1000/year 
Annual levy for RFL US$2000/year 
 
US$1000/year 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2010b and 2012) 
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8.6 Some mining related taxes and incentives adopted in Tanzania 
Type of tax or incentive 
From 1998 to 2003  From 2004 to 2009  From 2010 to 2015 
Description of tax or incentive and 
application 
 Description of tax or incentive and application  Description of tax or incentive and application 
Corporate income tax on 
unlisted company at DSE Charged annually at 30%. 
  
Charged annually at 30%. 
  
Charged annually at 30%. 
Corporate income tax on 
shortlisted company at DSE Charged annually at 25%. 
  
Charged annually at 25%. 
  
Charged annually at 25%. 
Withholding tax (On 
technical services fees paid 
to resident and non-residents 
for their such services) 
Charged at 3% on payments made to 
residents. 
 Charged at 5% made to residents.  Charged at 5% made to residents. 
Charged at 3% on payments made to non-
residents. 
 Charged at 15% on payments made to non-
residents. 
 Charged at 15% on payments made to non-
residents. 
Withholding tax (On interest 
paid to banks on loans 
provided) 
0% on foreign currency loan from third 
party. 
 Charged at 10% on interest income earned by 
individuals (resident and non-residents) in all 
sectors. Financial institutions collect it on behalf 
of TZGT. 
 Charged at 10% on interest income earned by 
individuals (resident and non-residents) in all 
sectors. Financial institutions collect it on behalf of 
TZGT. 15% on foreign currency loan from affiliates 
Withholding tax (On 
management fees paid to 
residents)  
 
Charged at 3% on payments made to 
residents for their managerial, technical 
and professional services in the country. 
However, the tax was only valid if 30% of 
such payments did not exceed 20% of the 
total operating costs. The amount was set 
not to exceed 20% of payments. 
 Charged at 3% on payments made to residents 
for their managerial, technical and professional 
services in the country. However, the tax was only 
valid if 30% of such payments did not exceed 20% 
of the total operating costs. The amount was set 
not to exceed 20% of payments. 
 Charged at 3% on payments made to residents for 
their managerial, technical and professional 
services in the country. However, the tax was only 
valid if 30% of such payments did not exceed 20% 
of the total operating costs. The amount was set not 
to exceed 20% of payments. 
Withholding tax (On 
management fees paid to 
non-residents) 
Charged at 3% on payments made to non-
residents for their managerial, technical 
and professional services they had 
provided in the country. 
 Charged at 15% on payments made to non-
residents for providing managerial, technical and 
professional services in the country. 
 Charged at 15% on payments made to non-
residents for providing managerial, technical and 
professional services in the country. 
Withholding tax (On 
dividends paid to residents 
from shortlisted companies 
at DSE) 
 
Charged at 5% on dividends payments 
made to locals by companies shortlisted at 
DSE. 
  
Charged at 5% on dividends payments made to 
locals by companies shortlisted at DSE. 
  
Charged at 5% on dividends payments made to 
locals by companies shortlisted at DSE. 
Withholding tax (On 
dividends paid to residents 
from un shortlisted 
companies at DSE) 
Charged at 10% on dividends payments 
made to locals by companies not shortlisted 
at DSE. 
 Charged at 10% on dividends payments made to 
locals by companies not shortlisted at DSE. 
 Charged at 10% on dividends payments made to 
locals by companies not shortlisted at DSE. 
Skills and Development Levy 
(SDL) 
Charged at 6% on emoluments paid to 
employee by employer. 
 Charged at 6% on emoluments paid to employee 
by employer. 
 Charged at 6% on emoluments paid to employee by 
employer. 
Value Added Tax (VAT) Granting of VAT relief to both imports and 
domestic consumers took place. 
 Granting of VAT relief to both imports and 
domestic consumers took place. 
 VAT on domestic sales is 18% and exports are 0% 
rated. VAT paid on exploration and mining 
equipment is reclaimable. 
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Fuel levy  
Charged at TZS200 per litre and fuel 
consumers were capable of claiming back 
the money. 
  
Fuel Taxes (Fuel levy and Excise Duty on fuel) 
are charged at US$200,000 per annum. 
  
Fuel Taxes (Fuel levy and Excise Duty on fuel) are 
charged at US$200,000 per annum. 
Excise duty Charged at TZS314 per litre and fuel 
consumers were capable of claiming back 
the money. 
   
Import duty 0% charged on Cost, Insurance and Freight 
(CIF) of the imported capital goods and 
supplies and consumables directly related 
to exploration and mining operations in the 
first year and 5 % thereafter. 
 0% charged on Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) 
of the imported capital goods and supplies and 
consumables directly related to exploration and 
mining operations in the first year and 5 % 
thereafter. 
  0% charged on CIF of the imported raw materials, 
intermediate goods and finished goods within East 
African Community countries.  
 On importation made outside EAC: 0% charged 
on CIF of the imported raw materials 10% for 
intermediate goods and 25% of finished goods. 
Contribution to the National 
Social Security Fund (NSSF) 
or Parastatal Pension Fund 
(PPF) 
NSSF contribution were of a twofold 
scenario; one is 10% of employers’ salary 
is to be paid by the employer and second is 
10% of employee’s salary from the 
employee himself/herself. 
On PPF, employer contributes 15% while 
employer pays 5%. All contribution are 
monthly basis. 
 NSSF contribution are a twofold scenario; one is 
10% of employer’s salary is to be paid by the 
employer and second is 10% of employee’s 
salary from the employee himself/herself. 
On PPF, employer contributes 15% while 
employer pays 5%. All contribution are monthly 
basis. 
 NSSF contribution are a twofold scenario; one is 
10% of employer’s salary is to be paid by the 
employer and second is 10% of employee’s salary 
from the employee himself/herself. 
On PPF, employer contributes 15% while employer 
pays 5%. All contribution are monthly basis. 
Ring fencing    
Ring fencing was by company 
  
Ring fencing was by company 
  
Ring fencing is by Mine 
Local government service 
Levy 
 
Charged US$200,000.00 annually 
  
Charged annually at the rate of 0.3% of total 
turnover of the mining company. 
  
Charged annually at the rate of 0.3% of total 
turnover of the mining company. 
Capital allowances for 
taxable income 
Mine development capital expenditures 
were immediately expensed at 100% 
followed with a 15% additional capital 
allowance to recoup capital from 
unredeemable qualifying capital 
(unrecoverable development capital 
expenditures).  
 Continued being applied to Mining companies 
with MDAs signed with TZGT before 1 July 2001. 
 Continued being applied to mining companies with 
MDAs signed with TZGT before 1 July 2001. 
Indefinitely carrying out of 
losses 
 
Losses were carried out indefinitely until 
recovered against income. 
  
Losses were carried out indefinitely until 
recovered against income. 
  
Losses are carried out indefinitely until recovered 
against income. 
Depreciation allowance for 
taxable income and profits 
 
 
Reduced at a rate of 100% on capital 
expenditures of exploration and mining 
equipment held by Mining companies 
having MDAs. 
 Reduced at a rate of 100% on capital 
expenditures of exploration and mining 
equipment held by mining companies with MDAs. 
 Reduced at a rate of 100% on capital expenditures 
of exploration and mining equipment held by Mining 
companies having MDAs. 
Sources: Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2015); Muganyizi (2012) 
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8.7 Life phases reflection of PLs under NDC from 2011 to 2015 
Some PLs of the same 
group 
A demo PL in 
the group 
Conformity to  Mining Regulations, 1999 Conformity to  Mining Regulations, 2010 
From To Year(s) Life phase under Mining Regulations, 1999 
(3:2:2) 
Life phase reflection in Mining Regulations, 2010 
(4:3:2) 
PL 4679/2007 PL 4679/2007 18.09.2007 17.09.2008 1 An IPP  of 3 years was valid and didn’t cross 
over a year 2011 
The IPP of 3 years under Mining Regulations 1999 expired 
on 31st October 2010 before commencement of Mining 
Regulations, 2010 on1st November 2010. So could not be 
reflected into Mining Regulations, 2010 
18.09.2008 17.09.2009 2 
18.09.2009 17.09.2010 3 
18.09.2010 17.09.2011 4 A FRP  of 2 years was valid and crossed over 
a year 2011 
The FRP of 2 years under Mining Regulations, 1999 was 
assumed to be equal to the IPP of 4 years under Mining 
Regulations, 2010 
18.09.2011 17.09.2012 5 
18.09.2012 17.09.2013 6 Mining Regulations, 1999were inapplicable A FRP of 3 years was valid under Mining Regulations, 2010 
 18.09.2013 17.09.2014 7 
18.09.2014 17.09.2015 8 
18.09.2015 17.09.2016 9 Mining Regulations, 1999were inapplicable A SRP of 2 years was valid under Mining Regulations, 2010 
18.09.2016 17.09.2017 10 
PL 5325/2008 and 
PL 5030/2008 
PL 5325/2008 25.07.2008 24.07.2009 1 An IPP  of 3 years was valid and crossed over 
a year 2011 
The IPP of 3 years under Mining Regulations, 1999was 
assumed to be equal to the IPP of 4years under Mining 
Regulations, 2010 
25.07.2009 24.07.2010 2 
25.07.2010 24.07.2011 3 
25.07.2011 24.07.2012 4 Mining Regulations, 1999 were inapplicable A FRP of 3 years was valid under Mining Regulations, 2010 
 25.07.2012 24.07.2013 5 
25.07.2013 24.07.2014 6 
25.07.2014 24.07.2015 7 Mining Regulations, 1999 were inapplicable  A SRP of 2 years was valid under Mining Regulations, 2010 
25.07.2015 24.07.2016 8 
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PL 6245/2009, PL 
6246/2009, PL 5756/2009, 
PL 5903/2009 and  
PL 6285/2009 
PL 6246/2009 31.12.2009 30.12.2010 1 Mining Regulations, 1999 were inapplicable  The IPP of 3 years under Mining Regulations, 1999was 
assumed to be equal to the IPP of 4years under Mining 
Regulations, 2010  
31.12.2010 30.12.2011 2 
31.12.2011 30.12.2012 3 
31.12.2012 30.12.2013 4 Mining Regulations, 1999 were inapplicable    A FRP of 3 years applicable under Mining Act, 2010 
31.12.2013 30.12.2014 5 
31.12.2014 30.12.2015 6 
31.12.2015 30.12.2016 7 Mining Regulations, 1999 were inapplicable  A SRP of 2 years was valid under Mining Regulations, 2010 
31.12.2016 30.12.2017 8 
PL 6708/2010, PL 
6710/2010, PL 6711/2010, 
PL 6643/2010  
and 
 PL 6712/2010 
PL 6708/2010 13.10.2010 12.10.2011 1 An IPP  of 3 years was valid and crossed over 
a year 2011 
The IPP of 3 years under Mining Regulations, 1999was 
assumed to be equal to the IPP of 4years under Mining 
Regulations, 2010  
13.10.2011 12.10.2012 2 
13.10.2012 12.10.2013 3 
13.10.2013 12.10.2014 4 Mining Regulations, 1999were inapplicable   A FRP of 3 years is valid under Mining Regulations, 2010 
13.10.2014 12.10.2015 5 
13.10.2015 12.10.2016 6 
PL 6917/2011, PL 
6923/2011, PL 6959/2011, 
PL 7413/2011 and  
PL 7461/2011 
PL 6959/2011 28.02.2011 27.02.2012 1 Mining Regulations, 1999were inapplicable   An IPP of 4 years was valid under Mining Regulations, 
2010 
28.02.2012 27.02.2013 2 
28.02.2013 27.02.2014 3 
28.02.2014 27.02.2015 4 
28.02.2015 27.02.2016 5 Mining Regulations, 1999were inapplicable    A FRP of 3 years is valid under Mining Regulations, 2010 
28.02.2016 27.02.2017 6 
28.02.2017 27.02.2018 7 
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PL 8797/2013 and  
PL 9056/2013 
PL 8797/2013 28.01.2013 27.01.2014 1 Mining Regulations, 1999were inapplicable   An IPP of 4 years is valid under Regulations, 2010  
28.01.2014 27.01.2015 2 
28.01.2015 27.01.2016 3 
28.01.2016 27.01.2017 4 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals (nd., 1998, 1999, 2010a and 2010b) 
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8.8 Payable annual levies for 13 gold PLs by BKGCL from 2011 to 2015 
 
Licence No. and 
mineral sought 
Initial Prospecting Period (IPP) First Renewal Period (FRP) Total Payable 
annual levies in 
IPP and FRP (US$) 
Period and No. 
of years 
Rate per km2 per year 
(US$) 
Payable levies in 
IPP                                                   
(US$) 
Period and 
No. of years
and reduced 
size of PL 
Rate 
per km2 
per 
year 
(US$) 
Payable 
annual 
levies in 
FRP 
(US$) 
PL 6427/2010  2011-2013 (2)  
 
40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 294.00 2013-2015 (2) 150 315.00 609.00 
PL 6428/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 418.60 2013-2015 (2) 150 448.50 867.10 
PL 6429/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 2,798.60 2013-2015 (2) 150 2,998.50 5,797.10 
PL 6430/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 1,246.00 2013-2015 (2) 150 1,335.00 2,581.00 
PL 6431/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 373.80 2013-2015 (2) 150 400.50 774.30 
PL 6432/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 275.80 2013-2015 (2) 150 295.50 571.30 
PL 6544/2010 2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 361.20 2013-2015 (2) 150 387.00 748.20 
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PL 6545/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 739.20 2013-2015 (2) 150 792.00 1,531.20 
PL 6546/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 2,437.40 2013-2015 (2) 150 2,611.50 5,048.90 
PL 6547/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 740.60 2013-2015 (2) 150 793.50 1,534.10 
PL 6548/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 264.60 2013-2015 (2) 150 283.50 548.10 
PL 6549/2010 
 
2011-2013 (2) 40 for 2011-2012 and 100 for 2012-2013 372.40 2013-2015 (2) 150 399.00 771.40 
PL 9968/2014 
 
2014-2015(1) 100 560.00 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
560.00 
 
 
Total 10,882.20 
  
11,059.50 21,941.70 
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8.9 Exploration expenditures in 19 PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 
Initial Prospecting Period (IPP) in which minimum allowable exploration expenditure 
rate per km2 per year is US$500  
First Renewal Period (FRP) in which minimum 
allowable exploration expenditure rate per km2 per 
year is US$2000 
 
Total 
minimum 
allowable 
expenditure 
in IPP and 
FRP (US$) 
Licence No., Initial size (km2) of PL and 
mineral sought 
Period & No. of 
years 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures  in 
IPP (US$)                       
Reduced 
size (km2) 
of PL  
Period and No. of 
years 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures  in 
FRP (US$)                                
PL 6477/2010 (Gold), size 7.98 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 7980 3.99 2013-2015 (2 years) 15960 23940 
PL 6537/2010 (Gold), size 7.61 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 7610 3.805 2013-2015 (2 years) 15220 22830 
PL 6755/2010 (Gold), size 24 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 24000 12 2013-2015 (2 years) 48000 72000 
PL 7132/2011 (Gold), size 9.98 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 19960 - - - 19960 
PL 8356/2012 (Gold), size 8.53 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 12795 - - - 12795 
PL 8794/2013 (Gold), size 8.1 km2 2013-2015 (2 years) 8100 - - - 8100 
PL 9243/2013 (Gold), size 7.1 km2 2013-2015 (2 years) 7100 - - - 7100 
PL 9548/2014 (Gold), size 3.77 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 1885 - - - 1885 
PL 9549/2014 (Gold), size 10.94 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 5470 - - - 5470 
PL 9550/2014 (Gold), size 7.01 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 3505 - - - 3505 
PL 9578/2014 (Gold), size 16.2 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 8100 - - - 8100 
PL 9594/2014 (Phosphates), size 1.61 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 805 - - - 805 
PL 9595/2014 (Phosphates), size 6.14 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 3070 - - - 3070 
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PL 9856/2014 (REE), size 15.86 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 7930 - - - 7930 
PL 9857/2014 (REE), size 10.69 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 5345 - - - 5345 
PL 9858/2014 (Gypsum), size 3.96 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 1980 - - - 1980 
PL 9859/2014 (Kaolin), size 2.7 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 1350 - - - 1350 
PL 9860/2014 (Feldspar), size 18.05 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 9025 - - - 9025 
PL 9963/2014 (Coal), size 33.38 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 16690 - - - 16690 
Total 152700   79180 231880 
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8.10 Payable annual levies for 19 PLs by STAMICO from 2011 to 2015 
 
 
Licence No. and mineral sought 
 
 
Initial Period (IPP) First renewal period (FRP) Total 
Payable  
annual 
levies in IPP 
and FRP 
(US$) 
Period and No. of 
years 
Rate per km2 per year 
(US$) 
Payable 
annual  
levies in  
IPP 
(US$)  
Period and No. of years and 
reduced size of PL 
Rate per 
km2 per 
year 
(US$) 
Payable  
annual 
levies in 
FRP (US$) 
PL 6477/2010 (Gold), 7.98 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 40 /1 year & 100/1 year 1,117.20 2013-2015 (2 years), 3.99 km2 150 1,197.00 2,314.20 
 
PL 6537/2010 (Gold), 7.61 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 40 /1 year & 100/1 year 1,065.40 2013-2015 (2 years), 3.805 km2 150 1,141.50 2,206.90 
PL 6755/2010 (Gold), 24 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 40 /1 year & 100/1 year 3,360.00 2013-2015 (2 years), 12 km2 150 3,600.00 6,960.00 
PL 7132/201 (Gold), 9.98 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 40 /1 year & 100/3 years 3,393.20 - - - 3,393.20 
PL 8356/2012 (Gold), 8.53 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 100 2,559.00  - - 2,559.00 
PL 8794/2013 (Gold, 8.1 km2 2013-2015 (2 years) 100 1,620.00 - - - 1,620.00 
PL 9243/2013 (Gold), 7.1 km2 2013-2015 (2 years) 100 1,420.00 - - - 1,420.00 
PL 9548/2014 (Gold), 3.77 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 377.00 - - - 377.00 
PL 9549/2014 (Gold), 10.94 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,094.00 - - - 1,094.00 
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PL 9550/2014 (Gold), 7.01 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 701.00 - - - 701.00 
PL 9578/2014 (Gold), 16.2 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,620.00 - - - 1,620.00 
PL 9594/2014 (Phosphates), 1.61 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 161.00 - - - 161.00 
PL 9595/2014 (Phosphates), 6.14 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 614.00 - - - 614.00 
PL 9856/2014 (REE), 15.86 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,586.00  - - 1,586.00 
PL 9857/2014 (REE), 10.69 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,069.00  - - 1,069.00 
PL 9858/2014 (Gypsum), 3.96 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 396.00 - - - 396.00 
PL 9859/2014 (Kaolin), 2.7 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 270.00 - - - 270.00 
PL 9860/2014 (Feldspar), 8.05 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,805.00 - - - 1,805.00 
PL 9963/2014 (Coal), 33.38 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 3,338.00 - - - 3,338.00 
Total 27,565.80   5,938.50 33,504.30 
 
NB: (i) 40 /1 year & 100/1 year means that US$40 is applied in 1km2 of PL per year in the first year and US$100 in 1km2 of PL per year in the 2nd year. 
  (ii) 40 /1 year & 100/3 years means that US$40 is applied in 1km2 of PL per year in the first year and US$100 in 1km2 of PL per year in the next 3 years. 
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8.11 Mineral rights partially and wholly owned by STAMICO  
Nature of 
mineral 
rights 
ownership 
from 1996 
to 2015 
Type of 
mineral 
rights 
Description of mineral rights  
 
No. of 
mineral 
rights 
Mineral 
sought 
% of 
ownershi
p of  
STAMICO 
in mineral 
rights 
% of ownership  
of private or 
other TZGT 
partner in 
mineral rights 
Sole commercial entity, partnership or 
company holding mineral rights (100%) 
Partial 
ownership  
PLs 
Gold PLs partially owned by 
STAMICO and TANZAM 2000 
13 Gold 
45 
55 BKGCL (Private JV company) 
MLs Tanzanite MLs partially owned by 
STAMICO and TOML 
1 
Tanzanite 
50 
50 Partnership of STAMICO (50%) and 
TOML (50%) 
Gold MLs partially owned by 
STAMICO and TANZAM 2000  
1 
Gold 
15 
85 Partnership of STAMICO (15%) and 
TANZAM 2000 (85%) 
SMLs Gold SMLs partially owned by 
Stamigold and TR 
1 
Gold  
99 
1 Partnership of Stamigold (99%) and TR 
(1%) 
Gold SMLs partially owned by 
STAMICO and TANZAM 2000  
1 
Gold 
45 
55 BKGCL (Private JV company) 
  
Subtotal 
17     
Wholly 
ownership  
PLs Gold PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 11 
Gold 
100 
- 
STAMICO (Sole commercial entity) 
Phosphate PLs wholly owned by 
STAMICO 
2 Phosphat
e 
100 
- STAMICO (Sole commercial entity) 
REE PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 
2 REE 100 
- STAMICO (Sole commercial entity) 
Gypsum PLs wholly owned by 
STAMICO 
1 Gypsum 100 
- STAMICO (Sole commercial entity) 
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Kaolin PLs wholly owned by 
STAMICO 
1 Kaolin 100 
- STAMICO (Sole commercial entity) 
Feldspar PLs wholly owned by 
STAMICO  
1 Feldspar 100 
- STAMICO (Sole commercial entity) 
Coal PLs wholly owned by STAMICO 1 
Coal 
100 - STAMICO (Sole commercial entity) 
SMLs 
Coal SMLs wholly owned by 
STAMICO 
1 
Coal 
100 - KCPL (A subsidiary sole commercial 
entity of STAMICO) 
Subtotal  
20     
Total 
37     
 149 
 
8.12 Exploration expenditures in 37 PLs partially owned by NDC 
Initial Prospecting Period (IPP)  in which minimum allowable 
exploration expenditure rate per km2 per year is US$500  
First Renewal Period (FRP) in which minimum 
allowable exploration expenditure rate per km2 
per year is US$2000 
 
 
 
 
Second Renewal Period (SRP) in 
which minimum allowable 
exploration expenditure rate per 
km2 per year is US$6000  
 
Total 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures  
in IPP, FRP 
and SRP                                 
(US$) 
Licence No., Initial size (km2) of PL 
and mineral sought 
Period & No. of 
years 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditu
res in IPP                                  
(US$) 
Reduced 
size (km2) 
of PL  
Period and No. of 
years 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditure
s in FRP                                  
(US$) 
Reduce
d size 
(km2) of 
PL 
Period 
and No. 
of years 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditure
s in SRP                                  
(US$) 
PL 5030/2008 size 16.69 km2 - - 8.345 2011-2015 (3 years) 50070 4.1725 2014-2015 
(1 year) 
25035 75105 
PL 5756/2009 (Coal), size 14.77 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 7385 7.385 2012-2015 (3 years) 44310 - - - 51695 
PL 5903/2009\ (Coal), size 14.72 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 7360 7.36 2012-2015 (3 years) 44160 - - - 51520 
PL 6285/2009 (Coal), size 4.71 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 2355 2.356 2012-2015 (3 years) 14130  
  
16485 
PL 7391/2011 (Coal) , size 19.8 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 39600 - - - - - - 39600 
PL 7392/2011 (Coal), size 20 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 40000 - - - - - - 40000 
PL 7620/2012 (Coal), size 17.39 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 26085 - - - - - - 26085 
PL 8999/2013 (Coal), size 58.47 km2 2012-2015 (2 years) 58470 - - - - - - 58470 
PL 9807/2014 (Coal), size 6.93 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 3465 - - - - - - 3465 
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PL 10417/2014 (Coal), size 15.44 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 7720 - - - - - - 7720 
PL 6005/2009 (Iron), size 11.22 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 5610 5.61 2012-2015 (3 years) 33660 - - - 39270 
PL 6006/2009 (Iron), size 15.73 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 7865 7.865 2012-2015 (3 years) 47190 - - - 55055 
PL 6007/2009 (Iron), size 3.32 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 1660 1.66 2012-2015 (3 years) 9960 - - - 11620 
PL 6008/2009 (Iron), size 12.28 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 6140 6.14 2012-2015 (3 years) 36840 - - - 42980 
PL 6009/2009 (Iron), size 3.6 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 1800 1.8 2012-2015 (3 years) 10800 - - - 12600 
PL 6010/2009 (Coal), size 12.52 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 6260 6.26 2012-2015 (3 years) 37560 - - - 43820 
PL 6643/2010 (Iron), size 9.9 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 9900 4.95 2012-2015 (3 years) 19800 - - - 29700 
PL 6712/2010 (Coal), size 18.77 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 18770 9.385 2012-2015 (3 years) 37540 - - - 56310 
PL 7413/2011 (Iron), size 4.4 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 8800 - - - - - - 8800 
PL 7461/2011 (iron), size 4.95 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 9900 - - - - - - 9900 
PL 6986/2012 (Coal), size 6.48 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 9720 - - - - - - 9720 
PL 7714/2012 (Dolomite), size 1.83 
km2 
2012-2015 (3 years) 2745 - - - - - - 2745 
PL 7716/2012 (Coal), size 12.96 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 19440 - - - - - - 19440 
PL 7717/2012 (Dolomite), size 1.66 
km2 
2012-2015 (3 years) 2490 - - - - - - 2490 
PL 7718/2012 (Dolomite), size 1.8 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 2700 - - - - - - 2700 
PL 8128/2012 (Dolomite), size 3.65 
km2 
2012-2015 (3 years) 5475 - - - - - - 5475 
PL 9056/2013 (Dolomite), size 2.2 km2 2013-2015 (2 years) 2200 - - - - - - 2200 
PL 9533/2014 (Coal), size 12.62 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 6310 - - - - - - 6310 
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PL 9766/2014 (Dolomite), size 1.66 
km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 830 - - - - - - 830 
PL 9767/2014 (Dolomite), size 1.8 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 900 - - - - - - 900 
PL 9881/2014 (Coal), size 6.48 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 3240 - - - - - - 3240 
PL 10110/2014 (Coal), size 18.77 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 9385 - - - - - - 9385 
PL 10259/2014 (Iron), size 5.59 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 2795 - - - - - - 2795 
PL 10260/2014 (Iron), size 8.09 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 4045 - - - - - - 4045 
PL 10261/2014 (Iron), size 6.14 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 3070 - - - - - - 3070 
PL 10263/2014 (Coal), size 12.62 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 6310 - - - - - - 6310 
PL 10418/2014 (Iron), size 4.95 km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 2475 - - 
 
- -  
 
2475 
Total 353275   386020   25035 764330 
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8.13 Payable annual levies for 37 PLs by TEL and TCIMR 
 
Licence No., size and mineral 
sought 
Initial Prospecting Period (IPP) 
 
First Renewal Period (FRP) 
 
Second Renewal Period (SRP) 
 
Total Payable  
annual levies in 
IPP, FRP  
and SRP 
(US$) 
Period and No. of 
years 
Rate per km2 per 
year (US$) 
 
 
Payable 
annual 
levies in 
IPP 
(US$) 
Period, No. of years and 
reduced size of PL 
Rate 
per km2 
per 
year 
(US$) 
 
Payable  
annual 
levies  
n FRP 
(US$)  
Period, No. of 
years and 
reduced size 
of PL 
Rate per km2 
per year 
(US$) 
 
Payable  
annual 
levies in 
SRP 
(US$)  
PL 5030/2008 (Coal), size 16.69 km2 - -  2011-2015 
(3 years), size 8.345 km2 
150 2,920.75 2014-2015 
(1 year), size 
4.1725 km2 
200 834.50 3,755.25 
PL 5756/2009 (Coal), size 14.77 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 40 590.80 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 7.385 km2 
150 3,323.25 - - - 3,914.05 
PL 5903/2009 (Coal), size 14.72 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 40 588.80 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 7.36 km2 
150 3,312.00 - - - 3,900.80 
PL 6285/2009 (Coal), size 4.71 km2 2011-201 (I year) 40 188.40 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 2.355 km2 
150 1,059.75 - - - 1,248.15 
PL 7391/2011 (Coal) , size 19.8 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 40 for 
2011-2012 & 100 for 
2012-2015 
6,732.00 - - - - - - 6,732.00 
PL 7392/2011 (Coal), size 20 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 40 for 
2011-2012 & 100 for 
2012-2015 
6,800.00 - - - - - - 6,800.00 
PL 7620/2012 (Coal), size 17.39 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 100 5,217.00 - - - - - - 5,217.00 
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PL 8999/2013 (Coal), size 58.47 km2 2012-2015 (2 years) 100 11,694.00 - - - - - - 11,694.00 
PL 9807/2014 (Coal), size 6.93 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 693.00 - - - - - - 693.00 
PL 10417/2014 (Coal), size 15.44 
km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,544.00 - - - - - - 1,544.00 
PL 6005/2009 (Iron), size 11.22 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 40 448.80 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 5.61 km2 
150 2,524.50 - - - 2,973.30 
PL 6006/2009 (Iron), size 15.73 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 40 629,20 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 7.865 km2 
150 3,539.25 - - - 4,168.45 
PL 6007/2009 (Iron), size 3.32 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 40 132.80 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 1.66 km2 
150 747.00 - - - 879.80 
PL 6008/2009 (Iron), size 12.28 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 40 491.20 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 6.14 km2 
150 2,763.00 - - - 3,254.20 
PL 6009/2009 (Iron), size 3.6 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 40 144.00 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 1.8 km2 
150 810.00 - - - 954.00 
PL 6010/2009 (Coal), size 12.52 km2 2011-2012 (I year) 40 500.80 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 6.26 km2 
150 2,817.00 - - - 3,317.80 
PL 6643/2010 (Iron), size 9.9 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 40 for 
2011-2012 & 100 for 
2012-2013 
1,386.00 2013-2015 
(2 years), size 4.95 km2 
150 1,485.00 - - - 2,871.00 
PL 6712/2010 (Coal), size 18.77 km2 2011-2013 (2 years) 40 for 
2011-2012 & 100 for 
2012-2013 
2,627.80 2013-2015 
(2 years), size 9.385 km2 
150 2,815.50 - - - 5,443.30 
PL 7413/2011 (Iron), size 4.4 km2 2011-2015 (4 years) 40 for 1,496.00 - - - - - - 1,496.00 
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2011-2012 & 100 for 
2012-2015 
PL 7461/2011 (iron), size 4.95 km2 
2011-2015 (4 years) 40 for 
2011-2012 & 100 for 
2012-2015 
1,683.00 - - - - - - 1,683.00 
PL 6986/2012 (Coal), size 6.48 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 100 1,944.00 - - - - - - 1,944.00 
PL 7714/2012 (Dolomite), size 1.83 
km2 
2012-2015 (3 years) 100 549.00 - - - - - - 549.00 
PL 7716/2012 (Coal), size 12.96 km2 2012-2015 (3 years) 100 3,888.00 - - - - - - 3,888.00 
PL 7717/2012 (Dolomite), size 1.66 
km2 
2012-2015 (3 years) 100 498,00 - - - - - - 498.00 
PL 7718/2012 (Dolomite), size 1.8 
km2 
2012-2015 (3 years) 100 540.00 - - - - - - 540.00 
PL 8128/2012 (Dolomite), size 3.65 
km2 
 
2012-2015 (3 years) 100 1,095.00 - - - - - - 1,095.00 
PL 9056/2013 (Dolomite), size 2.2 
km2 
2013-2015 (2 years) 100 440.00 - - - - - - 440.00 
PL 9533/2014 (Coal), size 12.62 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,262.00 - - - - - - 1,262.00 
PL 9766/2014 (Dolomite), size 1.66 
km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 166,00 - - - - - - 166.00 
PL 9767/2014 (Dolomite), size 1.8 
km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 180.00 - - - - - - 180.00 
PL 9881/2014 (Coal), size 6.48 km2 2014-2015 (1 year) 100 648.00 - - - - - - 648.00 
PL 10110/2014 (Coal), size 18.77 
km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,877.00 - - - - - - 1,877.00 
PL 10259/2014 (Iron), size 5.59 km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 559.00 - - - - - -  
559.00 
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PL 10260/2014 (Iron), size 8.09 km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 809.00 - - - - - -  
809.00 
PL 10261/201  (Iron), size 6.14 km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 614.00 - - - - - -  
614.00 
PL 10263/2014 (Coal), size 12.62 
km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 1,262.00 - - - - - - 1,262.00 
PL 10418/2014 (Iron), size 4.95 km2 
2014-2015 (1 year) 100 495.00 - - - - - -  
495.00 
 
Total 60,413.60  28,117.00  
 
834.50 89,365.10 
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8.14 Exploration expenditures in 20 PLs wholly owned by NDC  
Initial Prospecting Period (IPP) 
in which minimum allowable exploration expenditure rate per km2 per year 
is US$500 
First Renewal Period (FRP) in which minimum 
allowable exploration expenditure rate per km2 
per year is US$2000 
 
Second Renewal Period (SRP) in which 
minimum allowable exploration 
expenditure rate per km2 per year 
is US$6000 
Total 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures 
in IPP, FRP 
and SRP                                 
(US$) 
Licence No., Initial size (km2) of PL and 
mineral sought 
Period & No. of 
years 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures 
in  IPP                               
(US$) 
Total 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures 
in IPP, FRP 
and SRP                                 
(US$) 
Period  
and  
No. of years 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures in 
FRP                                  
(US$) 
Reduced 
size (km2) 
of PL 
Period and 
No. of years 
Minimum 
allowable 
expenditures 
in SRP                                  
(US$) 
PL 4679/2007 (Coal), size 8.42 km2 2011-2012 (1) 4210 4.21 
2012-2015 
(3) 
25260 2.105 
- - 29470 
 
PL 5325/2008 (Coal), size 18.94 km2 
 
- 
 
- 9.47 
2011-2015 
(3) 
56820 
 
 
4.735 
2014-201 (1) 28410 85230 
PL 6245/2009 
(Soda Ash), size 41.03 km2 
2011-2012 (1) 20515 20.515 
2012-2015 
(3) 
123090 
 
 
10.2575 
 
- 
 
- 
 
143605 
PL 6246/2009 (Soda Ash), size 39.33 km2 2011-2012 (1) 19665 19.665 
2012-2015 
(3) 
117990 
 
 
9.8325 
 
- 
 
- 137655 
PL 6708/2010 (Coal), size 7.16 km2 2011-2013 (2) 7160 3.58 
2013-2015 
(2) 
14320 
 
 
 
- 
- 21480 
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1.79  
PL 6710/2010 (Coal), size 14.73km2 2011-2013 (2) 14730 7.365 
2013-2015 
(2) 
29460 
3.6825  
- 
 
- 44190 
PL 6711/2010 (Coal), size 9.78 km2 2011-2013 (2) 9780 4.89 
2013-2015 
(2) 
19560 
2.445  
- 
 
- 29340 
PL 6917/2011 (Coal), size 9.47 km2 2011-2015 (4) 18940 4.735 
 
- 
 
- 
2.3675  
- 
 
- 18940 
PL 6923/2011 (Coal), size 7.36 km2 2011-2015 (4) 14720 3.68 
 
- 
 
- 
1.84  
- 
 
- 14720 
PL 6959/2011 (Coal), size 11.87km2 2011-2015 (4) 23740 5.935 
 
- 
 
- 
2.9675  
- 
 
- 23740 
PL 7713/2012 (Gold) size 10.91 km2 2012-2015 (3) 16365 5.455 
 
- 
 
- 
2.7275  
- 
 
- 16365 
PL 7715/2012 (Coal), size 15.53 km2 2012-2015 (3) 23295 7.765 
 
- 
- 
3.8825  
- 
- 23295 
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PL 8065/2012 (AOBG), size 49.72 km2 2012-2015 (3) 74580 24.86 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
12.43 
 
- 
 
- 74580 
PL 8797/2013 (Soda Ash), size 99.21 km2 2013-2015 (2) 99210 49.605 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
24.8025 
 
- 
 
- 99210 
PL 9573/2014 (Soda Ash), size 82.08 km2 2014-2015 (1) 41040 41.04 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
20.52 
 
- 
 
- 41040 
PL 9575/2014 (Soda Ash), size 68.38 km2 2014-2015 (1) 34190 34.19 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
17.095 
 
- 
 
- 34190 
PL 9751/2014 (Coal), size 9.47 km2 2014-2015 (1) 4735 4.735 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
2.3675 
 
- 
 
- 4735 
PL 9577/2014  (Iron), size 6.18 km2 2014-2015 (1) 3090 3.09 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
1.545 
 
- 
 
- 3090 
PL 10081/2014 (Coal), size 7.36 km2 2014-2015 (1) 3680 3.68  -   - 3680 
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- 
 
 
1.84 
- 
 
PL 10193/2014 (Iron), size 2.61 km2 2014-2015 (1) 1305 1.305 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.6525 
 
- 
 
- 1305 
Total 434950  386500  28410 849860 
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8.15 Payable annual levies for 20 wholly owned PLs by NDC  
 
Licence No., size 
and mineral sought 
Initial Prospecting Period (IPP) 
 
First Renewal Period (FRP) 
 
Second Renewal Period (SRP) 
 
Total Payable  
annual levies in 
IPP, FRP and 
SRP                                                   
(US$) 
Period and 
No. of years 
Rate per 
km2 per 
year (US$) 
 
Payable  
Annual in 
IPP levies                                                   
(US$) 
Period, No. of 
years and 
reduced size of 
PL 
Rate per 
km2 per 
year 
(US$) 
 
Payable  
Annual 
levies 
 in FRP                                                   
(US$) 
Period, No. 
of years 
and 
reduced 
size of PL 
Rate per 
km2 per 
year (US$) 
 
Payable  
annual levies                                                   
in SRP  
(US$) 
PL 4679/2007 
(Coal), size 8.42 km2 
2011-2012 
(1 year) 
40  336.80 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 
4.21 km2 
150 1,894.50 
   
2,231.30 
PL 5325/2008 
(Coal), size 18.94 
km2 
   2011-2015 
(3 years), size 
9.47 km2 
50 for 
2011-2012 
and 150 
for 2012-
2014 
3,314.50 2014-2015 
(1 year), 
size 4.735 
km2 
200 947.00 4,261.50 
PL 6245/2009 
(Soda Ash), size 
41.03 km2 
2011-2012 
(1 year) 
40 1,641.20 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 
20.515 km2 
150 9,231.75  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
10,872.95 
PL 6246/2009 
(Soda Ash), size 
39.33 km2 
2011-2012 
(1 year) 
40 1,573.20 2012-2015 
(3 years), size 
19.665 km2 
150 8,849.25  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
10,422.45 
PL 6708/2010 
(Coal), size 7.16 km2 
2011-2013 
(2 years) 
40 for 2011-
2012 and 
100 for 
2012-2013 
1,002.40 2013-2015 
(2 years), size 
3.58 km2 
150 1,074.00  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
2,076.40 
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PL 6710/2010 
(Coal), size 14.73km2 
2011-2013 
(2 years) 
40 for 2011-
2012 and 
100 for 
2012-2013 
2,062.20 2013-2015 
(2 years), size 
7.365 km2 
150 2,209.50  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
4,271.70 
PL 6711/2010 
(Coal), size 9.78 km2 
2011-2013 
(2 years) 
40 for 2011-
2012 and 
100 for 
2012-2013 
1,369.20 2013-2015 
(2 years), size 
4.89 km2 
150 1,467.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
2,836.20 
PL 6917/2011 
(Coal), size 9.47 km2 
2011-2015 
(4 years) 
40 for 2011-
2012 and 
100 for 
2012-2015 
3,219.80  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
3,219.80 
PL 6923/2011 
(Coal), size 7.36 km2 
2011-2015 
(4 years) 
40 for 2011-
2012 and 
100 for 
2012-2015 
2,502.40  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
2,502.40 
PL 6959/2011 
(Coal), size 11.87km2 
2011-2015 
(4 years) 
40 for 2011-
2012 and 
100 for 
2012-2015 
4,035.80  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
4,035.80 
PL 7713/2012 
(Gold) size 10.91 
km2 
2012-2015 
(3 years) 
100 3,273.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
3,273.00 
PL 7715/2012 
2012-2015 
(3 years) 
100 4,659.00  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
4,659.00 
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(Coal), size 15.53 
km2 
      
PL 8065/2012 
(AOBG), size 49.72 
km2 
2012-2015 
(3 years) 
100 14,916.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
14,916.00 
PL 8797/2013 
(Soda Ash), size 
99.21 km2 
2013-2015 
(2 years) 
100 19,842.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
19,842.00 
PL 9573/2014 
(Soda Ash), size 
82.08 km2 
2014-2015 
(1 years) 
100 8,208.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
8,208.00 
PL 9575/2014 
(Soda Ash), size 
68.38 km2 
2014-2015 
(1 year) 
100 6,838.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
6,838.00 
PL 9751/2014 
(Coal), size 9.47 km2 
2014-2015 
(1 year) 
100 947.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
947.00 
PL 9577/2014 
(Iron), size 6.18 km2 
2014-2015 
(1 year) 
100 618.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
618.00 
PL 10081/2014 
2014-2015 
(1 year) 
100 736.00       736.00 
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(Coal), size 7.36 km2 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
PL 10193/2014 
(Iron), size 2.61 km2 
2014-2015 
(1 year) 
100 261.00  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
261.00 
Total (US$) 78,041.00   28,040.50  947.00 107,028.50 
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8.16 Mineral rights partially and wholly owned by NDC from 1996 to 2015 
Nature of 
mineral rights 
ownership 
from 1996 to 
2015 
Type 
of 
minera
l rights 
Description of mineral rights  
 
No. of 
mineral 
rights 
Mineral 
sought 
% of 
ownershi
p of  NDC 
in mineral 
rights 
% of ownership 
and name of  
private investor 
in mineral rights 
Sole commercial entity, 
partnership or company 
holding mineral rights (100%) 
% of 
ownershi
p of  
private 
investor  
Name 
Partial 
ownership 
PLs Coal PLs partially owned by NDC 
and IETL  
10 Coal 30 70 IETL TEL 
(Private JV company) 
Coal PLs partially owned by NDC 
and SHG  
10 Coal 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
(Private JV company) 
Iron PLs partially owned by NDC 
and SHG  
16 Iron 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
(Private JV company) 
Dolomite PLs partially owned by 
NDC and SHG  
7 Dolomit
e 
20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
(Private JV company) 
MLs 
 
Coal MLs partially owned by NDC 
and IETL  
1 Coal 30 70 IETL TEL 
(Private JV company) 
SMLs 
 
 
Iron SMLs partially owned by 
NDC and SHG  
1 Iron 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
(Private JV company) 
Coal SMLs partially owned by 
NDC and SHG  
1 Coal 20 80 SHG TCIMRL 
(Private JV company) 
  Subtotal     46      
Wholly 
ownership  
PLs Coal PLs wholly owned by NDC  12 Coal 100 - None  NDC (Sole commercial entity) 
Soda ash PLs wholly owned by 
NDC  
6 Soda 
ash 
100 - None  NDC (Sole commercial entity) 
AOBG PLs wholly owned by NDC  1 AOBG 100 - None  NDC (Sole commercial entity) 
Gold PLs wholly owned by NDC  1 Gold 100 - None  NDC (Sole commercial entity) 
Iron PLs wholly owned by NDC  2 Iron 100 - None  NDC (Sole commercial entity) 
Subtotal  
   22   
Total 
   68 
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8.17 Non-financial benefits of TZGT equity role in medium and large scale mining 
Scale of 
mining 
Mine Greater control of 
the mineral sector 
(for TZGT having % 
of ownership 
shares in the 
mining share) 
Employment equity Human resource development Procurement and 
enterprise 
development 
Community development 
(MCD) 
Medium MTM Fairly achieved 1,166 locals were cumulative 
employed from 2009 to 2015 than 
expatriates at 23.  
Fairly achieved despite lack of 
monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Local procurement at 
91.6% from 2012 and 
2014 at the value of 
value of US$11.6 million. 
Mine supplied water, 
constructed school classrooms 
and roads. From 2010 to 2014 at 
the cost of US$427,967 to zero 
respectively. 
KGM Fairly achieved No data displayed in public domains. No data displayed in public domains. No data displayed in 
public domains. 
None. 
NCM Fairly achieved No data displayed in public domains. Fairly achieved despite lack of 
monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
No data displayed in 
public domains. 
No data displayed in public 
domains. 
Large  BKGM Fairly achieved No data displayed in public domains Fairly achieved despite lack of 
monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
No data displayed in 
public domains. 
No data displayed in public 
domains. 
LIOM Fairly achieved LIOM together with MCM will employ 
32,000 locals. 
Fairly achieved despite lack of 
monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
No data displayed in 
public domains. 
No data displayed in public 
domains. 
MCM Fairly achieved MCM together with LIOM will employ 
32,000 locals. 
Fairly achieved despite lack of 
monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
No data displayed in 
public domains. 
No data displayed in public 
domains. 
WDM Fairly achieved 558 locals were cumulative 
employed from 2009 to 2015 than 
expatriates at 11.  
Fairly achieved despite lack of 
monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Local procurement of 
goods was at 80.5% of 
total procurement from 
2012 to 2014 at a value 
of US$98.91 million. 
Mine supplied water, 
constructed school classrooms 
and roads. From 2010 to 2014 at 
the cost of US$381,813 to 
US$125,323 respectively. 
KCM Fairly achieved No data displayed in public domains No data displayed in public domains. No data displayed in 
public domains. 
No data displayed in public 
domains. 
SBM Fairly achieved Only locals, 340 skilled and 43 non-
skilled employed at the mine from 
2014 to 2015.  
Fairly achieved despite lack of 
monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Mine spent 
US$63,076.92 in local 
procurement of 
foodstuffs from 2011 to 
2015. 
From 2011 to 2015, the mine 
spent a total of US$101,238.47 
on CSR activities including 
facilitation of desks to pupils, 
renovations of water storage 
facilities, feeder roads as well as 
classrooms. 
 
